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THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: POWER,
PURPOSE, AND POLITICS IN ORGANIZED MEDICINE
INTRODUCTION
IN its hundred-odd years of existence the American Medical Association
has attained a position of undeniable authority and influence over medical
affairs. The power of organized medicine affects not only the physician but
also everyone who requires the assistance of the healing arts. AMA successes in
raising the quality of medical education, practice, and care are beyond ques-
tion. However, in these endeavors it has acquired such power over both
public and practitioner that it can channel the development of American
medicine. Dangers inherent in such power are compounded by the layman's
ignorance of medical matters and the AMA's monopoly position as spokes-
man for the profession. Out of this situation arise questions of grave signi-
ficance. The AMA is motivated both by obligations to the public and loyalties
to its own members. The demands on it from these two points of view under-
lie all its activities and suggest the possibility of conflict. To what extent
does professional self-restraint, combined with present laws and institutions,
assure that this conflict will be resolved in favor of the public interest?
TEm AMA STRUCTURE
Membership
The American Medical Association consists of 53 state and territorial (con-
stituent) societies and 1987 county (component) societies.1 Each county
society sets its own qualifications for membership and its members automati-
cally belong to the state association.2 Aside from racial barriers in most
southern counties, 3 all "reputable and ethical" licensed M.D.'s are eligible for
1. AMA, GuiDE To SERviczs 4 (1952). Each component society serves a separate
geographical area, and there can be no more than one county society in such an area.
E.g., VA. MED. Soc BY-LAWs Art. 3, § 2 (1953). However in some rural areas a local
society may cover several counties. E.g., COLO. STATE MED. Soc. BY-LAWS c. 11, § 1
(1951-52).
2. E.g., id. c. 11, § 5. Some county societies in Kansas admit "associate members" al-
though the state society will not recognize them as members. REPLY TO QUESTIONNAIRE,
KANSAS MEDICAL SOCIETY, Question No. 10. (Hereinafter cited as QuESTIONNAIRE
No. -. A comprehensive questionnaire was sent to the 48 state medical societies
and to the Medical Society of the District of Columbia. The following twenty-four
fairly representative societies responded in varying degrees of detail to the 83 questions:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West
Virginia. The original answers from each society and a compilation of all the answers
given to each question are on file in the Yale Law Library.)
3. See note 22 infra.
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membership.4 And in most areas virtually every practicing physician belongs
to his local society.5 Until recently, all members of county and state medical
societies were also automatically members of the national association. But in
1950 payment of dues, previously assessed only by the county and state
groups, became a prerequisite to AMIA membership.0 Now some physicians
belong only to their county and state societies, and are not members of the
American Medical Association.7 On the other hand, since belonging to a
county society is a prerequisite to admission at all levels, membership in the
AMA depends upon acceptance by the local organization.
Reasons for meembership. Many factors contribute to the high percentage
of physician membership in organized medicine-a proportion unique among
voluntary professional associations.83 With membership in the society, the
doctor receives ready access to the social and professional contacts indis-
pensable to the growth of his practice-contacts which may lead to patient
referrals and consultations.9 Additionally, there is the all-important factor of
association with men engaged in his own science, with opportunities for ex-
change of knowledge and acquisition of professional status. The medical
societies disseminate the latest scientific information through professional
journals which are available to members either at no cost or at reduced rates,
and through lectures, exhibits, and medical libraries which the societies sup-
port. In addition to these professional services, the local and state societies
aid members by providing group malpractice insurance,10 and by offering
legal advice.11 Many of the larger societies maintain bill collection agencies.'-
4. Many county societies impose additional requirements upon applicants for member-
ship: e.g., they must be graduates of an AMA approved medical school, United States
citizens, present medical practitioners within the county, and practitioners of non-sectarian
medicine. QuEsTIONNAIm No. 9.
5. QuEsTIoNNAiE No. 5. Half of the societies report over 90S membership among
eligible, active physicians in their states. Only two states-Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton-report two-thirds membership or less.
6. See text at note 656 infra.
7. The AMA claims a membership of over 140,000. IT's Youa AMA [1] (1953).
Although in one society-New Hampshire-less than E0,% of the state society members
pay dues to the AMA, more typically 95% to 99% are AMA members. Qvrsnon:;-,%rx
No. . And in Illinois, the Society's constitution and by-laws require all members to pay
AMA dues. ILLuIzOs QUEsTIONNAImE No. S.
S. How the Doctors Solved the Coordination Problem, 21 A.B.A.J. 221, 233 (1935).
9. See Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39
Wash.2d 586, 626, 237 P2d 737, 759 (1951); G.-,rcFxu, Tnn PvarLc.um LiFE or cnu
Azmmc.xAN MiEDIc.cL AssociATioz 103 (1941) (hereinafter cited as G.,trx:a=).
10. A 1950 survey showed 35% of the county societies maintaining grcqup malpractice
insurance for their members. AMA, AcriviTiEs OF Couv, .MEDICAL SOMciIES 6, 7
(1951). Three state societies reporting now offer this insurance to their members and tuo
others formerly did so. QUEsTIO N NAx No. 55.
11. See, e.g., You AND THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF NEW Yonn 14 (1952)
(legal defense provided for members involved in malpractice suits).
12. Seven percent of the county societies respunding to an AMA questiknnaire hbd
collection bureaus for their members. AMA, AcriviTiEs o rC.ux MEDICAL ScL.ez,;i,
6, 7 (1951).
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
There may also be direct economic benefits incident to membership. Since
the societies often contract to furnish medical care to indigents 13 and vet-
erans,14 participating physicians have a supplementary source of income from
these programs. Membership can also be a conduit to such professional ad-
vancements as hospital staff appointments, 1 teaching positions,10 and specialty
ratings.17
Beyond the advantages which accrue to the member physicians, there are
services which the society renders to the profession as a whole. The AMA
has improved curricula and facilities in American medical schools. It gives
financial support to research projects and publicizes medical discoveries
through its journals and meetings. Moreover, many doctors look to the
American Medical Association to protect their interests against encroachment.
Thus, the AMA spearheaded the drive against compulsory health insurance
and other governmental inroads into private medical practice. And the Associa-
tion has worked to rid the profession of quacks, as well as licensed physicians
thought guilty of malpractice, and to limit the activities of non-medical prac-
titioners. Since the entire profession profits by these efforts of the AMA,
physicians may feel obligated to join and give their material and moral support.18
13. In Iowa the county societies conduct indigent patient clinics and in four other
societies membership is a prerequisite to physician participation. QUESTIONNAIRE No.
54(c); IOwA STATE MEDICAL SociEry, HANDBOOK FOR THE HouSr OF DnEATES 20-44
(1950) (county societies reporting upon relief contracts held with local Boards of Super-
visors). See, generally, iSTElR, MEDICAL SERVICES BY GOVERNMENT 23-6 (1946).
14. IowA STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY, HANDBOOK FOR THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 55
(1950) (reporting contract with Veterans Administration to furnish medical care in
veterans hospitals); You AND THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE op NEW YoK, 53
(1952) (reporting fee schedule negotiations with the Veterans Administration for physi-
cians serving veterans).
15. See notes 93-5 infra and accompanying text. See also Group Health Cooperative
of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39 Wash.2d 586, 620, 623-5, 237 P.2d
737, 755-6, 757-8 (1951).
16. E.g., in Illinois, Kansas, and Pennsylvania. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 54(a). Hearings
before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1606, 79th Cong., 2d Sess, 2642
(1946) (non-members of the Chicago Medical 'Society ineligible for staff membership of
teaching or research institutions). But see text at note 23 in!ra.
17. "We [non-society members] cannot be accredited by various specialty boards be-
cause membership in the local medical society is a condition of eligibility. This is an
increasingly serious handicap, since many hospitals are making certification by a specialty
board an absolute condition for practicing within those hospitals." Testimony of Lawrence
Jacques, M.D., in Hearings, supra note 16, at 2642. See also Group Health Cooperative
of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39 Wash.2d 586, 626, 237 P.2d 737,
759 (1951). *
18. The AMA and the state societies solicit support by emphasizing their contribu-
tions to the profession. See, e.g., IT's YOUR AMA [1] (1953) : "We can take great pride
in our AMA. It is the largest, most influential and most active medical association in the
world. Even if you are not a member, it is your AMA to a certain extent. The Associa-
tion began helping you the day you entered medical school and continues to aid your practice
and guard your freedom. Though, for one reason or another, you do not share the responsi-
bilities of membership, you benefit daily from the Association's work." See also You AND THE
[Vol, 63: 937
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Reasons for non-mwwbership. However, a substantial number of American
doctors do not belong to the American MKedical Association or its component
units.' 9 Many of these are retired physicians who let their membership
lapse, or young practitioners who have not yet fulfilled the residence require-
ments for their local society.2  Doctors who do not conform to the code of
medical ethics are not eligible for membership.21 And many southern societies
exclude Negro physicians.2: Salaried doctors, such as those on the staffs of
MEDICAL SOCIrv OF THE STATE OF NEW YonK 4 (1952) ("The freedom with w:hich you
practice and your very livelihood would be seriously jeopardized if the physicians of Nev.
York were not organized into a state-wide association.").
19. Of the 215,000 licensed physicians in the United States, Womn kLMAxw" 779
(1954), about 140,000 are AMA members. Supra note 7. Some non-AMA members be-
long to local and state societies. Supra note 5.
20. QUFSTIOXNAiRE No. 5. Connecticut, for example, has a one-year residence re-
quirement, and reports a corresponding lag in admitting physicians new:ly arrived in the
state.
21. Eg., TEx. Maf. Ass'N CoxsRT. Art. 1, § 3 (1952).
22. The majority of county medical societies in the southern states deny membership
to Negro physicians. Of those southern societies responding to the Questionnaire, four
report no Negro members. A.ALBAmA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, VIPGINIA Q SrTIo:zAItRN o.
11. Cf. 140 JoURxAL OF THE A uERic-.na" MEDICAL ASsOcATIo. 1278 (1949) (hereinafter
cited as JAMA).
The unsegregated National Medical Association is the organization to which most
Negro physicians belong. In 1870 the A.MA House of Delegates refused to accredit the
NMA as a constituent society. COBB, THE Fmsr Nrzao MEDICAL SocinY c. 2 (1939).
In rejecting the NMA's then tiny membership the AMA established a policy, since written
into the by-laws of many state societies, of one component society only in a given geo-
graphical area. E.g., VA. MED. Soc. BY-LAws Art. 3, § 2 (1953). MembQrs of the
colored 'Medico-Chirurgical Society of the District of Columbia, for example, cannot be-
come AMA members through their present organization since, as the component scliety
for that territory, the District of Columbia Medical Society fills the field.
There have been some signs of progress in the eradication of racial barriers on the
local level. Recently, previously exclusionary local societies in the District of Columbia,Florida, and Missouri have admitted Negro members. Cannon, Why I am a 3emncr of
the Physicians Forum, Physicians Forum Bull., Sept., 1951, p. 10. See also AanA:;SAS,
FLORIDA, MlSSo0-RI QUESTIO NrAmE NO. 11 (reporting some Negro members). In 1950,
New York sent the first colored member, Dr. Peter Murray, to the AMA House of Dele-
gates. 140 JA.MA 1278 (1949). Dr. Murray has since been elected to office in the New
York County Medical Society. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1952, p. 29, col. 4 (Vice-President) ;
id., May 26, 1953, p. 31, col. 8 (President-Elect). And members of the N.MA have at-
tended AMA's county, state, and national scientific sessions, and N.M1A "observers" have
been invited to AMA conventions. See, e.g., 140 JAMA 1-8 (1949).
But the AMA as a national organization has failed to take steps toward a fundamental
change in membership policy. Its spokesmen assert thuir inability to act, pointing out
that each county society has absolute control over its own membership qualifications.
Cannon, supra, at 9; Chicago Tribune, May 19, 1939 (Editorial). Huwever, a group C.f
New York physicians obtained State Society approval of a resolution providing that "no
constituent association shall exclude from membership any physician for other than pro-
fessional or ethical reasons." The resolutions failed in the AMA Huuse of Delcgatcs.
Medicine: White or Black, 68 SCHOOL & SoCI=r" 70 (1948). Similarly the M lical
Society of North Carolina made an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the one componunt
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universities and research institutes, and civil servants often do not join medi-
cal societies ;23 here professional advancement is available through channels
other than medical society membership. In remote areas services which the
society can render may be so negligible that doctors have little incentive to
join.24 Some physicians may find the dues prohibitive; for example, in parts
of California the total of county, state, and national dues runs as high as $190
annually.25 Undoubtedly some doctors do not join because of apathy,20 while
a small minority of physicians do not choose to belong because they disapprove
of the policies of the AMA.2'
Formal structure
The formal structure of the American Medical Association provides for the
largest measure of direct democratic control in the county medical societies,
and increasingly indirect representation at the state and national levels. Mem-
bers vote directly for county officials and representatives to the state "legis-
lature," usually known as the House of Delegates.28 These delegates select
their own state officers and elect the state representatives to the national
society geographical rule when it proposed admittance of the colored Old North State
Medical Society as a constituent organization. 147 JAMA 1241 (1951); 150 JAMA
1684 (1952).
The AMA has, however, deemed it politic to court colored non-member doctors for
support in its opposition to compulsory health insurance. At the 1950 NMA convention,
an AMA representative cited Dr. Murray's election to the House of Delegates as an indi-
cation of equality in medicine. Cannon, supra at 9. The NMA, seeking the full benefit of
AMA membership for all colored physicians, treated AMA overtures with caution. It
avoided the endorsement of either the AMA's or the Truman Administration's position on
health insurance, perhaps hoping that its strength of 4000 members might be a bargain-
ing lever to gain full affiliation. Time, Aug. 22, 1949, p. 32. But with the compulsory
health insurance issue at least temporarily mooted, the southern colored physician will
have to look for a change of heart from within the AMA before he can expect full equality
with his white colleague.
23. QuEsToNNAIRE No. 5; GARcEAu 105.
24. Cf. WEST VIRGINIA QUESTIONNAiRE No. 5.
25. CALIFORNIA QUESTIONNAIRE Nos. 12, 13. Several societies mention inability to
pay dues as a cause of non-membership. QuEsTioNxAiRE No. 5. Other societies mitigate
the dues requirement in cases of financial hardships. See, e.g., CoLO. STATE MED. Soc.
BY-LAws c. 1, § 5a (1951-52) ; W. VA. STATE MED. Ass'N BY-LAws c. 1, § 5 (1952).
The range of county society dues within a state may be wide. E.g., Texas: $1 to
$100; California: $5 to $125. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 13. And state society dues vary from
$15 to $55 a year; the average is about $25. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 12.
The AMA assesses its members $25 for annual dues. AMA, GUIDE TO SERVsCES 10
(1952). However it grants exemptions for the following reasons: financial hardship,
retirement from practice or reaching the age of 70, internship or residency with five years
of graduation. Id. at 17.
26. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 5.
27. See, e.g., Dr. I. H. Means resigns from AMA to protest levy to fight Federal
insurance, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1951, p. 14, col. 4.
28. Each county society is entitled to at least one delegate although representation in
state Houses is generally proportional to membership in the local society. Apportionment
[Vol. 63:937
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House of Delegates.29 This body elects the President and other AMA officers
and the nine-man Board of Trustees.3 °
In theory, the policy-making function of the American Medical Association
is vested in the House of Delegates. However, since the House meets semi-
annually, many administrative and policy decisions are necessarily left to the
Board of Trustees.31 Although it is responsible to the House of Delegates,
the Board functions with little supervision when the House is not in session.
The members of the Board perform the typical role of corporate directors:
they approve all AIA expenditures, and generally the Chiefs of the Asso-
ciation's operating bureaus are responsible to them.32 The Trustees also ap-
point the Secretary-General Manager 33 and the Editor of the JournalS'a The
President has little formal power in formulating AMA policy, although he
enjoys tremendous prestige as chief spokesman for the organization.
The AMA functions through standing committees or councils elected by
ratios vary among the societies from one delegate for every ten members to one for
every hundred; the average representation is one delegate for every twenty-five member-.
QurEsox. AmE No. 19. Densely populated areas tend to be under-represented. E.g., in
New York, Schuyler County has one delegate for its eleven members, while New Yorh
County (Manhattan) has only 24 delegates representing its 6954 members. Kings County
(Brooklyn) also has 24 delegates for 3467 members. You AM THE .MEDncu SWmv 07
THE STATE OF NEW YoP., 32 (1952).
29. An AMA delegate's term is two years. State societies are represented by one
delegate for every thousand members or fraction thereof. A representative from the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Veterans Administration and U. S. Public Health Service, and twenty
representatives from the specialized medical fields within the AMA also serve in the
House. AIA BY-LAws c. 9, § 1(B) (1952).
30. The President, President-Elect, Vice-President, and other .ACMA officers are
elected annually. The President and President-Elect serve on the Board o Trustees. The
other Trustees are chosen for staggered five-year terms and may serve not more than
two successive terms. S'S YOUR AMA 3 (1953).
31. Ibid. The Trustees meet si:x or eight times a year.
32. AMA BY-LAws c. 13, § 4(A) (1952). The powers of the AMA Board of
Trustees are duplicated on the state level. E.g., the Texas Board of Trustees serves "as
a board of directors, within the meaning of the corporate laws of the state." Tm. Mm.
Ass'x CoxsT. Art. 4 (1952).
33. AMA BY-LAws, c. 13, § 4(D) (1952). After he is appointed General Manager
by the Trustees, he is elected Secretary by the House of Delegates. Unlike the officers and
Trustees, he is a salaried employee. IT's Your AMA 3 (1953).
34. AMA BY-LAws c. 13, § 4(C) (1952). Until recently the Editor of the Journal
was the dominant figure in the Association. Mayer, The Rise and Fall of Dr. Fishbin,
Harper's, Nov., 1949, p. 199.
35. The President's official duties consist largely of addressing the House of Dele-
gates and nominating members for various committees, subject to confirmation by the
House or Trustees. AMA BY-LAws c. 12, § 1 (1952). Prior to his term of office, the
President serves as President-Elect for one year, during which time he presides over th2
General Sessions and Council of the Scientific Assembly. AMA Co:.sr. Art. 7, § 3;
AMA BY-LAws c. 12, § 2 (1952). However, the President's Page in the Jorsnal and
his frequent appearances before Congressional Committees increase the President's import-
ance as "chief spokesman for the Association on policy matters:' IT's Yot.a AMA 3
(1953).
1954]
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the House of Delegates or appointed by the Board of Trustees."0 Each
council directs the activities of the Association in a particular field with the
assistance of a full-time staff. The 900 employees of the national organization
are supervised by the Secretary-General Manager of the Association, who has
chief responsibility for the day-to-day decisions of the organization between
meetings of the Board of Trustees.
Real power structure
While democratic procedures exist at the county level,87 many members
do not have sufficient interest in activities .to attend meetings.38 Doctors are
extremely busy with their practice and have little time to devote to the
problems of organized medicine. In New York, for example, 25% attendance
at a business meeting is considered good.3 9 Thus, the few doctors who are
interested in medical politics can easily wield power and influence out of pro-
portion to their numerical strength.
The nominating process for elections within the American Medical Asso-
ciation allows the officers in power to have the dominant influence in decid-
ing who shall succeed them in office. At the county level, the President ap-
points a nominating committee which puts up a slate of officers and delegates
for the state House of Delegates. 40 The state President functions in the same
way in the selection of national delegates. 41 These elections are rarely con-
36. For a general description of the AMA's operational structure, see IT'S YouR
AMA 1-6 (1953); AMA, GUIDE TO SmVICES 8-9 (1952).
37. See, however, AMA, PUrrING PR TO WORK 13 (1st Public Relations Institute
1952) : "You would be surprised how many county societies do not even have a semblance
of democracy in their sessions." (statement of county society official).
38. The results of an AMA survey showed that urban county societies had the lowest
average attendance at meetings. Sixty of 64 societies with more than 300 members report
attendance of under 50%, while only 48 of 581 societies having less than 100 members
were in this category. And 111 of the smaller societies report 90-100% attendance. AMA,
AcTIvITiEs OF COUNTY MEDICAL SocIETIES 3 (1951). Although the AMA regards these
results as indicative of generally good attendance at local meetings, a former AMA
President has remarked that "if 10% of the membership [in many areas] attend a meeting
it is about average and it is usually the same 10% at each meeting." BAUER, TuE IMrORTANCS
OF THE COUNTY MEDICAL SocIm IN THE STATE AND NATIONAL PROGRAMS (address be-
fore the Medical Society of the State of New York, January 27, 1947) (copy on file in
Yale Law Library).
County societies list as their best attended meetings those featuring speeches on
general medical subjects by "well known" and "respected" members of the medical
profession. Meetings on socio-economic problems are ranked as poorly attended, "despite
the increased interest in . . . [these] problems by members of the medical profession
during the past few years." AMA, AcTIvITIES OF COUNTY MEDICAL SocinrEs 4 (1951).
39. RICHARDSON, FREEDOm OF SPEECH AND ORGANIZED MEDICINE 4 (undated type-
written manuscript on file with Physicians Forum, 510 Madison Ave., New York City).
40. E.g., PENNSYLVANIA QUESTIONNAIRE No. 18. In Virginia the county President
alone chooses some of the delegates to the State House. VIRGINIA QUESTIONNAIRE No. 18.
41. E.g., KANS. MED. Soc. BY-LAws c. 6, § 1 (1952) (Nominating Committee for
the selection of state society officers composed of five former Society Presidents) ; CoLO.
[Vol. 63: 937
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tested. In at least one state, Alabama, the delegates are appointed by the
President.43 The election of the official slate is made easier by the fact that
the state and national organizations forbid electioneering and soliciting votes
for office.4 Even where the official slate offers alternative nominees, basic
differences between the candidates are unlikely.5
The nominating process, in combination with the apathy of the average
doctor,4 6 assures domination by a single faction within the AMA. 4 7  In
New York-one of the few states where an organized opposition has
developed-these challengers have had little success. 44 State societies re-
port that reelection of delegates is common 4 9 the same names appearing on
the ballot year after year. Frequently officers progress steadily from county,
to state, to national prominence as they acquire seniority10
STATE MED. Soc. BY-LAws c. 6, § 1 (1951-52) (nominations from the floor permitted ;
CONNECTICUT QUESTION.Am No. 20 (same).
All state society delegates to the AMIA House mut meet the AMA constitutional re-
quirements of two years' prior membership in the AMA and its Scientific ,ssembly.
A'MA BY-LAws c. 9, § 1 (A) (1952).
42. QUESIfIONNAlRE No. 21 (only four of 24 state societies report competition for
position of AMA delegate). Kansas requires Nominating Committees to present tv.o
nominees for each delegate position. K.is Mu. Soc. BY-LAws c. 6, § 1 (1952).
43. ALABAMA QUESTIOxNAIE No. 20.
44. E.g., KAxs. MrD. Soc BY-LAWS c. 6, § 4 (1952); AM6A House of Delegates Stand-
ing Rule, adopted June 13, 1902: "Resolved that it is the sense of the House of Delegates tf
the A'MA that the solicitation of votes for office is not in Ieeping with the dignity of
the medical profession, nor in harmony -with the spirit of this Association, and that such
solicitation shall be considered a disqualification for election to any office in the gift of the
Association." Although the Judicial Council has stated that this rule, as phrased, was unen-
forceable, FisaEEIx, A HISTORY OF THE AZMMcA,.€ MEwcI.L Assocvnxo:: 419-20 (1947)
(hereinafter cited as FIsHBEiN), it was found to be an "effective moral influence," ibid.,
and it has never been repealed. Id. at 224.
45. RICHADso., op cit. supra note 39, at 3-4.
46. The inertia of the majority of A.IA members has been attributed to the consum-
ing nature of medicine, the drive toward material success, and an aversion against "pili-
tics." GArCEAu 61-3. Consequently the membership is said to turn to the AMA, thus
saving itself from the "awkward predicament of having to think" Id. at 101.
47. RicHARDS N . op. cit. supra note 39, at 4.
4S. The Physicians Forum was organized in 1941 by members of the Medical Society
of the County of New York to defeat a proposed amendment to the state society con-
stitution. This amendment provided that members "shall not initiate or participate in any
activities outside the structure of the 'Medical Society of the State of New York, wvhich
are contrary to [its] policies. ... Chapters have been formed in other cities and the
group has promoted health insurance and other measures counter to "official AMA doc-
trine." 12 N.Y. MlrncizE, Nov. 20, 1952, p. 13 (letter from Ernst P. Boas, M.D., chairman of
Physicians Forum). Although the Forum was successful in defeating the amendment
and in electing "several liberal minded physicians" to county officerships, its influence vas
of short duration. RICHARDSON, op. cit. supra note 39, at 16.
49. Several societies report that all delegates are re-elected while others estimate
that between one-third and one-half of the delegates are rechosen. One replied that
"receptive delegates" are re-elected and another characterized the tenure of delegates
as extending "until they choose to retire." Only three indicated that few or no delegates
were "repeaters." QUESTIONNAIMR No. 23.
50. An example of "devotion to medical society office" is the career of former AMA
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One of the major obstacles to the formation of any opposition is the lack
of an effective forum for dissident opinion. The Journal of the American
Medical Association, which is the publication most widely read by members,
rarely prints opinions in disagreement with positions taken by the House of
Delegates or Board of Trustees.51 In response to criticism of this policy the
American Medical Association asserts that members can present their views
initially in their county societies; that if these views win approval, delegates
will present them to the state society, and finally the members' opinions will
be presented to the national House of Delegates for consideration. In prac-
tice, however, because of the indirect system of elections, 3 such a procedure
eliminates any dissident viewpoints above the county level unless they win
majority support. And while a member can oppose official policy in his local
society, the structure of organized medicine makes it almost impossible for
him to effectuate his opinions within this framework. 4
One study of the American Medical Association has concluded that the
physicians who rise to power within the medical societies are predominantly
urban practitioners and specialists. 5 Although there is only a slightly larger
President Rock Sleyster who served as Secretary of his county society, Secretary, Presi-
dent, Treasurer, and Editor of the Wisconsin Society, Delegate and Vice-Speaker of the
AMA House, and member and Chairman of the Board of Trustees. GARc AU 59. For
further illustrations see id. at 58-61.
The "active physician" in the New York Society proceeds from membership in a
standing committee to its chairmanship. The second vice-president, who automatically
becomes President within a few years, is chosen from such members. RIcHARDSON, op. cit.
supra note 39, at 3.
51. DAvis, AImEcA ORGANIZES MEDICINE 175-6 (1941); Medical Economics, July,
1952, p. 12. Spokesmen have emphasized their desire that organized medicine present a
united front. See, e.g., 111 JAMA 936 (1938) ("Once the House of Delegates has
spoken its actions should be supported by the united voice of American medicine.") ; 49
N.Y. STATE J. OF MED. 2527 (1949); cf. 139 JAMA 788 (1949). Perhaps the Journal's
practice is a result of this attitude. However, this policy has been widely criticized. See
1 N.Y. MEDIcINE, Aug. 20, 1945, p. 11 (editorial advising that "some further consideration
... be given to [the Journal's] policy with reference to publication of dissident opinions
and views.") ; 244 N. ENG. J. oF MED. 307 (1951) (reporting resolution of Mass. Medical
Society urging "that the Journal of the American Medical Association welcome and pro-
vide space for the presentation of considered discussion from varying points of view.
. ."). Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1952, p. 54, col. 3 (Editor of Atlantic Monthly criticizing
Journal's refusal to accept paid advertisement of article on compulsory health, insurance).
State society journals have been similarly criticized. DAvIs, op. cit. supra; GARacAu
100; 27 J. OF PEDIARIcs 196 (1945). However, there are some exceptions, The New
England Journal of Medicine maintains that its columns are open to comment critical of
the official AMA position and has published divergent viewpoints. 240 N. ENG. J. oF MED.
397 (1949).
52. 149 JAMA 1227 (1952). But see 5 N.Y. MEDICINE, March 5, 1949, p. 41 (county
society member describing his inability to have his views heard) ; note 37 supra.
53. See text at note 40 et seq. supra.
54. But cf. 149 JAMA 1227 (1952) (example of individual member's securing
passage of previously unconsidered resolution concerning physical selection of airplane
pilots without prior official support).
55. GAxcEAu 55-8.
[Vol. 63: 937
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
number of specialists in the United States than general practitioners,", usually
over 90% of the officers of the AMA are specialists.57 Specialists, whose in-
comes are above those of the average practitioner,5s are probably better able
to devote time to medical politics. Statistics also reveal that cities contribute
a larger proportion of officers than rural areasr 9 And in the AMA House
of Delegates those who have served long terms are primarily from urban
localities, while the shorter term delegates tend to be from the rural areas.P
Although these officers are not "average" American doctors, it would not
be accurate to say that their policies are unrepresentative. The support of the
membership is dearly shown in the immediate response of most members to
a voluntary assessment voted by the House of Delegates.0 ' Most members
also seem willing to distribute literature and advocate AMA policies. 6- But
perhaps the most indicative fact is that groups organized to oppose AMA
policies regarding the economic and political aspects of medical practice have
never gained widespread support among the doctors. No group of any signi-
ficance that has been formed to modify or review AMA policy has offered
itself as an alternative to the AMA. Doctors are free to join such organiza-
tions while retaining their AMA membership but few have enrolledPm Even
though the actively controlling group within the American Medical Associa-
tion is a self-perpetuating minority its viewpoint is readily accepted by the
passive majority. This acquiescence assists that governing minority in ex-
cluding dissident opinion from organized medicine.
SOURCES OF AMA POWER AND INFLUENCE
The essence of AMA strength is found in its power over the medical pro-
fession, its economic position, and the status of the doctor in society. More-
56. There were, in 1949, approximately 72,500 physicians e:xclusively in general prac-
tice, 55,000 exclusively practicing a speciality, and 23,000 general practitioners "giving at-
tention" to a specialty. 3 PRasmEzis CouTISSIoN O THS Hr-%uTH NEras OF THE IN4rON,
BUILDING Am cA's HEALTH 140 (1952-53) (hereinafter cited as MAoxuso: RP.).
57. All but one of the present members of the Board of Trustees and all AMA Prei-
dents, Vice-Presidents, and Speakers since 1947 have been specialists. Compilation on file
in Yale Law Library.
58. 4 MAGxUSON REP. 247.
59. Only seven of 31 recent and present high officers and Trustees of the AMA prac-
tice in communities of 25,000 population or less. Compilation on file in Yale Law Library.
60. GARcFru 50.
61. Only one state society indicated that less than 50%- of its membership paid the
194S assessment. And 14 societies reported that from 60% to 96, of their memer;
contributed. QUasriox.uRE No. 15. See also note 641 infra.
62. See text at notes 642-S infra.
63. Thus, the Committee of Physicians for the Improvement of Medical Care has
functioned within the AMA with about 700 members. M-a. s, Docrorts, PEorL., M:.a
GovEr.,a.ENT 147-50 (1953) ; D.Avis, Amrrmc& ORGA, Nizs MEfics- 293 (1941). The
Physicians Forum is open only to members of county societies or the National Medical
Association, 12 N.Y. M ilc= , Nov. 20, 1952, p. 12, and has never drawn much suppurt.
See note 48 supra.
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over, due to the character of its membership, organized medicine probably
has a greater potential influence than organizations of other professions. And
it has capitalized upon its latent strength by a skillful application of all the
resources at its disposal.
Power over the profession
Consent. Fundamental to medical practice is the concept of professional-
ism.614 Practitioners are bound by a common interest in increasing the effec-
tiveness and maintaining the integrity and prestige of the profession. This
derives from recognition of a duty toward the public, as well as a desire to
benefit individual members. In addition, problems and affairs of medical
practice are assumed to be beyond the comprehension of the layman.05 So,
in order to realize its objectives, the profession must govern itself through
an effective organization. The American Medical Association fulfills this
function and enjoys the consent and loyalty of an overwhelming majority
of physicians. Even potential dissenters may remain silent in the belief that
the interest of the profession is best served by presenting a united front to
the public. 6
Monopoly. This consent has enabled the AMA to attain a monopoly
position within the profession. Doctors may believe rivalry between competing
professional associations would be injurious to both public and practitioner.
Consequently, other medical groups formed to fulfill specific needs have
tended to cooperate or affiliate with the AMA. And until recently there was
almost no disagreement within the profession concerning its proper interests.0 7
So the small minority which would today challenge AMA authority is con-
fronted with an organization that has already built its position into one of
"natural" monopoly.
No independent medical association provides the doctor with an alternative
to membership in his local medical society. In the scientific realm there are
such groups as the American College of Physicians, the American College of
Surgeons, and organizations representing the recognized specialties. In the
field of medical economics and politics the Committee of Physicians for the
Improvement of Medical Care and the Physicians Forum actively oppose
AMA policies. And the National Medical Association, composed of Negro
physicians, is concerned with the problems of a minority group and seeks
constituent membership within the AMA.68 These groups, whose members
are usually AMA members as well, supplement its work or compete with it
only in a limited sphere. None possesses the membership size, power, and
influence of the AMA, nor can any challenge its claim to speak on behalf
of the profession.
64. See generally, GAXcEAu 5-12.
65. Id. at 5.
66. See note 51 infra. See also FisHBEIN 392; IT'S YOUR AMA 41 (1953); 149
JAMA 843 (1952).
67. Fishbein reports only minor disputes. FiSHEiN 144, 390, 395-6.
68. See note 22 supra. The NMA's membership is 4000. WoRD ALMANAC 495 (1954).
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Coercion. To maintain what it considers the integrity and standing of the
profession, the American Medical Association has established a code of ethics
to govern the behavior of practitioners.69 The most basic of its standards have
usually been enacted into state medical practice laws. For example the felon,
abortionist, alcoholic,70 and in some states the fee-splitter 71 is subject to sus-
pension or revocation of licensure. But the medical societies have more exact-
ing standards governing virtually every aspect of medical practice and care.
Because almost all physicians recognize the need for some such standards,
application of sanctions is rarely necessary. 72 However, this nearly unani-
mous agreement does not extend to some "ethical" interpretations which in-
hibit experimentation in solving problems of medical economics.
Because the A'MA has the consent and support of a great majority of
doctors, its standards can often be enforced against an offender without formal
action. The physician who is suspected of "unethical" practice may be sub-
jected to professional ostracism.73 This may involve denial by member phy-
sicians of patient referrals and consultations,74 and the loss of advancement
in hospital and other professional appointments.-' The mere availability of
such sanctions is usually enough to deter possible violators of AMA's code
of conduct.
If a physician does not respond to such techniques, formal sanctions may
also be invoked. County, medical societies generally have boards of censors
to hear charges against members.7" A system of appeals is provided, cul-
minating in the judicial Council of the AMA.77 However, this body is bound
69. AMA, PmxcrpiT s OF MEDIcAL ETHIcs (1952), discussed infra page 976 ei seq.
Many state societies have adopted the Principles as their own codes of conduct. E.g.,
TEx. M a. Ass'x BY-LAws c. 10, § 21 (1952); VA. MN. Soc BY-LAws Art. 11 (1952).
70. E.g., 9 IowA CODE ANN. §§ 147.55-6 (1946); CoDE OF VA. §§ 54-316-317(1) (2) (3)
(1950).
71. E.g., 9 IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.56(4) (1946); CoDE oF VA. §§ 54-873, 54-316,
54-317(6) (1950) (fee splitting a misdemeanor as well as grounds for license revocation).
72. Eleven societies report no expulsions during the last five years and in only one
society were there more than five during this same period. QLsTio.%:xAsiP No. 41.
73. "First, of course, and never out of use [as a sanction], is social pressure in a
small group. The social life of the county society is important to some doctors . . .a
doctor can ill afford the hostility of an organized group in positions of local prnominence.
S.. Ostracism becomes a terrible weapon in such a business." GARcMILu 103. A state
court has found the threat and practice of professional and social ostracism to a "hard-
ship" to doctors, but did not find social ostracism to be an "official" technique of the
society. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39
Wash2d 586, 627-9, 237 P.2d 737, 759-60 (1951).
74. GARca.u 103; Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County
Medical Society, supra note 73, at 663-4, 237 P.2d at 778.
75. Id. at 623-5, 664, 667, 669, 237 P.2d at 757-48, 778, 780, 781.
76. E.g., TEx. MED. Ass'x BY-LAws, c. 10, §§ 14, 17, 21 (1952) (each county society
to form a three-man board of censors to receive, investigate, and report on charges made
by the public or fellow-members).
77. The Council's five members are elected for five-year terms by the AMA House of
Delegates. It operates as the appellate "Supreme Court" of the Association and, where
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by findings of fact made at the local level. 7s Those found guilty of violating
the standards of the organization may be subjected to reprimand, suspension,
or expulsion.79 Such safeguards as the requirement that charges be specified
and proved and the right of appeal limit the availability of these sanctions.
The consequences of a denial of an application for membership are just
as serious as those of expulsion. But admission is entirely at the discretion
of the county society;80 there is no right to a hearing and no appeal from
the society's verdict.8 ' In one extreme case a county medical society dis-
solved itself and then reformed without an alleged offender, who was then
the AMA is a party, it has original jurisdiction over controversies arising under the
Constitution, By-Laws, or Principles of Medical Ethics. The Council settles disputes
between component societies or between members of different societies. It may also re-
quest the appointment of "investigating juries" to consider complaints of unethical con-
duct; if the jury's findings indicate "probable cause for action" the Association's President
appoints a prosecutor to present the AMA's case against the accused; after hearing both
sides the Council delivers a verdict and sentence. AMA BY-LAws c. 10, § 4(-I) (1)
(1952) ; AMA, GuIDE To SERVICES 52-3 (1952).
78. "The Council shall have appellate jurisdiction in questions of law and procedure
but not of fact in all cases which arise between . . . a member or members and the
component society to which said member or members belong." AMA BY-LAWS c. 10,
§ 4(H)(1) (1952).
The Judicial Council has recently adopted elaborate rules of procedure which provide,
inter alia, that before the Council may assume jurisdiction, the aggrieved member must
submit evidence that he has exhausted all county and state society remedies. 147 JAMA
1687 (1951).
On occasion the Judicial Council has reversed the decisions of lower medico-judicial
bodies, indicating the Association's reluctance "to back the excesses of some component
groups and [its insistence] on a properly conducted trial." GARcEAu 107. See 106 JAMA
300 (1936).
79. In some societies, members themselves vote upon the guilt of accused members,
after hearing the report of the Board of Censors. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 40. In Texas, if a
majority votes "guilty" there is another vote taken to censor, suspend, or expel the
accused. The first two sanctions require a majority vote while expulsion requires a two-
thirds. TEx. MED. Ass'N By-LA ws c. 10, § 21 (1952). However, in other societies ex-
pulsion is ordered by the Board of Censors alone. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 40.
The AMA Judicial Council has similar powers to "acquit, admonish, suspend or expel
the accused." AMA BY-LAws c. 10, § 4(H) (1) (1952).
80. State constitutions often provide: "Each component society shall judge the
qualifications of its own members, but as these societies are the only portals of entrance
to this Society and to the American Medical Association every reputable and ethical
physician having a degree of Doctor of Medicine from an accredited medical school and
licensed by the [state] shall be privileged to apply for membership." KANS. MED. SOc.
BY-LAws c. 12, § 5 (1952); see also W. VA. STATE MED. Ass'N BY-LAws c. 9, § 5
(1952).
The New York State society expressly prohibits denial of membership because of
race, color, or creed. YoU AND THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 14
(1952).
81. Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1606, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2637 (1946). The AMA also declines jurisdiction over denials of membership in
county societies. Id. at 2638.
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denied admission and had no further recourse.P The threat of denial is par-
ticularly effective in controlling the behavior of the young physician who de-
sires membership, as well as of the doctor who has transferred his residence.83
The importance and effectiveness of these formal sanctions is reflected by
their severe consequences. In addition to the imposition of the informal sanc-
tions mentioned above, the physician who is expelled or denied membership
loses the positive benefits and economic advantages conferred by organized
medicine. M1embership in organized medicine has also been adopted by some
outside groups as a criterion of professional competency.8 4 Non-membership
may raise questions regarding the character of an applicant for reciprocal
licensing privileges.85 The non-member will also find it difficult to obtain
malpractice insurance on terms comparable to those offered members, if he
can obtain it at all. In one instance doctors were forced to obtain insurance
from Lloyds of London after being refused by American companies.80
The most serious consequences of rejection or denial are those which handi-
cap the physician in the actual practice of his profession. 7 As a non-member,
82. SHAD D, A DocroR FOR THE PEOPLE 133 (1946).
83. Many societies treat physicians who have moved into their areas as new applicants
despite a former status as member in good standing in another society. QuEs'nomArME
No. 33. Or societies may require or request transferees to submit evidence of good
standing in their former county societies. Id., Nos. 33-4.
Transfer of membership to the Vashington State Society vas refused physicians ,.,ho
intended to practice with a disapproved group. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
v. King County Medical Society, 39 Wash.2d 5S6, 626-7, 237 P.2d 737, 759 (1951). See
also SHADi, A DOCTR FOR THE PEOPLE 136-8 (1939).
84. During World War II an application to serve as a medical officer in the U.S.
Navy was not considered "unless accompanied by a letter certifying that the applicant was
a member in good standing in [a] society." Hcarings, supra note 81, at 2642. But this
requirement is not currently imposed. Letter to the YAum L.w Joumzn, from Captain
W. B. Mosser, U.S.N.R-, dated Feb. 26, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
85. Some states have the following requirement: an applicant seeking a license under
reciprocity provisions must present a certificate signed by the president or secretary of his
former county or state society, stating that he is an ethical practitioner and of good moral
character, or a recommendation from two reputable physicians who are members of the so-
ciety where he formerly resided. Rrtts OF THE BO.RD OF MEDICAL RGISxRATO.I M:M Ex-
AINATION7 OF THE STATE OF KAIs.As 23 (1943). See also SHAID, A Docro% Ffrn rur-
PEOPLE 137-8, 207 (1939).
86. Hearings, supra note 81, at 2643; SHADW, op. cit. supra note 85, at 134. Although
only a few state societies presently write a group malpractice liability policy for their
members, such policies are frequently written at the county level. And many societies aid
their members in obtaining malpractice insurance elsewhere. The rates of commercial in-
surance companies are sometimes from 20% to 1005 higher for non-society members and
some insurance companies refuse to issue any policies to non-members. QuEsTxoN;,;NAr
Nos. 55-7.
87. In general a physician's ability to continue his professional development is re-
stricted by the loss of participation in scientific programs and professional relationships.
And a rejected doctor is denied the use of the medical societies as a forum for bringing
his own discoveries before the profession. The non-society member is "quite generally
regarded as an outcast." Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound %. King County
Medical Society, 39 Wash.2d 586, 626, 237 P2d 737, 759 (1951).
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he is ineligible for specialty board examinations and ratings.8 8 Referrals and
consultations, so essential to the growth of a new practice, are denied him 80
Expulsion or denial carries the stigma of unethical practice so that members
who have professional relations with a rejected practitioner may themselves
be considered unethical.00 Thus, as part of its enforcement program one
medical society circulated a "white list" of approved doctors to its members. 1
The disapproved physician will also be handicapped in caring for his patients.
Unless he relinquishes control over the patient he may be unable to secure
assistance in time of emergency. 92 Perhaps most important, he will be denied
the use of most hospital facilities. The Mundt Resolution, passed by the AMA
House of Delegates in 1934, advises that the staffs of hospitals accredited for
internship training be composed solely of members of local medical
societies. 3 Accordingly, hospitals with a combined total of up to 99% of
88. E.g., the American Board of Internal Medicine requires applicants for examina-
tion to be "active members in good standing" of the county and state societies in their
states of residence; the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery requires applicants for
the Part II Examination to have membership in the AMA or Canadian Medical Associa-
tion; both the American Boards of Ophthalmology and Psychiatry & Neurology require
all candidates to be members of the AMA or of such other societies as are recognized for
the purposes of certification by the AMA Council of Medical Education and Hospitals.
150 JAMA 384, 394, 396, 411 (1952). See Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v.
King County Medical Society, 39 Wash.2d 586, 626, 631-2, 237 P.2d 737, 759, 761-2
(1951).
89. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society,
supra note 88, at 626, 663-4, 237 P.2d at 759, 778 (denial of right of consultation considered
"effective and damaging" weapon). See GARCEAU 103.
However, all societies responding to the Questionnaire state that they do not disapprove
of consultations or referrals between members and non-members, although the question
made no effort to single out the treatment accorded a disapprovcd physician. QUESTION-
NAIRE No. 44.
90. E.g., Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society,
supra note 88, at 601, 237 P.2d at 746 (county society resolution condemning "association"
by members with non-member group practitioners).
91. United States v. American Medical Association, 110 F.2d 703, 706-7, 715 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940) (list circulated "for the purpose of threatening
with disciplinary action any member ... who ... consulted with [disapproved] doctors.
92. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39
Wash.2d 586, 619-20, 624, 237 P.2d 737, 755-6, 758 (1951) (Group Health physicians
denied "courtesy privileges" at city hospitals). One hospital refused a Group Health
physician access to its facilities in an emergency, forcing a seriously ill patient to be taken
through a.snow storm to a distant hospital for treatment by the physician of his choice.
Id. at 624, 237 P.2d at 758.
93. FiSEBEI 403-4. For one instance of the use of this resolution, set American
Medical Association v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 250 n.87 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943) : The Secretary of the Wisconsin society cited the Mundt Resolution in
a letter to a Milwaukee hospital superintendent who retained on his staff physicians ex-
pelled for participating in a prepaid group practice. When the superintendent failed to
drop these physicians from his staff, he was notified by the state society that it was recom-
mending removal, of the hospital from the "approved intern list" and the AMA Register.
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their state's bed capacity require membership. 4 Others give non-members
limited privileges, or extend staff membership only to society members and
those "qualified" for membership.
The medical societies will rarely choose to disrupt the professional life of
non-members eligible for membership, or those excluded only by racial barriers.
Miember physicians will often cooperate with such doctors; they may find less
difficulty in obtaining hospital appointments and may be invited to participate
in the scientific programs of the medical society."" It is the practitioner who
is expelled or denied membership who finds the punitive tactics of organized
medicine employed to their fullest against him. In these cases non-member-
ship amounts to a partial revocation of licensure to practice medicine. 7 It is
only the established physician with guaranteed tenure on hospital staffs and
specialty boards, or one who has the security of a faculty or governmental
position who can afford to challenge the ethical standards of the AMA. Few
doctors enjoy such a status, and defiance of AMA authority means profes-
sional suicide for the majority.
The financial basis of power
Physicians receive an average income higher than that of any other pro-
fessional group.98 Consequently, organized medicine can receive considerable
financial support by drawing on the resources of its membership. On the
county level, where dues are the major source of revenue, assessments vary
from nominal amounts to as much as $125 per year.0 9 State dues range from
$20 to $55 annually, 0 0 while the AMA itself assesses each of its members
$25.10 On the state and national levels considerable income is also derived
from subscriptions and the sale of advertising in the societies' publications. o2
"One week later the Superintendent . .. wrote . . . that the objectionable physicians
had been denied further staff courtesy privileges of the . . . Hospital by vote of the
Executive Committee."
94. Over half of the societies reported membership as a prerequisite for appointment
to at least some of the hospitals in their states. In five states the medical societies reported
that this membership requirement covered "practically all" the hospital bed capacity in the
state, while 40% was the lowest bed capacity figure cited. Forty percent of the hospitals in
one state have this requirement, and 90% or more in five states. QuESrzTs:uuAimX NO. 54.
95. Hearings, supra note 81, at 2642.
96. See supra note 22.
97. Hearings, stpra note 81, at 2642.
98. WEINFELD, Ixcom oF PnYsIcuAs, 1929-49 p. 10 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
1951).
99. QvEsnoNNAiRE No. 13.
100. QUESTIONNAI No. 12. Dues paying members sometimes receive the society
journal free or at reduced rate. Id., No. 25.
101. AMA, GUIDE To Svicxs 17 (1952). A subscription to the Joun:al is included in
the dues.
102. In 1951 the AMA derived 19% ($1,712,000) of its income from subscriptions and
30% ($2,696,000) from advertisments in its publications. AMA, Gumw To Sumvmcs 10
(1952).
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Total revenues of the national organization exceed $9,000,000 per year.10 3
State societies have incomes ranging as high as $500,000.104 With only
1601 dues-paying members the Colorado State Medical Society, for example,
has an annual income of $120,000.105 Similarly, the financial strength of many
of the county societies assumes considerable proportions. This substantial eco-
nomic support enables organized medicine to attract new members, and to en-
gage in a variety of costly activities which serve to enlarge its power and
influence.
The political basis of power
Prestige. The political strength of the AMA is to a large degree attribut-
able to the status of the doctor in society. Because of his services to humanity,
his learning, and economic position, the physician enjoys prestige and public
confidence. The public looks to the doctor for advice and gives great weight
to his opinion. 10 6 This trust, unchallenged in the realm of medical science,
extends also into economic and political aspects of health. Because of the
AMA's high percentage of physician membership and its status as spokesman
for the doctor, the lawmaker turns to organized medicine to ascertain medical
opinion.
Mastery of political tactics. Attempting to influence governmental decision
is one of the historic purposes of organized medicine. 10 7 Without encouraging
public action of a regulatory nature, the early medical societies could not have
fully realized their objective of raising medical standards. But regulation of
the professions is a function of the states, and medical legislation has been,
until recently, devoted primarily to policing medical practice rather than pro-
viding medical care.108 So the American Medical Association had few
The California Medical Society obtained $143,250 of its 1951-2 $566,250 income from
subscriptions, reprints, and advertising attributable to its journal. In its 1952-3 budget
the society hopes to increase its advertising sale by $20,000. CAIUFORNIA QUESTIONNAIRE
(Budget). And Colorado's 1952-3 budget lists $35,100 of its $120,000 revenues as derived
from subscriptions to its journal. COLORADO QUESTIONNAIRE (Budget).
103. AMA, GuIDE To SEvicEs 10 (1952).
104. CALIFORNIA QUESTIONNAIRE (Budget).
105. COLORADO QUESTIONNAIRE (Budget).
106. "Doctors properly rate high in the social scale and sometimes politically they
exercise important influence. The reasons are partly the many varied contacts they have
with cases and people and partly the professionally-trained type of personnel they have
become. Thereby they qualify to teach of things that relate to the body and that people
do not any too well understand and likewise exert over them an influence in political and
family matters." BROWN, ORGANIZATION FOR HLALTH 15 (1938).
107. One of the principal reasons for the organization of the Medical Society
of Virginia was "to memorialize the legislature of Virginia for the passage of a Medical
Practice Act." BLANTON, MEDICINE IN VIRGINIA 110 (1923). Reporting in 1854 upon
the early accomplishments of AMA, the President cited as highly important the AMA's role
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occasions to influence political action on the national level.103 However, with
growing public acknowledgment of governmental responsibilities in furnish-
ing medical care 110 the political activities of the ALLA have expanded enor-
mously.'-" This development, most pronounced on the federal level, has also
been manifest in the states."' But while the public may have confidence in
the judgment of individual doctors, it may be suspicious of selfish motivations
in an organized group. Therefore organized medicine's new "lobbying" has
developed techniques of creating a favorable public opinion to supplement the
older techniques of direct contact with lawmakers.113
The American Medical Association is considered by some observers the
most powerful legislative lobby in Washington."14 Measures apparently as-
sured of passage have been voted down, buried in committee, or substantially
amended upon the announcement of AIA disapproval. 1"r In physical size
the AMA's lobbying facilities are not impressive."" Yet during 1949 and
1950 the AIA reported the highest expenditures of any group registered
109. In 1899 the Committee on National Legislation was first created to represent the
A'MA. FiSHBmaN 1018. As recently as 25 years ago the AfA's lobby w.as describd as
relatively inactive. HaaING, GRoup REPRESENTATION BEroRE CO. NGiss 184 (1929).
110. Anderson, Public Health-A Mandate from the People, 42 AMx. J. or PUMAc
HEALTH 1367, 1369 (1952).
111. The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950, p. 75; Means, The
Doctors' Lobby, Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1950, p. 57. See pages 997-1006 infIra.
112. See text at note 133 et seq., infra.
113. See te-t at notes 645-8, 659-62 infra.
114. "Some rather expert observers of the art of lobbying as practiced in Washingtin
assert that the AMA is the only organization in the country that could marshal 140
votes in Congress between sundown Friday night and noon on Monday. Performances
of this sort have led some to describe the AMA lobby as the most powerful in the country."
Huston, AMA is Potent Force Aoiong the Lawmakers, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1952, § 4,
p. 7, col. 6.
115. E.g., in 1950 the AMA Washington office reported that no bill opposed by the
AMA had been passed by Congress and that several favored by the AMA were enacted.
144 JAMA 637 (1950).
The 1952 social security bill was defeated by a 150 to 140 vote after the AMA had
announced its opposition to a single feature of the bill. A few days prior to the AMA's
anouncement, proponents had been able to muster a tw:o-thirds vote for a suspension of
the rules, apparently ensuring an immediate favorable vote. Huston, supra note 114.
See also 143 JA'MA 1264 (1950) (federal aid to medical education bill pigeon-holed);
143 JAfMA 478 (1950) (provision in 1950 social security bill dropped). See generally
pages 1000-6 infra.
116. The Washington office, established in 1944, has only three registered lobbyists,
although a few state societies also send representatives to WVashingtun.
Measures proposed in Congress are studied and reports on bills of medical interest
are made to a committee of the Board of Trustees and a decision is reached on what
position, if any, the Association will take. 144 JAMA 637 (1950) ; Ir's Youn AMA 21
(1953). Once the organization's position has been determined, legislators are informed
of it antd public pressure is brought to bear on important measures.
Personal contact with legislators is stressed and the personal physician of every
Congressman is informed of the stand taken so that lie may present the Associatin's
views if the occasion arises. The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Repvrts, Feb., 190,
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
under the federal lobbying law. 117 While its financial outlay has since de-
clined,118 its potential influence remains unimpaired.
Both national and state organizations have public relations programs to
present the views of organized medicine. 119 Attempts are made to solicit
editorial support 120 and societies have purchased advertising in the press and
on radio and television. 12 1 These efforts are generally designed to illustrate
the achievements of American medicine; sometimes they may be directed to
medico-political issues.'2 Member physicians are urged to participate in these
political endeavors by delivering public addresses-the texts of which are often
furnished by state or national headquarters, 123 and by distributing literature
in waiting rooms 124 and with monthly bills.1 2 5 Doctors' wives, working
through medical society auxiliaries, are also active in this type of work.12 0
Organized medicine also attempts to demonstrate numerical support for its
position by getting outside groups to "go on record" as allies. 127 Related pro-
pp. 75, 76. At Committee hearings it is customary to have high officials of the AMA and
state societies appear to testify.
Those opposing the AMA's stand are frequently labelled "subversive" or accused of
selfish motivations. See e.g.: "Nickolay Lenin, one of the Gods of the Marxist party
line, laid down this fundamental precept: 'socialized medicine is the keystone to the arch
of the Socialist State.' " AMA, COMIPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE-POLITICALLY CON-
TROLED MEDICINE 17 (1949). See also Means, The Doctors' Lobby, Atlantic Monthly,
Oct., 1950, pp. 57, 58.
117. 7 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 718 (1951) (the AMA's 1950 lobbying allocation
was $1,326,078.)
118. In 1952 the AMA was reported as the second highest spender among registered
lobbyists in Washington. The Association reported expenditures of $309,514 for that
year. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1953, p. 34, col. 1. In 1953 it dropped to sixth place, reporting
expenditures of $106,624. New Haven Register, Apr. 6, 1954, p. 14, col. 2.
119. AMA, GUIDE TO SERvIcEs 68 (1952). Many state societies employ full- or
part-time public relations officers. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 62.
120. See text at notes 620, 635 infra.
121. Several societies purchased, or were given as a "public service," newspaper space
and radio or television time for public information and "AMA campaign" purposes,
QuESTIONNAIRE No. 64.
122. See collection of newspaper advertising layouts on file in Yale Law Library.
123. See note 659 infra.
Thirteen state societies reported the existence of state or county Speakers Bureaus
and one society was supplied with speakers by the AMA Councils on Medical Service
and Public Relations. QUESTIONNAIRE No. 63. The AMA Department of Public Rela-
tions will furnish state and county societies with slides and "sample talks" describing
AMA activities. IT'S YOUR AMA 26 (1953).
124. Almost all societies reported that members displayed pamphlets in their waiting
rooms during the AMA's campaign against compulsory health insurance. QUESTIONNAIRE
No. 80. Initial shipments from national headquarters to state societies were to be "on
the basis of 50 pamphlets per doctor." A SIMPLIFIED BLUEPRINT OF THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE (1949) (hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINT).
125. Doctors' bills "are covered with stickers reading, 'as your personal physician...
Please write your U.S. Senators and Representatives. For more information, ask me.' "
Mayer, The Dogged Retreat of the Doctors, Harper's, Dec. 1949, p. 25.
126. AMA, PUTTING PR TO WORK 64 (1st Public Relations Institute, 1952).
127. See text at notes 645-6 infra.
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fessions in particular share common political interests with medicine. The
recently formed Inter-Association Committee on Health, consisting of the
AMA and the American Dental, Hospital, Public Health, Nursing, and Public
Welfare Associations, serves as liaison in this area.- During health insur-
ance controversies, medical supply houses, pharmaceutical firms, and insur-
ance companies cooperated closely with the AMA, rendering financial assist-
ance and publishing tie-in advertising furnished by the medical societies. 1-3
Some of organized medicine's present political power may be attributable
to the increased activity of its members in political affairs. The AMA sup-
ports no party or candidate, but in many localities physicians organize separate
"healing arts" committees to campaign for candidates favorable to the Asso-
ciation's views.Y30 The formation of these committees has been approved and
their choice of candidates endorsed in some instances by local medical socie-
ties,' 3' although the latter practice is not common. The work of these healing
arts committees is thought to have been influential in several dose congres-
sional contests and primaries. 132
The medical societies also exert great influence over medical legislation on
the state and local levels. The enactment of favored measures and the defeat
of those opposed can usually be secured.' 33 State societies have a lobbyist or
legislative agent, often the executive secretary.'34 The societies also actively
encourage their members to run for legislative positions to insure adequate
representation of the organization's interests.' 35 Personal contact with each
legislator, if possible by his own physician, is stressed.12 01 County societies
128. See 146 JAMfA 835 (1951).
129. QUsTiomN:nRE No. 81; The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950,
pp. 75, 76-7.
130. QUESTIoNxAmE No. SO.
131. E.g., in Pennsylvania's 26th Congressional District the Healing Arts Commit-
tee's candidate was officially endorsed by the Cambria County Medical Society. The So-
ciety -as also active in the Committee's formation. Cunningham, Can Political Mcans
Gain Professional Ends?, Modern Hospitals, Dcc., 1951, p. 51.
132. In Florida the defeat of Senator Pepper by Congressman Smathers "can be at-
tributed in part to their respective stands" on health insurance. FLORIDA QutESronxAIO ,
No. 83.
The New Hampshire Society takes credit for making greater the already inevitable
defeat of a pro-health insurance candidate. Nv HI .suinn QuESTION:NAixn No. 83.
In Montana a Senatorial incumbent favoring health insurance wvas re-elected, but the
society claims his victory cannot be attributed to his stand on that issue. MON.TA:NA
QUESTIONNAnE NO. 83.
133. Almost all societies report that their members have been active in drafting sub-
sequently enacted legislation such as state Basic Science Lavws and Medical Practice Acts.
QvnsTiomxm No. 67.
134. QutsToNNARE Nos. 65-6.
135. See, e.g., IowA STATE zIxcAL Socinry, HAND0ooK rOR TE HousE OF Dan-
GATES 49 (1952). And it is not uncommon to find society officers serving in the legis-
latures. See note 139 infra.
136. The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950, pp. 75, 76; 31 N.Y. Smva -
J. OF MED. 109 (1931).
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may also endeavor to have prominent local doctors write their legislators and
encourage their patients to do likewise. 13 7 Much state medical legislation
originates with the state societies ;138 bills are often drafted with the aid of
counsel, and such measures are easily introduced. 1 9
While influencing the actions of legislative bodies constitutes the most
apparent means of determining governmental action, the continuing relation-
ships of organized medicine with administrative agencies are no less important.
It is at this level that much public health legislation originates 140 and is
implemented by rules and regulations; here also enforcement takes place. The
AMA and its constituent societies have many councils and committees which
serve public agencies in an advisory capacity.141 Such bodies can gather in-
formation of a professional nature not readily available to government officials.
And by receiving the views of the profession on specific regulations the public
agency obtains the opinion of one of the groups vitally affected and whose
cooperation is necessary for the success of most programs.
The medical societies have also attempted to increase the profession's in-
fluence in administrative decisions by trying to make medical licensure a pre-
requisite for positions of control over health or medical programs.1 42 The
137. The New York Society's legislative agent suggests the names of legislators to
whom prominent local physicians should write and all county members are urged to con-
tact their patients. New York Medical Society Legislative Bull., March 3, 1953.
138. QUESrIONNAIRE No. 67.
139. E.g., in 1935 Dr. Marcus Newcomb was majority leader of the New Jersey
Assembly and in 1936 served as Speaker. During this period he was also President of
the New Jersey State Medical Society and managed all public health bills in its behalf.
McKEAN, PRESSURES ON THE LEGISLATURE OF NEv JERSEY 232 (1938).
140. Anderson, Public Health-A Mandate from the People, 42 AM. J. or PuBLIc
HEALTH 1367 (1952).
141. E.g., the AMA Council on Food and Nutrition works with federal and local
health regulatory agencies; the Committee on Federal Medical Services cooperates with
Governmental groups; and in 1949 the Director of the Bureau of Health Education was
loaned by the AMA to military government as a consultant in public health practices.
AMA, GUIDE TO SERvicES 39, 58, 65 (1952). And in New York the state society's Work-
men's Compensation Bureau has worked closely with the state's own Workmen's Com-
pensation Board on matters involving medical practice under state law. You AND T UE
MEDICAL SocImE- OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 35-7 (1952). One of the reasons for plac-
ing organized medicine in a position of responsibility was the eradication, in industrial
accident cases, of fee splitting and "kick-backs" at the state's expense. Governor Herbert
Lehman's Special Message to the Legislature (1-934), quoted in Greenberg, Studies of
Medical Leadership: The New York County Medical Society and Workmen's Cornpet-
sation, Physicians Forum Bull., Sept., 1951, 1. 11. But the societies' representatives have
been severely criticized for having "seemingly closed their eyes to this widespread system,
except as to one commercial establishment engaging in x-ray examinations in competition
with physicians. . . ." Report to Governor -Thomas E. Dewey by Commissioners to Ex-
amine and Investigate the Administration of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the
State of New York (1944), quoted in Greenberg, supra, at 12.
142. "Public health relies in the last analysis on medical science .... The physician
must be a central figure in any successful public health program." Bauer, The Physician's
Place in the Health Program, 107 JAMA 485 (1936). See also 143 JAMA 560 (1950)
text at note 495 in!ra.
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influence of medicine upon administrative agencies is probably stronger on the
state than on the national level. Many state health officials are appointed on
the recommendation of the medical society, 1 3 and it is often through their
offices that federal health grants are administered. Health officials, kmowing
the legislative influence of the medical societies, are not likely to incur their
antagonism. Having accused Federal Security Administrator Oscar Ewling of
sympathies toward "socialized medicine," the AMA consistently opposed pro-
visions which would grant his agency discretionary authority in administer-
ing health programs.'l  But such outright enmity between organized medi-
cine and health agencies is the exception rather than the rule.
Legal recognition. As a consequence of its monopoly position, financial
resources, and political strength, organized medicine is able to maintain a
quasi-legal status in medical affairs. In many states, laws authorize state and
local medical societies to appoint or recommend members of regulatory
bodies.' 4 AMA standards in medical education, training, and practice are
usually adopted by law. In addition, AMA inspection to determine whether
its own standards have been satisfied is seldom subject to judicial review.
Thus the political authority of the state itself has in effect been delegated to
organized medicine.
THE APPLICATION OF AMA POWER
No aspect of medical affairs-from Hadacol' 40 to health insurance '47-is
outside the scope of AMA interest. The power of organized medicine is
exerted in a wide variety of ways. Its activities may conveniently be cate-
gorized as raising the quality of medical services, determining the conditions
of practice and payment, and controlling an ever-expanding governmental
interest in the national health.
Promoting the Quality of Medical Services
Scientific activities
Historically, the AMA has exerted influence and directed more than half
its yearly expenditures into "scientific activities."' 48 It has felt a vital interest
143. QUFsTIN NoA Nos. 36, 38. In over half the states reporting, the societies
recommend appointees for heads of the state health departments, while in Alabama the
society itself makes the appointment.
144. See, e.g., text at note 500 infra.
145. In half the states reporting the society recommends appointees for the State
Board of Medical Examiners, in others the society nominates candidates for this office,
and in one state the State Medical Society Board of Censors itself constitutes the State
Board of Medical Examiners. QUESTIONNAImE No. 31. See, e.g, CoM.". GMT. STATS.
§ 4365 (1949) (nominations by society) ; MAss. Lws ANN. c. 13, § 10 (1952) (Governor
appoints with consent of society).
146. See 145 JAMA 107 (1951). See also, e.g., 143 JAMA 555 (1950) (report of
AMA inspection of a health resort).
147. See pages 980-96, 1007-17 infra.
148. See, e.g., A-MA, Guma To SERvcEs 11 (1952) (1951 balance sheet, showing 54%
of AMA expenditures for "scientific activities").
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in the quality of products closely related to the practice of medicine. In the
early years, the AMA's efforts in this respect were designed primarily to
eliminate extravagantly advertised nostrums. 4  Since then it has adopted a
more positive approach-the policing and promotion of higher standards for
recognized medical products.
Through laboratory tests and expert evaluation, AMA Councils examine
new drugs and medicines, dietary and other special-purpose foods, and thera-
peutic and diagnostic devices.'5 ° A manufacturer of any such product may
obtain an evalution at no charge, or the AMA may investigate on its own
initiative. 1 51 Standards are above the bare minimum of harmlessness; require-
ments as to purity, effectiveness, and the truthfulness of the manufacturer's
claims must be met.15 2 Even AMA critics concede the impartial scientific
basis upon which the judgment is rendered. 15 3 Products which meet AMA
standards receive the privilege of displaying the Seal of Acceptance in their
medical journal or lay publication advertisements. 1' 4 But the Seal of Accept-
ance is of greater value to a manufacturer than a mere advertising device. A
medical product must be "accepted" before its manufacturer can buy adver-
tising space in the Journal or in the great majority of state society journals.15 0
Thus, products which depend to a great extent upon a doctor's prescription
or recommendation cannot advertise in the medium which best reaches the
medical profession unless AMA standards are met.
To buttress its work in this field, organized medicine has campaigned for
legislation to protect the consumer further. The AMA was a sponsor of the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 15 and it has promoted similar state meas-
ures.157 Moreover, a provision in the AMA code of ethics forbids member-
doctors from prescribing "unknown or secret remedies."' 5 8 Infractions are
149. FISHBEIN 233, 235, passim.
150. AMA, GUIDE TO SERvicEs 36-41 (1952).
151. Id. at 37, 39, 41.
152. Id. at 39. See also 135 JAMA 159 (1947) (withdrawal of acceptance for alleged
extravagant advertising). Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1953, p. 41, cols. 2-3.
153. See, e.g., Mayer, The Rise and Fall of Dr. Fishbein, Harper's, Nov., 1949, pp.
77-8. ("[T]here has never been even the flimsiest support of the charge that the Seal of
Acceptance could be had under the counter .... ") ; Rorty, Whose Medicinc?, The Nation,
July 11, 1936, p. 43 (placing of advertising in the Journal not a condition of Acceptance
"[b]ut a dubious and uncomfortable 'community of interest' has been established [between
organized medicine and the manufacturers of proprietary medicines]."). See also The
American Medical Association, Fortune, Nov., 1938, p. 89 (as of 1938, suits against the
AMA for unfavorable notices of products totalled $35 million; total damages assessed,
one cent) ; FISHBEIIr 495-533.
154. AMA, GUIDE TO SERvicEs 37, 39 (1952).
155. Id. at 36; Editorial: Scientific Medical Advertising, 136 JAMA 400 (1948).
156. FIsHBEIN 234-43 (1947). See also id. at 1030-1.
157. See, e.g., AMA, Proposal for a Uniform State Law Governing Distribution of Lye
and Other Caustic Substances (1928 draft) (copy on file in Yale Law Library).
158. AMA, P~iNcniLEs OF MEDICAL ETHIcs c. 1, § 6.
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rare, for few physicians would risk use of a medicine untested by the Asso-
ciation's staff.1 9
The AIA does not attempt to develop new medical products directly, but
it does foster independent research.'6 0 The Committee on Research awards
grants to projects which have particular medical significance.t" The Com-
mittee also obtains outside sponsorship, often from pharmaceutical firms, for
clinical studies of disease, nutrition, and long-term effects of new medicines. 2
Post-graduate medical education
The practicing physician must keep himself informed of improvements con-
stantly being made in the field of medicine. And the average doctor has come
to depend on his society as a highly important source of new medical knowl-
edge. 16 3 The process of instruction on the local level is carried on at society
meetings largely by speakers from medical school faculties or the staffs of
large hospitals. This service is of particular importance to "country doctors"
whose contact with medical progress might otherwise be limited. The socie-
ties provide specialized courses of instruction,0 4 and, at their annual meetings,
arrange for a concentrated series of scientific papers, demonstrations, and e:-
hibits 165 Moreover, most state societies, or a small group of state societies,
:publish a journal, 60 largely devoted to scientific matters. The national
organization's most effective means of keeping physicians informed is through
its publications. The Journal, published weekly, has the largest circulation and
159. The case of Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, who was suspended from the Chicago Medical
Society, is an exception. Dr. Ivy, a notable physiologist and head of the University of
Illinois medical, dental, and pharmacy schools, was disciplined by the local society for
having prescribed the then "secret drug" krebiozen in his search for a cancer cure. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 1951, p. 22, col. 5.
160. Of great service to independent scientific research has been the effort of organized
medicine to resist the -passage of anti-vivisection legislation. Recently the state societies
have seized the initiative and, in a few states, procured the passage of compulsory pound
acts. These bills give express authority for animal experimentation and enable a state
official to requisition impounded animals for distribution to approved laboratories. See
generally, Menges, Anti-Vivisectionists os; the Run, Medical Economics, April, 1952, p.
74. See also News Letter, Massachusetts Medical Society, Dec. 14, 1950, p. 2 (urging the
support of all physicians and their wives in procuring passage of such a measure). For
an example of a Compulsory Pound Act, see N.Y. Pun. HEALTu Lw § .a (McKinney,
Supp. 1953). Several state medical societies report that no appreciable anti-vivisection
opposition remains. QuEsToNN.mE Nos. 58-9.
161. AMA, GUIDE TO SEavicEs 47 (1952).
162. Ibid.
163. AMA, Acrninis OF CouNTY MEDICAkL SocxznEs 2 (1951).
164. See, e.g., 150 JAMA 127 (1952), for a report on postgraduate and continuation
courses offered under the auspices of organized medicine.
165. AMA, GuIm TO Sz.vicEs 26, 30-3 (1952).
166. Examples of jointly-sponsored journals are the Rocky Mountain .lfcdica Jiour-
nal (Colorado, Utah and Wyoming), and INorthwest Mcdicine (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington).
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is one of the most respected of the world's medical periodicals.10 7 Its staff
selects about six hundred of the most outstanding of several thousand manu-
scripts submitted annually for publication. 10 8 Its special departments, in ad-
dition to organizational and political news of interest to doctors, include re-
ports of the tests conducted by various AMA councils and committees, medi-
cal book reviews, a medical question and answer column, and medico-legal
information.
The AMA's Scientific Sections, representing the various medical specialties,
each present full programs at the annual national conventions.100 Nine of these
specialties also publish their own monthly journals geared to the specialist's
needs.' 70 Also valuable to the physician are the AMA's quarterly index of
medical literature, a directory of licensed physicians in the United States and
Canada, and various handbooks on drugs and diseases.
Services to the public
Much of the AMA's contact with the public is in the field of health educa-
tion. Today's Health, a monthly publication, is written for the lay reader;
its purposes are to gain public backing for health measures supported by
organized medicine, and to foster understanding of the developments in medical
science.17 1 The Bureau of Health Education also maintains a speaker's bureau,
offers an extensive radio transcription service, and has recently added a series
of packaged television showsY.7 2 Another type of AMA educational work is
directed toward making the member physician a more effective health educa-
tor. Materials on public speaking, radio presentation, health column writing,
and program planning are available to members.'7 8
The AMA also engages in extensive activities within specialized areas of
public health. Association officers have cooperated with the National Edu-
cation Association and other interested groups in formulating school health
policies and programs.'7 4 The Chicago headquarters has full-time personnel
167. The Journal currently publishes 165,000 copies every week.
168. AMA, GUIDE TO SEavicEs 74 (1.952).
169. Id. at 26-9.
170. Id. at 75.
171. Id. at 77.
172. AMA, GUIDE TO SERVIcES 64-5 (1952). See also HESTER, AMA RADIO HAND-
BOOK (1946) ; HESTER, AMA TELEVISION HANDBOOK (1951).
173. See, e.g., Bauer, Dramatizing the Health Message 30 AMA BULL. 97 (1935);
Bauer, Teach Health, Not Disease, 12 J. HEALTH & PHYSICAL ED. 296 (1941) ; Tesclmer,
When Doctors Address the Public, 110 JAMA 155 B (1938) ; Writing A Health Column,
109 JAMA 1926-7 (1937).
174. See, 'e.g., NAT'L CoMMs. ON ScHoOL HEALTH PoLIcIEs, SUaGESaM SCHOOL
HEALTH POLICIES (2d ed. 1950); SmILEY & HEIN, HEALTH APPRAISAL OF SCHOOL Ci.-
DREN (1948) (Nat'l Ed. Ass'n and AMA joint report); Ric, HEALTH CONDITIONS
AFFECTING THE PERSONALITY OF SCHOOL YOUTH (1952) (same); THE PHYSICAL EDU-
CAToR ASKS ABOUT HEALTH (Rugen, ed. 1951) (same).
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engaged in industrial health,175 rural health,1 70 and civil defense vwork.177 In
all of these activities the AIA works closely with lay organizations to co-
sponsor conferences, stimulate interest, and publish materials.
Setting the Qualitative and Quantitative Standards for Medical Practitioners
The campaign against non-medical practitioners
To protect the public against treatment by improperly trained practitioners,
all states have passed statutes making a license prerequisite to the rendering
of healing art services. 78 Legislative pressure by state medical societies has
been largely responsible for the original passage and periodic revision of these
Medical Practice ActsY.1 7  Licensing requirements provide for minimum edu-
cational standards and successful completion of an examination given by a
state examining board.
Quacks. One of the AMA's first goals was to bar from practice a wide
variety of completely unqualified healers.'8 0 This campaign complemented its
role in removing non-scientific remedies from the market.18 ' Licensing re-
quirements forced the quacks to withdraw or practice illegally.1 2 Since pas-
sage of these laws, the AMA's function in this field has been primarily one of
policing.183 Advertising often provides a clue; the quack still relies upon
ballyhoo to attract patients. 8 4 Since the turn of the century, various medical
societies have exposed mail order "diagnosis" by urinalysis, 8s vacuum "treat-
ments,"' 8 6 cancer "cures," diabetes "cures," virility "regenerators," and a wide
variety of electric, radioactive, or otherwise miraculous remedies-all dis-
pensed by unlicensed practitioners. 8 7 The Association's Bureau of Investiga-
tion in Chicago keeps a file of known offenders and supports county and state
societies in their detection and prosecution of the unlicensed invader.'5 3
Chiropractors and Osteopaths. The emergence of conflicting theories of
175. AMA, GUIDE To SEavwczs 34-5 (1952). See generally, Hx., SArETn Ac-rvirmz
OF THE AHERIcAN 1Muic~A AssocuLTio (mimeo. report, undated) (copy on file in Yale
Law Library).
176. AMA, GUIDE TO SEavrcis 62-3 (1952).
177. Id. at 60-1.
178. See, e.g., 5 ARIz. CODE Axx. c. 67, art. 11 (1939); 2 Rzv. LAws N. HAnw. tit.
21 (1942).
179. See, e.g., notes 107, 133 supra.
180. FIsHIBEIN 31.
181. See text at notes 148-62.
182. See FIsHs= 1012.
183. Id. at 1034.
184. Id. at 1035-6.
185. Medical Economics, March, 1952, p. 241.
186. AMA, NOSTRUMS AND QUACKERY 314 (2d ed. 1912).
187. FisHmI 1034-8. See also FIsUBEIN, FADS AND QUACKY.EY In Hwuxu:w (1932).
188. AMA, GUIDE To SERvicEs 42-3 (1952). See also 144 JAMTA 764 (1950) (ac-
knowledging the support of various newspapers and local "Better Business Bureaus" in
detection of quackery).
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disease, particularly chiropractic 119 and osteopathy,100 has complicated state
medical licensing. Chiropractors are able to acquire licenses to practice in
nearly all states 91 but, due to strenuous opposition from state medical so-
cieties and the AMA, theirs is a limited privilege. Usually the practice acts
restrict treatment by a chiropractor to manual adjustment of the spinal column
and forbid administering or prescribing drugs, puncturing the skin, or prac-
ticing obstetrics.192 A few states limit the osteopath to almost the same nar-
row privileges granted chiropractors,193 but most allow him to administer
drugs or to perform surgery, although only upon a showing of additional
special training.0 4 Several states license the osteopath for the same unre-
stricted practice as the M.D. 15
Despite limitations, these groups continue to provide the medical profession
with active competition. Each year, two million Americans consult one of the
nation's 32,000 licensed chiropractors for the first time. 0 ' There are over
11,000 licensed osteopaths in the United States ;107 they maintain fully equipped
hospitals ;18s they sometimes serve in city and state health departments.100
189. "A system of therapeutics based upon the theory that disease is caused by inter-
ference with nerve function. Its theory is based upon the premise that all other systems
and physiologic processes of the human body are controlled and co-ordinated by the nerve
system. Its therapeutics attempts to restore normal function of the nerve system by
manipulation and treatment of the structures of the human body, especially those of the
spinal column." Definition of chiropractic adopted by National Chiropractic Association,
quoted in 6 ENcYCLOPEDIA A ERICANA 567 (1948).
190. "Osteopathy is that school of medicine the distinguishing feature of which is
found in its emphasis upon the importance of normal body mechanics for health, and
upon manipulation to detect and correct faulty relations of the body parts to restore
health." 21 id. 28-30. The osteopathic premise is that upon removal of mechanical "or
other" interferences the physiological functions will normalize themselves, i.e., the forces
are present in the human body to develop a natural immunity to disease. 21 id. 31-33.
191. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New York do not provide for licen-
sure of chiropractors in their Medical Practice Acts. In Massachusetts and New York
this is apparently taken to mean that a chiropractor may practice qua chiropractor pro-
vided he meets the standards set for a Doctor of Medicine. AMA, ScoPE oF CwotRl'Ac-
Tc PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATEs (mimeo survey of state laws relating to chiroprac-
tors, 1947) (copy on file in Yale Law Library). The Louisiana and Mississippi licensing
bodies do not recognize chiropractic as a profession within their states. Ibid.
1.92. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 259 (1940) ; 5 AaRz. CODE ANN. § 67-704 (1939) ; W.
VA. CODE §§ 3005-6, 3008 (1949).
193. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 91, § 5 (Smith-Hurd, 1948); CODE S. CAR. § 56-1101
(1952).
194. E.g., AmK. STAT. ANN. § 72-906 (1947); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 150.4-5 (1949);
REv. CODES MONT. § 66-1406 (1947). See American Medical Ass'n Daily Bulletin, June
12, 1952, p. 1, col. 2.
195. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-109 (1951); IND. STAT. § 63-1316 (Burns, 1951).
196. ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA ANNUAL 137 (1950).
197. Id. at 520.
198. See, e.g., Statement of Ralph Copeland, D.O., in 5 MAGNUSON Rr. 335, 336
(reporting 38 osteopathic hospitals in California); N.Y. Times, March 9, 1954, p. 29,
col. 2 (reporting purchase by osteopaths of a New York sanatorium).
199. Statement of Ralph Copeland, D.O., in 5 MAGNUSON REP. 335, 337.
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And, although organized medicine's justification for limited licensing of the
"cults" is expressed in terms of protecting the consumer from unqualified
practitioners, there may also be present an element of self-protection from
this economic encroachment.
Organized medicine's campaign against the chiropractor is presently a battle
of containment. In four states the requirements for licensing are the same as
those for a Doctor of Iedicine; practically, the chiropractor has been ex-
cluded. 20 Elsewhere, medical societies police the legal boundaries of a chiro-
practor's limited license and oppose legislative extension of his privilege. 01
Basic Science requirements, although originally designed as a method of
raising the standards of medical practice generall, 2 0 2 are a weapon of great
potential in organized medicine's struggle against chiropractic and other limited
healing arts. But it is a weapon that has thus far failed. These requirements,
adopted by law in nineteen states and the District of Columbia 2 0 3 direct all
applicants for any healing art licensure to pass examinations in anatomy,
physiology, chemistry, bacteriology, and pathology. But often the examination
taken by candidates for medical licensure is different from the chiropractic
basic science test.2 °4 Medical men have termed the chiropractic basic science
exam a "farce."20''  Consequently, the AMA has proposed a Uniform Basic
Science Act,2 0 applicable to "nonsectarian medicine, osteopathy, chiropractic,
naturopathy, sanipractic, and other modes of healing."207 AMA's stand is:
"Whatever may be said of separate licensing boards for the nonsectarian prac-
titioner and the cultists, there seems to be no valid argument against a uniform
examination in the basic sciences."2 3 Widespread adoption of this Act could
mean the end of the cults' challenge to organized medicine.203
Recently, the National Chiropractic Association has engaged the AMA in
a top-level clash of competing interest groups. The NCA vras successful in
having chiropractic colleges certified for the G. I. Bill; by 1949 the Govern-
ment had paid the tuition of 1700 veterans studying chiropractic.2 10 And now
the NCA is campaigning for Veterans Administration recognition of-and
200. See note 191 supra. DoYLE, ScIz~cE vs. Cnmorrr,&c-rc 15 (1953); cf. CrrzE:xs'
H.ALTH EDucArIoN CoMMIxT, WHAT PRICE YoUR LIr? (1952).
201. See, e.g., Medical Economics, May, 1952, p. 227 (chiropractor fined $1000 for
"mislabeling" a radiotherapeutic device, after complaint by medical organization) ; Cm-
zENS' HEALTH EDUCATION COMIITTEE, Op. cit. supra note 200 (Medical Society of the
State of New York statement against chiropractic licensing).
202. DOYLE, op. cit. su pra note 12, at 10-11.
203. AMA, ANALYSiS OF BAsIc SciExcz LAws (1940) ; id. (Supps. I-l1 1945, 1943,
1949).
204. See, e.g., 140 JAMA 229 (1949).
205. Ibid.
206. AMA, DRarr OF PRoPOSED BASIC Scmc ACT (undated) (copy on file in Yale
Law Library).
207. Id. § 2 Note.
208. Id. § 1 Note.
209. See Do-iLE, op. cit. smpra note 200, at 10.
210. 140 JAMA 229 (1949).
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reimbursement for-chiropractic care.211 In 1950 AMA spokesmen appeared
before the House Veterans' Affairs Committee and helped defeat this pro-
posal, arguing that chiropractic does not recognize the bacterial theory of
disease, is not taught at any university or college supported by public funds,
and therefore should not be recognized by the VA.2 12 So the NCA has moved
the fight to the American Legion, from which it has sought backing.2 18 There-
upon the AMA urged its member veterans to become active Legionnaires in
order to forestall any possible pressure from an organization equipped with
lobbying power on a par with its own.2
14
Historically, organized medicine's struggle to limit the practice of osteopathy
took the same form as that against the chiropractors. Courts have upheld the
constitutionality of AMA-fostered differentials in licensing privileges granted
an M. D. and a D. 0. despite apparent similarity of training.216 Further-
more, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of governing
boards of public (and a fortiori of private) hospitals to deny osteopaths use
of their facilities. 216 And hospitals seeking AMA accreditation for internship
and residency training usually must bar osteopaths from their staffs. 11
Recently, the city council of Bay City, Michigan, voted to allow osteopaths
to use municipal hospital facilities.218 The 70 staff M.D.'s then walked out
rather than "jeopardize their own ethical standings," and the AMA Council
on Medical Education and Hospitals immediately withdrew registration and
"Approval" of the hospital. The struggle between local physicians and osteo-
paths was finally resolved by a referendum in which the voters chose nearly
3 to 1 to exclude osteopaths from their city's hospital staff.210
An important recent change in the AMA attitude toward osteopaths has
been a policy tending toward their absorption into the medical profession.
Precedent for this trend exists in the case of the homeopathic 220 physicians,
211, 143 JAMA 659 (1950); Weintrob, Chiropractors Plan V.A. Coup, Medical
Economics, Jan., 1953, p. 115.
212. 143 JAMA 659 (1950).
213. Weintrob, supra note 211.
214. Id. at 123.
215. Cf. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114 (1889) ; see Polhemus v. American Medical Association, 145 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir.
1944).
216. Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927). See also Newton v. Board
of Comm'rs of Weld County, 86 Colo. 446, 282 Pac. 1068 (1929). Cf. Statement of Dr.
Roger E. Bennett, in 5 MAGNUSON REP. 332, 333; Statement of Dr. William A. Brandt,
in 5 id. 334-5.
217. 151 JAMA 579, 581 (1953) (staffs of accredited hospitals should be composed
of graduates of approved medical schools). But ef. text at note 224 infra; Statement of
Ralph Copeland, D.O., in 5 MAGNUSON REP. 335, 336 (reporting several California hos-
pitals with unified M.D.-D.O. staffs).
218. Fuller, M.D.'s Battle It Out With D.O.'s, Medical Economics, Sept., 1952, p. 71.
219. Medical Economics, Jan., 1953, p. 11.
220. See 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 342 (1948) (homceopathy: "[T]he treatment
of disease by means of its similimum. The cure is undertaken by a medicine capable of
producing in a healthy person symptoms similar to those manifested by the patient.").
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who formerly were considered cultists-2 1 but who now have "Approved"
medical schools,22 unlimited rights of practice, and membership in the AMA.
Evidence of a similar policy toward osteopaths is dear. Although the A1A%
code of ethics provides that "[a] 11 voluntarily associated activities with cultists
are unethical," 3 the Judicial Council has recently approved limited medical
consultation with osteopaths, as well as sharing facilities with them in "small,
outlying hospitals. 2 2 4 In many states, medical society-sponsored Blue Shield
plans allow osteopaths to participateY2r A resolution urging immediate action
toward an "eventual amalgamation" of medicine and osteopathy was voted
down by the House of Delegates,=0 yet AMA and AOA leaders have con-
ferred with amalgamation in mind.-
The basis for amalgamation is the present approximation of medical stand-
ards by osteopathic schools.2 2 s The osteopathic curriculum is nearly the same
as the medical, but includes osteopathic science, which to the AMA carries
the "stigma of cultism." -0 Virtual abandonment of this teaching would prob-
ably permit M.D.'s to instruct in osteopathic schools, leading to eventual
"Approval."2' 0 Indeed, osteopathic services are already approved by the
Veterans Administration and the United States Public Health Service.tm1
But AMA approval seems to depend upon economic as well as strictly
medical factors. Amalgamation is opposed in rural states where general prac-
tice prevails and the osteopath provides strong competition to the physician.'
Support for amalgamation comes from large urban centers where specialists
dominate medical practice.233 Probably a continued high demand for medi-
cal services, mitigating competition, will accelerate organized medicine's
acceptance of the osteopath as an equal.
221. See, e.g., FisHBrE 62, 96.
222. E.g., Hahnemann Medical College, Philadelphia, Pa., 150 JAMA 106 (1952).
223. AMA, PrIxcIILFs OF MEDICAL ETnics c. 2, § 1.
224. Medical Economics, Dec., 1952, p. 65.
225. Id., Aug., 1952, p. 65; id., April, 1952, p. 15. See also, e.g., Statement of Dr.
William A. Brandt, 5 MAIGusox REP. 334, 335.
226. Medical Economics, Aug., 1952, p. 65.
227. Ibid.
223. Ibid.; Address of John W. Cline, M.D., President of the AMA, to the House
of Delegates, June 9, 1952 (mimeo. press release on file in Yale Law Library). See also
Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Sheppard, in 5 MAGwUTSOx REP. 331, 332.
229. Address of John W. Cline, M.D., suprii note 223.
230. Ibid.
231. Medical Economics, Aug., 1952, p. 65. See also Statement of Ralph Copeland,
D.O., in 5 MAGNusox Rn,. 335, 336 (College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons
in Los Angeles received Federal grants for use in cancer teaching program) ; Statement
of Lawrence D. Jones, 5 id. 337, 33S (same, in Missouri osteopathic schools).
232. Medical Economics, Aug., 1952, p. 65. See also Statement of Lawrence D. Jones,
5 MAGNUSON REP. 337 (showing extent of osteopathic practice in Missouri). See also
Medical Economics, July, 1952, p. 25 (letter from M.D. in small Oregon town, complain-
ing that osteopaths dominate general practice and leave "neither room nor work enou7h
for M.D.'s").
233. Medical Economics, Aug., 1952, p. 65.
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Psychologists. Originally the practice of medicine was limited to the care
of physical disturbances; many state medical practice acts still do not specifi-
cally require licensure for the treatment of behavioral or mental disorders. 23 4
Both medical and non-medical specialists have contributed to knowledge in
the behavioral sciences. The psychiatrist claims exclusive jurisdiction in diag-
nosis and treatment of mental disease, 235 asserting that his medical training
gives him physiological knowledge requisite to an appreciation of the patient's
overall condition.mo He regards the psychologist's role as ancillary, similar
to that of the nurse or X-ray technician.2 7 Psychologists, who presently pro-
vide many diagnostic and therapeutic services to mental patients, 2 38 do not
agree that psychotherapy should be the sole province of the M.D.'s. 239
The American Psychological Association, much like the AMA, has at-
tempted to raise the level of psychological practice.2 40 Since many states do
not regulate the treatment of mental disorders, unqualified persons hold them-
selves out as competent psychologists. 241 To set the qualified practitioner apart,
many psychologists have urged passage of certification acts, 242 whereby those
meeting educational requirements and passing examinations may receive the
privilege of calling themselves "Certified Psychologists. 2 43 These acts, adopted
in only a few states, do not limit psychological practice to those certified, but
they do provide the public with a possible guide to competence.2 44 Bills have
also been proposed in a few jurisdictions requiring licensure of psychologists
and prohibiting practice by those not meeting prescribed standards. 245 But
psychiatrists, fearing that their sphere of competence might be invaded, have
234. See, e.g., N.Y. ED. LAW § 6513 (2) (c) : "A person practices medicine ...who
holds himself out as being able to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human
disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition. . . ." See also compilation and
analysis of statutes in Note, Regulation of Psychological Counseling and Psychotherapy,
51 COL. L. REv. 474, 475-8 (1951).
235. Letter, Defining Medical Practice, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1954, p. 24, col. 6;
Statement of the American Psychiatric Association's Position on Amending State Medi-
cal Practice Acts and Related Matters (1954) (copy on file in Yale Law Library).
236. Ibid.
237. Ibid.
238. Sanford, Annual Report of the Executive Secretary: 1952, 7 Am. PsvcnoLocIsT
686 (1952).
239. Letter, Restricting Psychologists, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1954, p. 30, col. 6.
240. Sanford, supra note 238, at 690. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 19, col.
8 (adoption of code of ethics).
241. See David, An Analysis of Psychologists in the Classified Telephone Directory,
3 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 133 (1948) ; N.Y. Times, March 17, 1951, p. 17, col. 5; id., March
31, 1951, p. 14, col. 3; Note, supra note 234.
242. See Saffir, Certification versus Licen.sing Legislation, 5 Aza. PSYCHOLOGIST 105
(1950) ; The Certification of Clinical Psychologists it Virginia, 1 id. at 395 (1946).
243. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4632-8 (1949) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.010-
319.990 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
244. See Note, supra note 234, at 482-5.
245. E.g., N.Y. Assembly, Nos. 2099, 3432 (Feb. 12, 1951); Pa. Senate, No. 848
(April 5, 1949).
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secured the support of organized medicine to defeat these measures. Governor
Dewey vetoed the New York licensing bill and cited the "vigorous and im-
pressive objections" of the state medical society and American Psychiatric
Association.20  After this setback, the psychologists refrained from seeking
legislation pending conferences with the medical profession designed to define
each profession's scope of competency.2 47
Recently, however, the psychiatrists have taken affirmative action to prevent
the further encroachment of non-medical practitioners. The Medical Society
of the State of New York, in cooperation with psychiatric groups, has unsuc-
cessfully sought revision of the New York medical practice act to make only
the M.D. competent to treat "mental and nervous disorders."9 Both the
American Psychiatric Association 24 and the AMA 20 favor such legislation.
But these laws would freeze the status of two professions which often work
in a flexible and cooperative relationship. Under such circumstances, joint
efforts to define each specialty's qualifications should be encouraged. This
would leave both groups free to cooperate in eliminating the unqualified prac-
tice of psychotherapy.
Controlling the quality and supply of doctors
Another key function of the AMA is its inspection of medical schools and
its annual listing of those approved.2- 1 All states require that an applicant for
medical licensure be a graduate of an acceptable medical school.- 2 Standards
of acceptability are set by statute, or by formal rule or informal policy of the
state medical examining boardsasa These statutes or rules provide that the
board will consider only graduates of schools approved by the AMA and/or
the American Association of Medical Colleges, whose lists are identical.234
246. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1951, p. 26, coL 5. See also Telegram from Daniel Bain,
M.D., Medical Director, American Psychiatric Association, to Governor Thomas E.
Dewey, dated March 21, 1951, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
247. Letter, supra note 239.
248. Egan, Medical Plan Stirs State Contro 'ersy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1954, §4, p.
7, cols. 1-5; Letter, supra note 235.
249. Egan, supra note 248; NEwsLurrr OF THr Aan. PsYca -mmc Ass.': (February,
1953).
250. 150 JAMA 16S7 (1952) (Report of AMA Committee on Mental Health): "It
is deemed advisable that all medical practice acts include the treatment of illness by
psychological methods. It is further recommended that the American Medical Assuciatiun
take active steps toward this end."
251. See 150 JAMA 99-139 (1952) for an example of the complete text of an Annual
Report on Medical Education by the Council on Medical Educatn and Hospitals of the
AMA. The Report contains, as well as the approved list, an analysis vf trends in medi-
cal school enrollment, developments in curriculum, medical school finances, foreign medi-
cal schools and students, and a variety of other related matters.
252. 149 JAMA 466 (1952). In addition to professional schoul requirements, all
states require completion of at least two years of college, and 31 boards demand at least
one year of internship. Ibid.
253. Ibid.
254. Twenty-nine boards require approval by both the AMA and AAMC, nineteen
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Since it is impossible for each state board to make an independent inspection
of every medical school whose graduates apply for licensure, these boards must
rely on an outside agency. The AMA fulfills this need and its list thereby
acquires the force of law.
Through their reliance upon the AMA to inspect the nation's medical
schools, the states tacitly confer upon it the power to set the standards for
approval. These standards, of course, fix the quality of medical education,
but they also indirectly determine the size of classes in each school. 25 Maxi-
mum student/faculty or student/cadaver ratios, 2 60 for example, make expan-
sion costly.
Moreover, many states require a medical school graduate to serve an intern-
ship in an approved hospital as an additional training requirement.25 7 Again,
practical considerations require licensing boards to utilize the AMA standards
and list of approved hospitals. 258 AMA approval is vital to a hospital; without
it, the hospital cannot obtain the low-cost services of interns. 2 9 This power
gives organized medicine a device to enforce conformity with policies occa-
sionally unrelated to medical training.260
Medical Education. The improvement of medical education was one motive
for the founding of the American Medical Association.201 Early attempts,
however, were not successful.262 In 1910, the Carnegie Foundation's Flexner
Report publicized the serious inadequacy of many of the medical schools in
by the AMA alone, two by the AAMC, and three jurisdictions maintain their own lists
(figures include the District of Columbia and American possessions). Id. at 466-7.
There have been minor differences in listings in the past, mostly concerning two-year
basic science schools and Canadian medical colleges. See 105 JAMA 682 (1935). How-
ever, the two organizations have cooperated closely in setting standards and making in-
spections. FISHBEIN 912-16.
255. See 10 AAMC JOURNAL 191 (1935); cf. 146 JAMA 865 (1951) (AMA asserts
it does not attempt to control size of medical school classes, but it may advise a school
to decrease its size when a larger enrollment might mean a lowering of standards).
256. AMA, ESSENTIALS OF AN ACCEPTABLE: MEDICAL SCHOOL 3 (1951) (other re-
quirements concern manner of faculty appointments, library and other physical plant,
clinical facilities, financial resources, admission standards, and, curriculum). The ESSEN-
TIALS have recently been revised in some respects. See 148 JAMA 374 (1952).
257. See supra note 252.
258. See 150 JAMA 275-377 (1952) for an example of the complete text of an
Annual Report on Internships and Residencies by the Council on Medical Education and
Hospitals of the AMA. See note 259 infra.
259. Some states maintain an independent inspection and approval list for hospitals
within their jurisdictions, and in a few instances, the board requires the applicant to have
served his internship within the state. 150 JAMA 466 (1952). But the state rarely
accredits a hospital not approved by the AMA. Therefore, generally, to attract interns,
the hospital must meet AMA standards, regardless of the separate state inspection.
260. For examples of AMA pressures upon hospitals see note 93 supra, notes 425, 429
infra and accompanying text.
261. FIsHBEiN 30; Johnson, The Council on Medical Education and Hospitals in
FisEBEIN 887.
262. Johnson, supra note 261, at 888-90; Cline, Medical Education and the Medical
Profession, 148 JAMA 1273 (1952).
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the country.263 Strong public opinion and state medical association pressure
has since forced state examining boards and medical schools to recognize the
standards set by the AMA Council on Medical Education.2" Although 81
substandard schools have been forced out of existence, some formerly inade-
quate schools have managed to survive by rapidly improving in quality.-0 5
Today there are 79 medical schools in the United States, all "approved -2 cO
When adoption of AIA requirements forced disapproved medical schools
to close, the annual graduating class of doctors was cut in half. - a7 But these
numerical losses have been recouped. Existing schools have gradually ex-
panded their facilities to a point where annual output exceeds the 1910
level.268 For the past five years, each freshman class has surpassed the pre-
vious year's record-breaking enrollment. - 9 The AMA has provided technical
assistance to schools planning expansion.27 ° And state societies have sometimes
advocated the formation of new medical schools, as in TMaine and New Jersey,
or supported the conversion of two-year "basic science" schools into full four-
year schools, as in North Carolina and West Virginia.-r 1 The resulting in-
crease in physician supply has raised the American doctor/patient ratio to
136 per 100,000, second only to Israel with its large number of refugee
Jewish physicians. 272 This ratio is expected to hold despite rapid population
gains. 2 3
But the AMA has not consistently pursued a policy of increasing the doctor
supply. Moved by a desire to mitigate competition among doctors during the
263. FL.EXN-E, MNElicAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITM STATES A11D CA.NADA (1910).
For the cooperative role played by the newly-formed AMA Council on Medical Education
in assisting Dr. Fle.'ner, see Johnson, supra note 261, at 897-9.
264. Id. at 898-9.
265. Id. at 898.
266. Originally the AMA's classification system included class A (approved), class
B (probation), or class C (unapproved) ratings. Upon the elimination of the class C
schools, the categories were changed to "Approved" or "Unapproved." The current list
of Approved schools is reported in 153 JAMA 114-16 (1953). The list includes 72 four-
year schools of medicine and 7 two-year basic medical science schools.
267. Cf. 142 JAMA 420 (1950).
268. Ibid. The number of graduates leaving Approcd (Class A) schools annually
has doubled since 1910.
269. 153 JAMA 118 (1953). Enrollment for the 72 medical and 7 basic science
schools for the 1952-3 academic year was 27,68; 6475 were members of the graduating
class.
270. 146 JAMA 865 (1951) ; Cline, supra note 262, at 1274.
271. Ibid. See also, e.g., Bangor (Me.) Commercial, June 20, 1951 (retiring presi-
dent of Maine Medical Association urges $50,000 society fund to assist in establishment of
medical school in 'Maine); 45 W. VA. MEz. J. 262 (1949) (resolution of state society
favoring efforts to establish four-year school to alleviate shortage of doctors in West
Virginia) ; 13 PnmiAcs 89 (1954) (recounting conflict bttween Medical Society of the
State of North Carolina and AMA concerning expansion to four-year school).
272. 3 MIAGNUSON REP. 135; 1 HEALTH 'MANFOWER SoucEs Boi- 20 (Federal Securi-
ty Agency 1948).
273. 1. MAGNUSON REP. 12. See also 146 JAMA 865 (1951).
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depression, the Association attempted to reduce medical school enrollments.
By 1932 the AAMC and AMA had become alarmed about an increasing "sur-
plus of doctors." 27 4 In 1933 the AMA Council on Medical Education invited
the "active support of the Association of American Medical Colleges in bring-
ing about a substantial reduction of their enrolment." 27 5 The Council's secre-
tary, in a speech before the AAMC, mentioned the alleged surplus of doctors
and deplored the practice of making up classes in medical schools "without
any regard to the needs of the profession or of the country as a whole."
2 70
He concluded: "The time has come when we must still further limit the en-
rollment of our medical schools." 277 By 1934 the Council could report that
274. The AAMC's Committee on Medical Education in 1932 reported an excess of
25,000 physicians. These figures were based upon the fact that the American patient/
physician ratio was lower than Europe's. AAMC, FINAL REP. OF THE CoMM. ON MED.
ED. (1932), abstracted in 99 JAMA 2206 (1932). The Committee feared that "there are
indications that [the oversupply] will increase." 99 id. at 2035-6. The AMA echoed the
AAMC's fears in commenting editorially upon the AAMC Report: "These are facts
which have been emphasized repeatedly in the columns of THE JOURNAL, and means must
be developed for correcting this situation." Id. Indeed, the Journal had already con-
sidered the problem of oversupply. See, e.g., 99 id. at 765 (Editorial: "Perhaps there is
need for professional birth control."). See also Beasley, Economic Statis of the Medical
Profession, 99 id. at 1358. Dr. Beasley suggested a reduction of enrollments by 25% per
year until a patient/physician ratio of 2000/1 is reached. He concluded:
"This must be done or the practice of medicine must be turned over to
the government. The government will employ only a sufficient number
to do the work .... What will those of us who are not in the employ of
the government do? The answer is simple-We shall of necessity be
forced to seek other employment."
275. Report of the AMA Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, 100 JAMA
1425 (1933). The Council's Report again emphasized the AMA's fear that the doctor
surplus was growing, since the number of graduates exceeded the number of physician
deaths, and since the increase exceeded the rate of population growth. Ibid.
276. Quoted in GREENBERG, MEDiciNE N CRusis 17 (Reprinted from Providence Jour-
nal and Evening Bulletin, March, 1951, copy on file in Yale Law Library). See also 101
JAMA 42 (1.933) (Resolution passed by Medical Society of the State of New York,
urging the AMA to investigate the oversupply of physicians and to "use its influence to
bring about a limitation of the number of medical matriculants, and hence of medical
graduates.").
277. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 276, at 17. See also 100 JAMA 198 (1933)
(AAMC announces policy against licensure of foreign-educated M.D's); 9 AAMC
JOURNAL 30 (1934) (statement of AMA President-Elect: "The limitation of schools is
possible, and here the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association
can do much. There can also be a distinct curtailment of certain schools.").
See Bevan, The Over-Crowding of the Medical Profession, 11 AAMC JOURNAL 377
(1936). Dr. Bevan, a former AMA Committee on Medical Education Chairman, an-
nounced:
"The evidence obtainable shows a definite overcrowding of the medical
profession. Both the people and the medical profession would be much better
off if by a well-organized plan the poorer qualified and least desirable 10 or
15 per cent of the medical practitioners could gradually be eliminated ...
"To accomplish this, we must elevate the standards of requirements de-
manded to secure a medical education and a license to practice medicine....
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several schools were decreasing enrollments in "adherence to the Council's
principles. ' 278
Even today, AMIA's limited support270 for expansion in medical education
may not be adequate to meet growing demand for physicians. Increased mili-
tary needs, coupled with expanded public health programs and private require-
ments, have created a doctor shortage which is becoming progressively more
acute.2 80 Estimates of the adequacy of the doctor supply by 1960 vary greatly,
depending on an intangible variable: "desirable level of medical care. "- 3'
Maldistribution of physicians, resulting from the emphasis on specialization
and the concentration of physicians in urban centers, has compounded the
shortage..2s2 Local action by doctor-needy communities-guarantees and spe-
cial inducements to young graduates seeking a location-max be a partial
solution.283  Local and state medical society scholarships, granted on the
stipulation that the recipient will practice in a small community, have also
helped.284 A recent AIA campaign glorifying the general practitioner may
The American Medical Association has already demonstrated its ability to
reduce the number of medical students by elevating the educational require-
ments." 11 id. at 379-80.
278. GVraNBERG, op. cit. supra note 276, at 17. See also Bevan, supra note 277, at
381.: "This [the size of the nation's 1935 freshman medical class] is a falling off of 584.
This is a most encouraging sign and is due to the efforts of the Council on Medical Edu-
cation of the American Medical Association and the Association of American Medical
Schools and the Federation of State Medical Boards."
279. See, e.g., 136 JAMA 626 (194); 142 JAMA 420 (1950); notes 270-1 supra
and accompanying text. See also text at notes 547, 552-60 infra.
280. 1 MAGNTJSOx Rip. 11-13.
281. See, e.g., Maisel, Our Alarmiag Doctor Shortage, Collier's, Dec. 16, 1950, p. 18
(quoting (1) an AMA official who stated, in 1945, that medical education could produce
only half of the 35,000 physicians needed after World War II; (2) another AMA officer
to the effect that the 1960 shortage would not exceed 15,000 physicians) ; 'Mou:-.T, PE:.-
xELL& BERGER, HEALTH SERvIcE ADEks: EsT'riLm OF FLTTUE PHYSIc IAn REqumr-
uExrs (U.S. Pub. Health Service Bull. No. 305, 1949) (shortage by 1960 of 17,000 to
45,000 depending upon which of three standards is applied) ; 142 JAMA 111-112 (1950)
(all three standards "unrealistic": possible 1960 surplus foreseen); de Kruif, WJ'hat About
This "Doctor Shortage," Reader's Digest, June, 1951, p. 24 (no shortage) ; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 14, 1951, p. 31, col. 5 (AMA official sees surplus "more likely" than deficit due to
increased productivity of physicians); id., Feb. 18, 1951, p. 58, cols. 3-4 (conclusion of
Health Resources Advisory Committee of the National Security Resources Board: short-
age of 22,000 physicians by 1954) ; 1 MAGNuso= REP. 13 (conclusion of President's Com-
mission on the Health Needs of the Nation: shortage of 22,000 physicians by 1960).
282. 3 MAGNTsoN REP. 136-9; cf. 1 id. at 12; de Kruif, supra note 281, at 25. But
see DicEmNsoN & BRADnuE, COMPAIUSONS OF STATE: PYSICIAN-POPuLATIO N Rvros r.n
1938 AND 1949 (AMA Bureau of M6ed. Econ. Research Bull. No. 78, 1950) (citing im-
provement in distribution of physicians) ; N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1954, p. 20, col 8 (report-
ing AMA's current study disclosing that doctors are "'well distributed throughout the
United States.").
283. de Kruif, supra note 281, at 26-7.
284. See, e.g., 146 JAMA 205, 855, 1428 (1951) ; QuL E ormAmrm No. 47 (several
societies report scholarship or loan funds).
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have some effect. 28 5 But the need for long-term regional or nation-wide plan-
ning of the supply and distribution of doctors has not been met under AMA
guidance.28 6
Indeed, the wisdom of lodging quasi-legal authority over medical schools
in the AMA may also be open to question. Without doubt, the quality of
medical education has improved enormously under AMA guidance. And ex-
perienced medical educators and practitioners are best fitted to adjust stand-
ards to the needs and potentialities of the school and student. But the power
to determine supply, which resides inevitably within the power to set stand-
ards, should not rest solely in the hands of a private group which is neither
directly responsible to the public nor necessarily responsive to the nation's re-
quirements.
Licensing of foreign-trained doctors. The establishment of licensure re-
quirements for foreign-trained physicians was not a pressing problem until
the late 1930's.287 With the rise and spread of European totalitarianism, how-
ever, the states received an increasing number of requests for recognition of
foreign credentials. 288 Today there are few displaced European physicians
left.289 But in their place increasing numbers of Americans, unable to gain
285. See, e.g., 152 JAMA 843, 1105 (1953).
286. Bevan, supra note 277, at 377:
"It became perfectly clear, when the problem was analyzed, that we
needed a national influence and control, and that under our constitutional
form of government this could not be exercised by the Federal Government
because the right to decide who should practice medicine belonged to the
individual states.
"It was felt that the best solution was for the American Medical Asso-
ciation to assume this function of national influence and control."
For one view of the effect of this tacit delegation of power see OFFICIAL REPORT OF
THE MEDICAL CARE COMMISSION ON THE EXPANSION OF THE MEDICAL SCHOOL OF TiUE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 108 (1947), reprinted in 13 PEDIATRICS 91 (1954):
"It is the function of the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of
the American Medical Association to be concerned with the national situa-
tion in regard to total personnel supply and hospital beds and with elevation
of standards in medical schools and hospitals. However, past experience
has shown that the Council-just as the official American Medical Asso-
ciation body-has been prone to generalize and has shown little concern in
local state inadequacies in hospitals, medical education, and distribution of
medical care. It is too content to sit complacently, often with ears and eyes
closed, and glory in the greatness of the contributions of American medi-
cine-of which we are all justly proud. It has shown a disappointing lack
of leadership with vision and courage in trying new methods of providing
medical care or in improving medical education. For it the traditional has
become the perfect way."
287. DAVIE, REFuGEFs IN AMERICA 257 (1947) (average of 535 physicians and den-
tists admitted to the United States annually from 1932 to 1944); note 277 supra. But
see Refugees, Unlimited, Medical Economics, Feb., 1939, p. 24 ("coming in droves").
288. Cf. DAVIE, op. cit. supra note 287, at 261.
289. Ibid.; Burgess, Resettlement of the Displaced Physician in the United States,
143 JAMA 413 (1950).
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admission to medical schools at home, have gone abroad to study and now
seek accreditation.290
The official attitude of the state examining boards toward foreign-trained
doctors has largely been the result of state medical society and AIA
policies. 291 By the 1930's, 22 states would not accept foreign physicians at
all.2 9 2 In several others, full citizenship and additional training requirements
achieved the same purpose.293 The exclusion of refugee physicians was ac-
complished over the protest of farmer and labor medical cooperatives, par-
ticularly in states suffering from doctor shortages.2
Since the war, the AMA Council on Medical Education has established a
less restrictive policy toward foreign medical school graduates. -°  The AMA
and AAIC have jointly issued a list of 50 European schools which they
suggest for state board acceptance.290 But the list does not include institutions
from which refugee doctors are likely to come-those of Germany and Aus-
tria 2 9 7 For these doctors an AMA spokesman has recommended adoption
of the procedure followed by the Iowa Board of Medical Examners 0 3 There
the foreign doctor is placed as an assistant in a state institution for one year
during which he receives supervision, refresher courses, and grades from his
physicians-in-charge. At the end of his trial period, his file is considered by
the State Board and he is accepted or rejected.
It is of great importance to American students educated abroad that tvwenty-
three licensing boards have reported willingness to consider graduates of
foreign schools recommended by the AMA.2 0 9 But, despite the A.A's insist-
ence that the list is "tentative" and that "[a]bsence of a school from the list
does not necessarily imply disapproval," 30 0 the tendency among these boards
has been to consider only graduates of already approved schools.301 Yet, of the
1121 American students in foreign schools in 1951, only half were enrolled
in approved schools -.3 0 2 Furthermore, 11 states still do not accept any foreign
credits. 30 3 And even in states which do allow foreign graduates to take the
290. 150 JAIA 125 (1952).
291, DAvIE, op. cit. supra note 237, at 265, 267; cf. Note, Refugees a:d thc Profcs-
sions, 53 HARv. L. REV. 112, 114 (1939). However, some local and state societies have
advocated liberalization in licensure of emigr6 doctors. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
1942, p. 7, col. 4; id., Mar. 9, 1943, p. 22, col. 2; id., April 25, 1943, p. 31, col 3.
292. Burgess, supra note 289, at 415.
293. DAvm, op. cit. supra note 287, at 267-76; Note, mspra note 291, at 113-114.
294. 85 SURvEy 592 (1949); Toledo Blade, Feb. 18, 1950 (Editorial, "The Little
Fishbeins," scores Wisconsin doctors for "arbitrary attitudes" toward foreign-educated
physicians).
295. 139 JAMA 1080 (1949); 142 JAMA 587 (1950); 150 JAMA 125 (1952).
296. 153 JAMA 133 (1953).
297. Ibid.
298. Burgess, supra note 289, at 415.
299. 149 JAMA 470 (1952).
300. 150 JAMA 125 (1952).
301. 149 JAIA 470 (1952).
302. PRCcEEDInGS, 48TH AN. CONG. o Mnu. EDUCATION & LicEuxsuRn 26 (1952).
303. 149 JAMA 470 (1952). See also N.Y. Times, May 19,1954, p. 33, col. 7.
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Board examinations, the percentage of failures among them has been high. 0 4
A European medical education is still not a reliable path to licensure in the
United States.
Determining the Conditions of Practice and Payment
The AMA "Principles of Medical Ethics" 83 0 r is a codification of the doctor's
professional conscience as well as a blueprint for the organization of medical
practice. In theory, the principles are not "laws to govern" but rather "guides
to correct conduct. '300 However, for the doctor they approach legal status
since unethical conduct is a ground for expulsion from every county medical
society.30 7 The code regulates, in general terms, a wide range of the doctor's
conduct, toward his patients,308 other physicians, 30 9 and the public at large.810
Thus it is applicable to most matters affecting medical practice.
This code of ethics is geared to the typical unit of medical practice in
America-the individual practitioner, remunerated on the basis of a fee for
service rendered. But the pressure of changed conditions is forcing modifica-
tions in this pattern. Increased medical knowledge and new techniques have
created the specialties, with consequent increased interdependence among doc-
tors; much modern medicine is practiced by a team rather than by a lone
practitioner. The need for expensive equipment and reliance upon technicians
has made individual entrepreneurship difficult; hospitals, medical consumer
organizations, and groups of doctors-able to supply needed capital-have
hired physicians on a salary basis, shifting risk of loss or chance for gain to
themselves. And a desire to anticipate unpredictable medical expenses has led
the consumer to demand an application of the insurance principle to the cost
of sickness. Each of these modifications-group practice, salaried practice, lay
sponsorship, and prepayment-is still in the experimental stage.
Throughout this period, organized medicine has resisted or attempted to
control change, rather than allow free experimentation. The physicians in
positions of power within the AMA have risen to the top of the profession
via the individual, fee-for-service system. Any significant change in that sys-
tem represents a threat to a familiar and tested method of practice.
The AMA has expressed or rationalized its opposition to change in terms
of ethics. In so doing it has often failed to meet the economic issues realisti-
cally. By counter-proposals, predicated on the fee-for-service system, it has
attempted to satisfy the same needs which brought forth the new methods of
practice. Organized medicine's purpose has thus been to contain developments
304. 149 JAMA 476 (1952).
305. Reprints of the AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS may be found in AMA,
GUIDE TO SERVIcES 101 (1952); AMERICAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY (1950).
306. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS Foreword.
307. See text at notes 69-79 supra.
308. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS C. 2.
309. Id., c. 3.310. Id., a. 4.
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ithin the orthodox pattern. Its effort to do so has called forth all the power
at its command.
Methods of practice
The vast majority of physicians in the United States practice alone.3 1 Yet
group practice 31 offers advantages both to patient and physician.3 13 It affords
fuller use of, and a chance to spread the cost of, technical equipment and per-
sonnel.314 The doctor has ready consultation with other specialist-partners-
a convenience to the patient, and a means of retaining control of the fee.3 1c
Moreover, younger men in the profession, schooled in a dependence upon
other members of the medical care team, often favor medical partnerships31
In the almost automatic referral from partner to partner, characteristic of
group practice, critics have seen an infringement of the patient's free choice
of physician.317 And they consider the division of income according to any
partnership agreement other than value of services rendered, as akin to fee
splitting.31 Early groups were disparaged as unethical3 19 But within recent
years active steps have been taken only against those groups offering a plan
for some type of flat-fee prepayment.3-0 Rather, the AMA has mildly dis-
couraged combined practice by repeatedly denying the necessity for, or suc-
cess of groups.3 2 ' Its studies have emphasized negative aspects of group prac-
311. HUNT & GOLDSTEa, MEDICAL GROUP PrxcrxcI IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (U.S.
Pub. Health Service Publication No. 77, 1951) (of 116,795 physicians in private practice
in 1946, only 3,034 were engaged in full-time group practice).
312. "Medical group practice is a formal association cf three or more physicians pro-
viding services in more than one medical field or specialty, with income from medical
practice pooled and redistributed to the members according to some prearranged plan.'
Hu-xT & GOLDSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1. For other definitions of group practice
see 2 MAGNUSoN REp. 241.
313. Goldmann, Potentialities of Group Practice of Iedicine, 10 Co:N. STATE 1M. J.
289 (1946); Black & Skaggs, Partnwrshlip Practice: Its Pros and Cons, Medical Eco-
nomics, November, 1952, l. 70. But cf. Hunt, Mcdical Group Practice in the Uritcd
States, 237 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 71, 74 (1947) (citing A.MA estimate that the individual
general practitioner can adequately care for 85% of all patients). For a list of advantages
and disadvantages of group practice considered most important by physicians, see HUNT
& GoLDsTEN, op. cit. su~pra note 311, at 47-8.
314. MEANs, DocroRs, PEOPLE, AND Gov Ernimrr 71-2 (1953) ; Goldmann, supra note
313, at 290.
315. HuNT & GOLDSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 311, at 46-7; Black & Skaggs, supra
note 313, at 72.
316. 1 MAGNUSON REP. 33; N.Y. AcAarE.y oF MEic1NE, MEDIcINE n. TtlE Cu;G-
ING ORDER 139 (1947).
317. Hunt, supra note 313, at 74.
318. 3 N.Y. MEDiciNE, Feb. 20, 1947, p. 13 (A43A Judicial Council ruling on division
of fees by groups). The AMA suggested that state or local societies require a group to
file its plan of income division to insure "strict adherence to the ethical principles." Ibid.
319. See, e.g., 99 JAMA 1950 (1932) (labeling groups "guilds or medical soviets").
320. 1 MAGNUsoN REP. 34; Hunt, supra note 313, at 75. See also note 324 infra.
321. See, e.g., 117 JAMA 122 (1941) (digest of second AMA study of group prac-
tice in America).
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tice, such as causes for frequent dissolution of groups and the legal snarls of
partnership agreements.322 Failing to curb the spread of group practice, 28
organized medicine has tried to keep existing groups within traditional bounds
through the ethical code :324 "The ethical principles actuating and governing
a group or clinic are exactly the same as those applicable to the individual."8 25
Methods of remunerating the physician
Eight out of ten practicing physicians are self-employed, either as indi-
vidual entrepreneurs or as members of a partnership firm. 20 But the number
of salaried practitioners has been increasing.3 27 Organized medicine disap-
proves of this trend and has condemned some types of salaried practice as
"unethical," fearing that a doctor's primary loyalty will be to his employer
rather than his patient.3
28
For many years certain familiar types of salaried practice have been accept-
able to the AMA. Physicians engaged in research, public health work, and
teaching do not establish a close relationship with patients, nor could the fee-
for-service system be readily adapted to suit their circumstances. Military
medicine, too, is far removed from the context of private practice. And one
physician may hire another on a salary; the employer is subject to the same
ethical requirements as the employee, and the patient commands the primary
loyalty of both. 20 Furthermore, such employment is usually for training pur-
poses and temporary, similar to internship or residency.
But organized medicine has not accepted some of the newer developments
322. E.g., DIcxINsoN & BRADLEY, DISCONTINUANCE OF MEDICAL GRoups (AMA
Bureau of Med. Econ. Research Bull. 90, 1952).
323. The number of physicians engaged in full-time group practice increased from
2093 in 1940 to an estimated 5000 in 1950. 2 MAGNUSON RE'. 242. However, organized
medicine's attitude has had considerable effect: "[A] hostile attitude on the part of or-
ganized medicine has made it extremely difficult for some groups to recruit or hold new
members. Many forms of professional ostracism, including in some cases denial of mem-
bership in the county medical society, have acted as powerful deterrents to young physi-
cians wanting to associate themselves with groups." 1 id. 34.
324. "When any group practice plan was tied in with a questionable insurance scheme
or when a patient was restricted to a particular group of doctors by his insurance policy
or when any group practice plan restricted a patient in the free choice of a physician, the
Association was never hesitant in voicing bitter objection. This was done in the sole
interest of better medical care for the patient." Statement of Elmer Henderson, M.D.,
ex-President of the AMA, 144 JAMA 934 (1950).
325. AMA, PRIN lPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS c. 1, § 3.
326. WEINFELD, INCOME OF PHYSICIANS, 1929-49, p. 12 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
1951).
327. Ibid. The percentage of salaried practitioners has increased from 13.8% in 19410.
to 22.3% in 1949 (figures exclude physicians in armed forces, internes, and residents).
Id. at 12 n.13.
328. 147 JAMA 1684-5 (1951). See also AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETiuIcs
c. 3, art. 5, § 4.
329. MEANS, DOCTORS, PEOPLE, AND GOVFRNMENT 70 (1953) ; Miller, Relatlioship of
the Anesthesiologist to the Hospital, 139 JAMA 9, 10 (1949).
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in salaried practice. One of the most widespread has been the hiring of doctors
by hospitals.330  The practice of radiology, anesthesiology, and pathology is
most commonly associated with large institutions.3 t Each involves large out-
lay for equipment and deals chiefly with hospitalized patients; none involves
the customary strong doctor-patient relationship. And since these specialty
departments-staffed by salaried '.D.'s-often provide profits which cover
other operating deficits,m2 hospital management is reluctant to abandon this
system.3 3 But the average net income of the salaried specialist ranges well
below that of his self-employed counterpart. The salaried anesthesiologist
averages $10,000 annually; the independent, $12,700. The hired radiologist
averages $12,300 and the independent, $18,500. 33 - These differentials may
have contributed impetus to AMA disapproval and action against hospital
practice.
Medical societies have characterized hospital practice as primarily a moral
problem; they fear exploitation and lowering the dignity of the profession,
and envision lay-employer control as forcing a lower standard of care for the
patient.335 The specially-appointed Hess Committee reaffirmed and clarified
the AMA's long-standing provision against salaried "purveyal of medical ser-
vice." -' 6 The Committee condemned hospital practice and urged component
societies to act against institutions and member physicians who work within
this disapproved framework.33 7
330. Resolution introduced at AMIA Convention, dated June 8, 1947 (copy on file in
Yale Law Library); Snoke, A Step For'ard in Hospital-Physician Rclationships, Hos-
pitals, Oct., 1953, p. 67.
331. 144 JAMNIA 394 (1950).
332. Miller, Relationship of the Anesthesiologist to the Hospital, 139 JAMA 9, 10
(1949) ; cf. Editorial, It will bear watching, Hospitals, Aug., 1949, p. 60.
333. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 332; Editorial, A bid for more money, Hospitals,
Sept., 1949, p. 62-3.
334. WINFELD, INcomE OF PHYsicLtNs 16 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1951) (1949
figures). These differentials may be partly attributed to the fact that salaried physicians
tend to be younger than independents. Id. at 12. See also Iedical Economics, May, 1933,
pp. 118-119.
335. AMNA, RELATION OF PHYSICLNS AND HospiT,%s (1951); GnmMcan., MuIc:Z-
IN Cmisis 41-2 (Reprinted from Providence Journal and Evening Bulletin, March, 1951);
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 21, col. 1; id., Feb. 23, 1954, p. 29, col. 6.
336. 140 JAIA 619 (1949). The Report of the Hess Committee on Hospitals and
the Practice of Medicine was drafted in 1947, revised in 1949, 1950, and 1951; for the final
version, see AIA, RELATION OF PHYSICLU.NS AND HosPr A.s (1951). See also AMA,
PRi-,cipLEs OF AIMEDicAL ETHicS c. 3, art. 5, § 6.
337. 137 JAAA 968 (1948); 140 JAMA 620-1 (1949); Editorial, It vill bcar watch-
ing, Hospitals, August, 1949, p. 60 ("When the Hess Committee members brand as un-
ethical the practice of medicine by a lay corporation, they imply that, under penalty to
losing its appro-al no hospital may employ a doctor on salary."). See also Editrial,
A clear case of misrepresentation, Hospitals, May, 1951, p. 62.
Despite its earlier unequivocal position, the A'MA has not carried out threats of en-
forcement. Its "Guides for Conduct of Physicians in Relationships with Institutons.' 147
JAMA 1684 (1951), omitted suggestions for punitive action. See also Snoke, supra note
330, at 68.
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But there has been neither extensive nor highly successful activity on the
lower levels. The head of anesthesiology of a Boston hospital attempted to
change its salary-plus-share-of-profits system, charging that he was being
forced to split fees with an institution. Although the hospital admitted making
a profit in that department, the local medical society upheld the arrange-
ment.33 8 And similar charges of unethical practices against the Yale Medical
School were dropped. The school was retaining the fees paid to its affiliated
hospital by patients for services of salaried medical school professors.A3 9
While state specialty societies have impeded the spread of salaried practice to
new hospitals by refusing to recommend, or threatening to expel a member
who accepts salaried terms, they have not effected any appreciable change
where the practice is already entrenched.3
40
The national organization is unable to initiate action in cases of individual
violations of the Hess Report since it is bound by its constitution to wait for
charges to proceed through regular channels.841 Instead, its officers have tried
to work out agreements that can deter salary-paying hospitals. They have
requested Blue Cross to refuse to pay hospital bills covering charges for
salaried doctors' services. 42 Conferences have been held with American Hos-
pital Association officials in an effort to work out a compromise arrange-
ment. Both sides have denied an irreconcilable conflict, but after four years
of negotiation there is still no agreement.3 43
Methods of paynent by the consumer
In meeting the cost of illness, the consumer is faced with two alternatives.
Under the traditional method, he pays in accordance with services actually
rendered. 344 But the need for medical attention is unpredictable and falls uin-
338. Boston Herald, Sept. 16, 1951.
339. New Haven Register, May 2, 1951, p. 51, col. 1 (charges made by Executive
Secretary of Connecticut State Medical Society; practice defended by Yale Medical School
Dean) ; Hospitals, Jan., 1952, p. 65 (Medical Society refers charges to AMA Judicial
Council for advice) ; Snoke, supra note 330, at 68, 162 (charges dismissed).
340. See Snoke, supra note 330, at 68.
341. 138 JAMA 1163 (1948); 137 JAMA 968 (1948).
342. GOLDMANN, VOLLTNTARY MEDICAL. CARE INSURANCE 58-9 (1948); 147 JAMA 1684
(1951); 137 JAMA 973 (1948); 42 IOWA STATE MED. Soc. J. 541 (1952).
343. A Proposed New Statement of Hospital-Physician Relationships, Hospitals, Aug.,
1953, p. 78.
344. 1 MAGNUSON REP. 43. The fee-for-service system has been criticized for the
following reasons:
1. The doctor usually varies his fees according to his knowledge of the patient's
ability to pay, often rendering gratuitous services to the needy. Having the doctor ad-
minister an informal "means" test is an unscientific method of apportioning the cost of
illness.
2. Physicians tend to locate in areas where they will receive the highest remuneration
rather than where they are the most needed.
3. To avoid incurring medical expense, patients do not tend to consult their doctors
for periodic checkups or for early diagnosis and treatment.
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evenly throughout the population. 343 The costs of serious illness, particularly
among low-income families, may be financially disastrous. Prepaid health in-
surance can alleviate such consequences by spreading the risk and expense
over a large group. 340 Under prepayment, the consumer pays in advance to
receive medical care and treatment if and when they are needed-not for ser-
vices actually received. 317 Consequently he can budget a regular portion of
his income to cover such potential medical needs as hospitalization, surgery,
or complete medical care.
The AMA endorses the principle of health insurance provided participation
is voluntary.34 8 However, organized medicine has not always had this favor-
able attitude.349 In 1932, the report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical
Care, advocating expansion and development of voluntary prepayment plans,
4. Severe illness may be financially disastrous to some families.
See Davis, Problems and Present Methods of Financing Health Sen'ies in 4 MA.c:soN
REP. 104; MEANS, DoCros, PEOPLE, AND GovERNMEsNr 67-70 (1953).
345. GoLD.&AxN, VOLUNTARY MNEDICAL CARE IS RAN Ec 5-6 (1948).
346. Ibid.; Cooley, The Pote;tials of Voluntary Health Insurance in 4 MAGNUSON
REP. 76; 2 id. at 257.
347. Ibid.
348. See, e.g., Cooley, supra note 346 (statement of Secretary of AMA Council on
Medical Service before Magnuson Commission); AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMIENT ME-
CAL BENEFrr PLANs (1953).
349. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 95 F. Supp. 103, 113, 113
(D. Ore. 1950), aff'd, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). See, generally, DAvis, AErmcA OrGAm.zEs
MEDICINE 166-9 (1941); M.,ALmIB.RG, 140 MILLION PAT.E.Ts 209-11 (1947).
The AMA's defense of its early record on the prepayment issue is set forth in DIcIcN-
sON, A BP=xn HISTORY OF THE ATTIT DE OF THE Am1nuca:z MEDICAL ASS0CIATiON
TowARD VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURv.NCE (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ. Research Bull.
No. 70, 1949). But the American Hospital Association's reaction was one of skepticism:
"Bulletin 70 sets out to prove that 'the American Medical Association
has never opposed voluntary sickmess insurance plans in this country as they
exist today.' It quotes many official statements between 1916 and 1933. It
points out that the opposition expressed-and this was sometimes pretty
-vicious-was aimed at earlier types of plans, not at those currently in opera-
tion. This document is not wholly convincing to hospital and Blue Cross
leaders whose experience dates back a few years. Nowhere in the selected
quotes is there a genuine word of encouragement to voluntary plans, much
less a sign of leadership. There are words of caution, of criticism, of fear
and warning. There are no words of confidence in the pioneers of voluntary
sickness insurance, no words of faith in the principle of prepayment, and not
even a forthright statement that some way must be found to make medical
and hospital services more widely available.
"It is a sad fact that through the 1930's and early 1940's, the American
Medical Association did not believe in voluntary sickness insurance and did
almost everything possible to prevent its development. It is a much happier
fact that during the last few years a great change has been under way.
The American Medical Association has supported constructive federal legis-
lation. It has so tempered its official recommendations that state and county
medical societies can now support Blue Shield plans. Today it is joining
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was severely condemned. 350 Experimentation with various methods of pre-
paid hospitalization, such as Blue Cross, was disparaged and discouraged.861
The AMA today explains this early opposition on the grounds of inadequate
standards of care under existing plans, insufficient payment to physicians, and
a fear of governmental domination leading to compulsory participation.8 2
However, although some early plans did exploit both patient and physician,
medical society opposition was directed against almost all such schemes.86
Not until serious proposals for governmental compulsory health insurance
materialized did organized medicine enthusiastically espouse voluntary pre-
payment. 354 State societies, encouraged by the AMA, then took the lead in
establishing insurance plans. 355 At the same time, the AMA attempted to
shape voluntary plans into an approved patternm 3 5
with other organizations in search of a formula that will make adequate
health care universally available-with voluntary prepayment as the basis.
"This is the big news of 1949. The old record is not good, and Bulletin
70 cannot make it look good, but what's the difference? A new bulletin
which leaves no doubt that the American Medical Association is now and
hereafter determined to find the formula would be a better answer to the
association's critics. It would also speed the day when a workable formula
is in operation." Editorial, Hospitals, Dec. 1949, p. 60.
350. 99 JAMA 1950, 1952 (1932) ; 100 JAMA 973 (1933). See notes 585-6 infra and
accompanying text; MALMBERG, Op. cit. supra note 349, at 209; MEANS, op. cit. .upra note
344, at 141-2.
351. See, e.g., 100 JAMA 973 (1933) (editorial condemning group hospitalization
plans as "half-baked experiments in changing the nature of medical practice."); Minor,
The Political Make-up of the American Medical Association, Medical Economies, Feb.,
1947, p. 80, 84:
"[Ilt is difficult to reconcile with actuality the popular fiction . . . that the
AMA has always fostered experimentation in voluntary prepayment plans.
The fact is that the AMA did nothing positive to encourage voluntary health
insurance until the formation of Associated Medical Care Plans only a year
ago, though in 1938 the House of Delegates had enunciated certain prin-
ciples approving voluntary hospitalization plans, reversing an action taken
five years previously when the plans had been roundly condemned. During
the early struggles of the plans, many state and county societies, far from
aiding in their development, actually opposed them; and it is reported reliably
that AMA officers from time to time expressed consternation at their grow-
ing popularity. To Blue Cross executives, among others, the doctrinaire
view crediting the AMA with early sponsorship of experimental voluntary
prepayment programs emerges as a simple untruth."
352. DIcKINSON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION TOWARD VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ.
Research Bull. No. 70, 1949). See also Henderson, A Fancy Package of Untruths, 144
JAMA 933, 934 (1950).
353. See notes 349, 351 supra.
354. See notes 590-1, 650-3 infra and accompanying text.
355. See text at notes 433-8, 444 infra.
356. See, e.g., the AMA standards of acceptance for medical care plans, in AMA,
VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 148-50 (1953).
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Prepayment plans may insure against the costs of hospitalization and/or the
expense of physicians' services. The most common type of health insurance
covers only specified hospital services.357 Commercial insurance companies,3 6
as well as the familiar non-profit Blue Cross plans,359 offer such policies.
State medical societies have approved the Blue Cross plans,c0 but have ob-
jected to the reimbursement to hospitals for services of their salaried doc-
tors.36'1 Other than this objection, and concern over the economic soundness
of some insurers, 3 62 hospitalization plans have caused no recent controversy
within organized medicine.
The recent development of insurance covering the costs of physicians' ser-
vices, however, has raised more fundamental problems. Two major types of
medical care plans have appeared30 3 Under the cash indemnity system, money
benefits are paid to cover specified medical expenses when incurred by the
insured. The patient consults his own physician and is reimbursed by the
insurance company according to a stipulated schedule. The insurance check
may or may not equal the full amount of the doctor's bill. The physician has
no contractual relationship with the insurer; he enjoys complete freedom as
to the method of rendering his service and determining his fee. Such policies
are offered by commercial firms 3- or by several state medical societies under
non-profit Blue Shield incorporation.30 3
In contrast, medical service plans offer their benefits in terms of physicians'
services. The patient can consult only a participating physician, from whom
he receives any needed care for which he has contracted. The physician is
reimbursed for his services by the insurer according to a previous agreement,
which may also determine the manner of practice. Lay organizations,0 0 inde-
357. SERBEIN, PAING FOR MEDIc.u. CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 377 (1953).
358. See generally, Mliller, An Evaluation of Medical Care Plans U:dcwritea by
Insurance Companies in 4 MLAkGN USoN REP. 55.
359. GoLD ANN, VOLUNT.RY MEoICAL CaRE IsvrAN::C 93-113 (194); SMe-
REIN, op. cit. sipra note 357, at 344-7; McNary, An Evaltiatlion of Blue Cross Plans in 4
MAGNusoN REP. 42.
360. AIA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT %aExcIL BENEFIT P.ANS (1953); Nv Yo
AcADEmy OF MEDICINE, MEDICINE IN THE CHANGING ORDER 35 (1947). See also collec-
tion of Blue Cross literature, on file in Yale Law Library.
361. See sources cited note 342 sura.
362. DICKINsON, A BRIEF HIsTORY OF THE ATrliTUDE OF TIHE A:mERIC:. M iICAL
AsSOcIATION TOWARD VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ.
Research Bull. No. 70, 1949).
363. On medical care insurance see, generally, GOLDMANN, VOLUNTARY MEDICAL Cum
I.N-SURANcE (1948); Nmv YoRK AcmeY OF MEIciNE, MEDICINE IN' ThE CHANGING
OrDER 199 et seq. (1947); SERBEIN, PAYING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNlTEF STATES
75-198, 339-55 (1953).
364. Miller, supra note 358.
365. AMA, VOLUNT.RY PREPAYMNT EDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 151-3 (1953).
366. AMA, THE GROWTH OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH IN STAN E 6 (1952) (reporting
over 100 independent plans including those sponsored by rural cooperatives, industry, and
union groups).
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pendent groups of physicians, 67 and a few state medical societies 808 have
sponsored such plans. The majority of medical society plans employ a com-
bination of the two methods, providing for service coverage to lower income
groups and cash indemnification for others.30 9 This permits the physician to
collect from higher income groups a fee above that granted him by the insurer.
Only under medical service plans does the insurer become a middleman
dealing with both physician and patient. He contracts with consumers to
furnish care, and must then obtain this care by securing physicians' services.
As contractee with both parties, the insurer is in a strategic position to deter-
mine the standard of medical care, services covered, financial arrangements
with both parties, consumer membership eligibility, and type of physician
participation. For this reason, organized medicine has laid great stress on the
sponsorship and control of service plans.370
If a medical service plan is operated for profit, the AMA fears exploitation
of both patient (through lowering of standards) and physician (by reduction
of income).371 This objection cannot pertain to cash indemnity systems-even
those operated commercially-because the doctor deals only with the patient
and retains control over standards and fee-setting. Service plans controlled
by state medical societies are said to provide professional safeguards for the
patient and a free choice of physician.372 Also the AMA believes that medical
society sponsorship shifts the consequences of financial failure.373 Subscribers
of some early insolvent service plans never received paid-for benefits since
funds were insufficient to engage doctors3 74 But in medical society plans,
participating doctors guarantee to provide their services, bearing the risk of
the insurer's financial inadequacy.37 5 More important from the standpoint of
the profession, medical society plans are open to all member doctors, 70 and
therefore do not affect competition within the membership group. Further-
more, remuneration rates are set on an individual fee-for-service basis s7
and at a level determined by medical society representatives. 378
367. See, e.g., The Ross-Loos Medical Group in AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT
MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 27 (1953).
368. AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 1SI-3 (1953).
369. Ibid.
370. Id. at 9-16; Hayden, An Evaluation of Blue Shield Plans in 4 MAGNUSON REP.
47 (1953).
371. AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 9 (1953).
372. Id. at 148-50; Hayden, supra note 370, at 53.
373. DICKINSON, METHODS AND RATES OF PAYMENT 4 (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ.
Research Misc. Publication M-43, 1950).
374. Id. at 3.
375. Id. at 4.
376. Medical societies and Blue Shield commissions are making strenuous efforts to
enlist the participation of physicians. See, e.g., sample solicitation letters from Kansas
Blue Cross-Blue Shield and Medical Service Association of Pennsylvania, on file in Yale
Law Library. As of December 31, 1951, more than 118,000 doctors had enrolled. FAST
FAcTS ABOUT BLUE SHIELD (1952) (Blue Shield Medical Care Plans pamphlet, on file
in Yale Law Library).
377. Hayden, supra note 370, at 51.
378. See, e.g., AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 21, (1953)
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At one time, organized medicine vigorously attacked prepaid service plans
operated by independent physicians ;37 some of these arrangements now re-
ceive qualified approval. 3 0 These plans have uniformly combined prepayment
with group practice.38 ' The choice of physician is thus limited to those prac-
ticing as a unit ;382 subscribers are removed from the doctor's competitive
market for patients. The economies of group practice may also enhance the
plan's competitive position.3s 3 But because the insurer is a group of doctors,
themselves subject to ethical precepts, the AIA does not fear exploitation
of this favorable economic position. Rates to subscribers, compensation to
participating practitioners, and standards of practice are all under professional
control. Medical societies do not encourage such plans, but, unless they vio-
late the professional code by such tactics as advertising, neither do they
actively oppose them.3s 4
The major area of controversy over voluntary health insurance concerns
lay-sponsored service plans. 3 5 There has been little change in organized
medicine's tenacious opposition to provisions found in such plans. However,
the AMA has provided a method for approval of these schemes if they con-
form to certain principles.38 0 The concessions necessary to gain organized
medicine's approval are so severe 387 that, as yet, virtually none have com-
plied.3 88
(Arizona Blue Shield Iedical Service: 15 directors of whom 10 must be members of the
state medical society) ; id. at 25 (California Physicians' Service: Board of Trustees con-
sisting of 14 physicians and 5 laymen, all appointed by California Medical Assuciatvn).
See also id. at 148, Standards of Acceptance for Medical Care Plans § 2(a) : "The plan
should provide for the appointment of a committee by the Medical profession in the area
served by the plan. One of the duties of this committee shall be the determination of
relative values of medical services and procedures as set forth in the plan's published
schedule of benefits...."
379. See, e.g., text at notes 415-20 infra.
380. See testimony of H. Clifford Loos, M4.D., in Hearings before House Con:niltee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on 'ohlntary Health Insurance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
1464, 1468 (1954).
381. Cf. GOLD EANx, op. cit. supra note 363, at 59, 148-50.
382. Id. at 16.
393. See text at notes 312-16 supra.
384. Cf. Hearings, supra note 380, at 1468-9.
385. See pages 989-96 infra.
386. See Standards of Acceptance for Medical Care Plans in AMA, VoL:rAn
PREPAYMIENT MEDICAL BNEFrr PLAxs 148-50 (1953). For a brief account of the his-
torical development of the AMA's criteria see id. at 9-13.
387. Perhaps the most difficult hurdle to overcome in obtaining medical society ap-
proval is §3 of the Standards, supra note 386: "Free choice of Physician: There should
be no regulation which restricts free choice of a qualified doctor of medicine in the
locality covered by the plan who is willing to give service under the conditions established."
State and local medical societies, which have the initial power to evaluate plans, § 1, have
interpreted this free choice provision to exclude prepaid group practice plans which limit
coverage to services performed by participating doctors in the group. Baehr, An Evalvatiall
of Independent Prepayment Plans for Medical Care in 4 M. oitcsO. REP. 61.
Other conditions for acceptance which lay-sponsored plans may find objectionable in-
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The earliest of the lay-sponsored service plans were formed by industrial
employers.38 9 Employee groups, often under collective bargaining agreements
calling for management support, soon followed., 0 Schools and universities
often employ this device to insure their student bodies. 9 1 The number of
potential subscribers in each instance is limited to the size of the specified
group. On the other hand, groups of consumers outside of industry have
formed cooperatives or community-sponsored non-profit corporations to pro-
vide prepaid medical services.3 2 These are open to the entire community,
subject only to the limitations of available facilities. AMA opposition to this
latter type has been much more pronounced than to restricted membership
plans.
Regardless of the nature of the sponsoring body, the AMA has laid great
stress upon placing control in professional hands.8 3  Such control involves
two aspects: over standards of medical care, and over terms of physician
participation. Lay sponsoring bodies readily grant the former.8 4 But the
power to set terms of physician participation means determination of the
method of practice and the type and level of doctor remuneration. This, in
effect, means control over the table of fees which the plan pays the physician
and consequently the rates which the plan must charge the consumer. Further-
more, this latter aspect of professional control must, to meet AMA approval,
be vested in a committee representing all the doctors in the community, not
just those serving the plan.3 9 So in order to qualify for approval, the lay-
sponsored plan must duplicate the essential elements of medical society plans.
Thus it would relinquish the very power which might enable it to outbid
individual practitioners and other prepayment systems in the medical market.
clude § 2(a), quoted supra note 378 (value of medical services to be set unilaterally by
medical profession rather than by sponsoring body and participating physicians) ; § 10(d)
(the plan's medical director to be acceptable to county or state medical society) ; § 8 (pro-
motional activities subject to approval of organized medicine).
388. Baehr, supra note 387, at 62 (only one "consumer or community-sponsored" plan
approved by a state medical society). As yet, none has the AMA's approval. AMA,
VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS (1953).
389. GOLDMANN, VOLUNTARY MEDICAL CARE INSURANCE 148 (1948). For a descrip-
tion of the Endicott-Johnson plan, one of the most famous of the employer-sponsored
programs, see MEANS, DocTORS, PEOPLE, AND GOVERNMENT 132-3 (1953) ; SERIJEIN, PAY-
ING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNIrED STATES 224 (1953).
390. GOLDMANN, op. cit. supra note 389, at 148. See description of several employee
plans in SERBEIN, op. cit. sitpra note 389, c. 18.
391. DICKINSON & WELKER, SECOND SURVEY OF UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE HEALTII
SERVICES: 1949-1950 (AMA Bureau of Med. Econ. Research Bull. No. 88, 1952).
392. GOLDMANN, op. cit. sufpra note 389, at 148-9; SERIEIN, op. Cit. supra note 389,
at 157-61, 164.
393. See note 387 supra.
394. E.g., in the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, the "entire responsi-
bility for medical matters and the determination of all professional standards are delegated
to a medical board and the medical aspects of the programs are supervised by a medical
director and his staff." Hearings, supra note 380, at 1585. Hansen, Laws Affecting Group
Health Plans, 35 IOWA L. REV. 209 (1950).
395. Standards of Acceptance for Medical Care Plans § 2(a), quoted supra note 378.
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Virtually all disapproved service plans render medical care through group
practice. 390 The combination of lay-sponsored prepayment and group practice
has been condemned by the AMA as "panel medidne."397 The subscriber
must seek his medical services from the limited number of doctors in the
group; the AMA views this as a denial of his free choice of physician. 9s
But from the non-participating doctor's standpoint, there is also a denial of
access to potential patients. Another reason for medical society hostility to
the "panel medicine" combination is its tendency to employ disfavored methods
of remunerating the doctor.3 99 Distribution of the group's income on a fee-
for-service basis is apparently not utilized. 400 Payment according to the num-
ber of patients treated, another possible method, is condemned as tending to
lower the quality of care to each individual. 40 1 The most common form of
physician payment is by salary.4 2
From the consumer's standpoint, prepayment group practice schemes offer
several advantages. Aside from the economies of group practice, these plans
tend to offer more thorough coverage.40 3 Subscribers may contract to receive
comprehensive medical care, often with hospitalization as well. 404 Because it
is to the advantage of the plan to minimize illness among members preventive
medicine is often stressed.405 In contrast, most medical society plans limit
benefits, up to a stipulated maximum, to surgery and medical care for hospi-
talized cases.400 To justify the exclusion of such low cost services as occa-
sional house and office calls, the AMA contends that these costs are not sus-
ceptible to the insurance principle.40 7  The risk falls evenly and widely
throughout the population so that the administrative costs of such insurance
396. Goldmann, Potentialities of Group Practice of Medicine, 10 Co::::. STAT EftP.
J. 289, 293 (1946).




400. HUNT & GOL)STEIN, MEDICAL GnouP PRACTICE IN TME UtIiTD STATS 19-20,
66-70 (U.S. Pub. Health Service Publication No. 77, 1951) (fee-for-service nut included
among prevailing methods of distribution); Goldmann, supra note 396, at 293 (same).
401. E.g., Master, supra note 397, at 766: "The basic fault of panel medicine is that
the physician is paid a per capita fee per year, regardless of how much or how little time
he devotes to a patient. Being only human, the panel physician is tempted to run patients
through his office on a mass production basis ... so as to increase his annual incume."
402. HUXT & GoLDsTErN, op. cit. supra note 400, at 19.
403. GoLDMANN, op. cit. supra note 389, at 152-3; Badr, supra note 387; Hansen,
supra note 394, at 210.
404. Ibid.
405. GOLDmANN, op. cit. supra note 3L9, at 152; MEAIts, D,,troas, P ,;t.
Govr.rE 125, 135 (1953).
406. See description of benefits offered by medical society spLunowtd Blue Shicld
plans in AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYM1ENT M uICAL BENEFIT PLANS 19-119 (1953).
407. Dic=iNso-, MrETHODS AND R.xrEs OF PAYMENT 5 (AIMA Bureau uf Mot Ec,u.
Research Misc. Publication M-43, 1950); Hayden, An Evalhation of B)lre Shield Ilais
in 4 MAGNusoN REP. 47, 49-50.
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are unjustified. 40 8 But this argument does not apply to a vast range of un-
usual medical exigencies which do not require hospitalization.
The public demand for broader coverage 40 and competition with lay-spon-
sored prepayment systems has forced many medical society plans to liberalize
their terms. 410 Some now offer "disaster" riders, covering costs above the
standard maximum.4 11 A few have removed income discrimination 412 while
others have expanded benefits to cover complete medical care.418
Methods of controlling disapproved voluntary prepaid health insurance plans
Even a close analysis of the AMA attitude toward various types of pre-
paid insurance schemes does not provide absolute predictability of medical
society reaction to any given plan. All non-medical society plans contain a
diversity of features any of which may be objectionable either alone or in
combination with others. Intangible factors such as the climate of political
and public opinion, the prestige and influence of the lay-sponsors, and the
intensity of professional attitude also govern medical society responses. Yet
the two broad considerations of professional integrity and economic interest
set outer limits beyond which no privately sponsored plan can venture with-
out incurring vigorous opposition. And these factors provide clues to probable
intensity of resistance against any plan containing objectionable features.
Discrimination against participating physicians. For many years attempts
to form medical service plans were opposed by organized medicine through
direct disciplinary action against participating physicians. The medical practi-
tioner has much to lose when membership in his medical society or the good
will of fellow physicians are denied him. It was therefore inevitable that
organized medicine would apply its strongest weapon in opposing early at-
tempts to form medical service plans. The AMA's record contains various
examples of techniques for disciplining physicians associated with disapproved
schemes. 414
408. Ibid. Dr. Hayden advocates a system of "coinsurance," whereby the insurer and
insured would each make partial payment for ambulatory diagnostic services and home
and office care. This might prevent any possible excessive or unwarranted utilization of
benefits.
409. Baehr, siapra note 387, at 61.
410. See Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society,
39 Wash.2d 586, 599, 237 P.2d 737, 745 (1951).
411. See, e.g., California Physicians' Service, Benefits in AMA, VOLUNTARY PRE-
PAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 25 (1953); ef. GOLDMANN, Op. Cit. supra note 389,
at 84.
412. See Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society,
supra note 410, at 602, 237 P.2d at 747 (absence of salary restriction in cooperative plan
led to liberalization of medical society terms). At present, the Washington Physicians
Service has no income limits. AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS
100 (1953).
413. AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS (1953).
414. See generally CoMmir ON RESEARCH IN MEDICAL ECONOMICS, RESTRICTIONs
ON FREE ENTERPRISE IN MEDICINE (1949) ; 96 CONG. REc. 13904-18 (1950).
[Vol, 63: 937
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
In 1929 the employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power entered into a doctor-sponsored prepayment service through an agree-
ment with the newly-established Ross-Loos Clinic. 415 The plan called for com-
prehensive medical care by the Clinic group's participating physicians as well
as hospitalization insurance benefits. 416 Subsequently, some of the Clinic's
doctors, including a former president of the Los Angeles Cuunty Medical
Society, were expelled by that Society.417 They were later reinstated on
appeal by the AIA's Judicial Council because of procedural defects in the
local society's action.41 8 Since that time the Ross-Loos Clinic has not en-
415. GoLDMANN, VOLUNTARY MIcl. C.wnn I-sTrLNcE 172 (1943). For general dis-
cussions of the Ross-Loos Clinic and its development see id. at 172-b; .MNi.s, Dazro.r,
PEOPLE, AND GoizaNMENT 130-1 (1953); Testimony of H. Clifford Laos, .M.O., in
Hearings before House Committce on Interstate and Foreign Conanerce on Volntarj%
Health In srance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1451 (1954).
1 416. Included in the coverage were house and office calls, diagnostic services, medical
treatment, surgery of all kinds, and hospitalization. Dependents of enrolled city employees
received the same services, though small additional charges such as 50 cents for an office
call and one dollar per house call were made for their coverage. The employee paid
twro dollars a month. The Nation, Aug. 1, 1936, p. 127.
417. Hearings, supra note 415, at 1454. Copies of the expulsion letters received by
Drs. Ross and Loos appear in their brief on appeal from the Los Angeles County Medical
Association to the Council of the California Medical Association, pp. 9, 26, 27 (1934)
(copy on file in Yale Law Library).
Expulsion was also directed against a prepayment rural cooperative medical plan
established in Elk City, Oklahoma in 1929; the plan contained many features vhich
organized medicine opposed: it owned a hospital staffed by salaried physicians, had
aspects of lay control, offered nearly complete coverage, and solicited membership. The
plan's founder, Dr. Michael Shadid, was expelled from his local Beckham County Medical
Society by the unique device of dissolving the Society and reforming thereafter without
him. Physicians employed by the hospital repeatedly were refused membership, and b~th
the local and state societies sought revocation of Dr. Shadid's license to practice medicine.
SHADiD, A DocToR FoR THE PEOPLE (1939) ; Plaintiff's Petition, Civil No. 11211, District
Court In and For Beckham County, Okla., 19.50 (copy on file in Yale Law Library).
In 1950, the cooperative and staff members filed suit for $3 0,000 damages and an in-
junction against the Beckham County Medical Society, alleging restraint of trade. The
action wras compromised before trial: the Society agreed to admit members of the
cooperative staff; the hospital agreed to open its facilities to Society physicians. Proposi-
tions of settlement betveen Farmers Union Hospital Association and Beckham County
Medical Society (on file in Yale La, Library). This agreement has been termed "clearly
a victory for the cooperative." Means, The Best Medicine for the Patient, Atlantic
Monthly, Dec. 1952, pp. 53, 57.
418. 106 JA.IA 300 (1936) ; Hearings, supra note 415, at 1454.
While expulsion cases like Ross-Loos may be carried on appeal to the A.MA Judicial
Council, a physician who is denied membership has no such recourse. See notes S0-2 and
accompanying text. In Chicago, for example, physicians associated with the Civic Medical
Center, a doctor-controlled prepayment group practice, were denied membership in the
Chicago M1edical Society. Admission wras refused, ostensibly because the group, for its
first ten months of operation, and a predecessor group, had advertised. But eleven years
after discontinuance of this practice none of the staff wvas admitted to membership despite
repeated formal applications and attempts to obtain personal hearings. Both the Illintois
State Medical Society and the AMA denied jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a noni-
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
countered further opposition from organized medicine;410 neither has it ac-
cepted opportunities for normal expansion of its facilities or enrollment. 42
In 1937 HOLC employees in the District of Columbia organized Group
Health Association, a non-profit, prepayment medical care and hospitalization
program for a limited number of qualified Government employees. Physicians
were hired on a full-time salary basis to provide low-cost medical care for
members and their families.4 21 The local medical society, however, objected
to this lay-sponsored group and employed its coercive powers to destroy this
competitive threat to private practitioners. The District Medical Society ex-
pelled or otherwise disciplined several of the doctors hired by Group Health ;4-'
in some instances mere threats of such action led to resignations from the
GHA staff.423 Moreover, the Society circulated a "white list" of approved
organizations and individuals, from which GHA was excluded, thereby making
it impossible for GHA doctors to obtain consultation with fellow physicians.
42 4
member concerning a local society ruling. Hearings before Comniittee on Education and
Labor on S. 1606, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2634-42 (1946).
419. Hearings, supra note 415, at 1464.
420. Testimony of Dr. Loos, Hearings, supra note 415, at 1469: "If I had accepted
all the groups that applied to us, we would need our city hall to house us. We have put
the brakes on. We can't accept too many. We feel we can't be too big."
421. United States v. American Medical Association, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
422. Id. at 707; Transcript of Record, p. 599, American Medical Association v. United
States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
Another early example of expulsion as a disciplinary technique occurred in Logan
County, Arkansas, where the entire county society was expelled through the State So-
ciety's revocation of its charter. The County Society was allegedly dominated by physi-
cians participating in a disapproved prepayment plan. 27 J. AzR. MED. Soc. 29 (1930). For
other examples of expulsion of physicians associated with prepayment plans, see United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 95 F. Supp. 103, 115 (D. Ore. 1950), aff'd, 343
US. 326 (1952) ; Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 669 (1930).
423. United States v. American Medical Association, supra note 421, at 707. The
threat of expulsion has usually been sufficient to inhibit the development of prepayment
plans. E.g., in Williston, North Dakota, such threats allegedly resulted in an insufficient
staff for the Farmers Union Medical Service. CooPE-.axnv HEALTH FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, STATEMENT TO THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIAnoN 8 (1948). See also Com-
MITrEE ON RESEARCH IN MEDICAL ECONOMICS, Op. cit. supra note 414, at 10: "More fre-
quently, . . . the doctors giv[e] up connection with the prepayment plan, or declin[e] to
go ahead with the lay group seeking to organize it. Many plans have thus (lied a-borning."
424. United States v. American Medical Association, supra note 421, at 706-7. Copies
of the "white list" were mailed to District Society members and to all Washington hos-
pitals. An accompanying letter reminded recipients of a rule forbidding association with
disapproved organizations. Transcript of Record, American Medical Association v.
United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aft'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
See also COMMITrEE ON RFSEARCH IN MEDICAL ECONoMICS, op. cit. supra note 414, at
11-12 (San Diego Medical Society "white listing" by advertisement in telephone directory
designating member doctors and statement implying that those not on the list were poorly
qualified) ; Transcript of Record, p. 3927, United States v. Oregon State Medical Society,
343 U.S. 326 (1952). (The Multnomah [Portland, Ore.] County Medical Society dis-
couraging consultation by members with physicians in disapproved plans).
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Furthermore Group Health had no hospital of its own but depended upon
the availability and cooperation of local institutions. The AMA and the
District Medical Society virtually crippled GHA by enlisting nearly all the
hospitals in the District to deny GHA physicians staff privileges and bed space
for their patients.- The effective combination of these tactics resulted in the
Justice Department's successful criminal prosecution of organized medicine
under the Sherman Act.4 6
In the State of Washington, Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound was
created in 1946 to give prepaid medical and hospital service to members of
several granges, unions, and consumer cooperatives. It hired a staff of
twenty doctors to be remunerated by salary and participation with subscrihers
in a profit sharing arrangement.- 7 Like the District of Columbia group, it
lacked hospital facilities of its own. 42s Again local medical society intervention
caused hospitals throughout the area to refuse GHC doctors staff privileges,
and even emergency surgical facilities. 4209 The Society's characterization of
425. In June, 1937, when Group Health appeared to be gaining strength in the District
of Columbia, the AMA for the first time in several years conducted an inspection of
Washington hospitals to determine which should retain AMA approval. Immediately
thereafter five hospitals were sent copies of the Mundt Resolution adopted by the AMA
House of Delegates in 1934, limiting hospitals approved for intern training to those staffed
by members of component medical societies. Transcript of Record, pp. 7,q-5 American
Medical Association v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
On Nov. 3, 1937, the District Medical Society decided to explore possible application of
the Mundt Resolution as "an apparent means of hindering the successful operation of
Group Health Association, Inc." Id. at 42. Subsequently a copy of the following rezolu-
tion was sent to each local hospital:
"R.EsoLVED, That as a matter of educational policy the Medical Society of the
District of Columbia strongly recommends that all hospitals engaged in
the teaching and training of residents, interns, and nurses, where possible,
follow the recommendations of the American Medical Association regarding
the constitution of their entire Medical Staffs, namely, that each appointee
be a member of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia... and a
member of the American Medical Association." Id. at 459.
For results of this policy see id. at 693-8, 753 ct scq. (Group Health physician denied
courtesy privileges in a Washington hospital to operate on his hospitalized patient since
he was associated with disapproved plan).
See also note 93 supra.
426. American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). For a
description of the present operation of Group Health Association, see Hcarings, supra
note 415, at 1801 et seq.
427. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society,
39 Wash2d 586, 603, 237 P.2d 737, 747 (1951).
428. Although Group Health owned a 55 bed hospital in Seattle, id. at 604, 237 P2d
at 748, it depended upon outside facilities for its subscribers, id. at 619, 237 P2d at 755.
429. Id. at 617-25, 237 P2d at 754-8. In one instance a GHC physician w,.as allegedly
refused surgical facilities when medical society members threatened to remove their
patients if he were granted emergency bed space, although there were one hundred b:ds
then available. Brief for Appellants, pp. 23-5.
In Tampa, Florida, a physician furnishing services under contract to a comprehensive
cooperative health plan x-as denied membership in the Hillsborough County -Medical So-
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GHC's staff as "unethical" resulted in its withholding or withdrawing member-
ship from several physicians who consequently lost consultation privileges and
certification by specialty boards requiring society membership.430 In 1949
Group Health doctors sued to enjoin the county medical society under a pro-
vision of the Washington State Constitution forbidding combinations or agree-
ments to fix prices or limit production of any "commodity. '431 In 1951, the
Washington Supreme Court decided for the Cooperative and delivered a force-
ful condemnation of organized medicine's tactics in attempting to halt the de-
velopment of private medical programs in the state.432
Sponsorship and promotion of competing plans and restrictive legislation.
Despite determined medical society disciplinary action against staff members
of disapproved prepayment groups, various forms of medical service plans
have continued to grow steadily. Furthermore, the use of discriminatory
tactics has been found illegal under both federal and state law. Consequently,
organized medicine has softened the use of such techniques, and adopted sub-
tler, but possibly more effective methods of meeting the threat of prepayment
plans.
A concerted effort to set up competing medical society sponsored and con-
trolled plans was the first of these.18 3 Before 1940 three such plans, California
Physicians' Service, Michigan Medical Service, and Western New York
Medical Plan, were in actual operation. 434 But their formation focused attention
upon two legal questions: whether these plans were subject to state laws
governing insurance companies and insurance contracts; and whether these
plans constituted the unlawful corporate practice of medicine. 435 In several
ciety and subsequently barred from the local hospital because he was not a member of that
organization. A temporary injunction was issued to permit him to use the hospital.
Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. OF Cmi. L. REv. 171, 196-7 (1951).
See also Hearings, supra note 418, at 2642-3 (Civic Medical Center group denied
access to all but two Chicago hospitals) ; Transcript of Record, pp. 1967-74, United States
v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (non-members already on hospital
staff allowed to remain, but no new non-member applicants admitted to staff; society
membership also a requisite for position on hospital's governing body).
430. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39
Wash.2d 586, 627-32, 237 P.2d 737, 759-62 (1951).
431. WASH. CONsT. Art. XII, § 22.
432. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39
Wash.2d 586, 237 P2d 737 (1951). Justice Hamley, for the Washington Supreme Court,
declared: "There can be no question but that the purpose of the combination in the
instant case is to pre-empt and control all contract practice of medicine in King County.
If respondents are successful in this effort, there will be no competition in the contract
medicine field. Members of the public will have no opportunity to choose between two
or more plans offering this type of service. The result will be a complete monopoly of
this product throughout the county." id. at 640, 237 P.2d at 766.
433. These early plans, spurred on by the depression, were originally designed to ex-
periment with prepayment for the "borderline income group," one step above the indigent.
Holman & Cooley, Voluntary Health Insurance it the United States, 35 IOWA L. RLy.
183, 190 (1950).
434. Id. at 191.
435. See generally, Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IowA L. Rav.
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jurisdictions, these obstacles had proved fatal to non-society plans.40 0 While
the elimination of these obstacles to the development of medical society plans
provided much of the incentive for organized medicine's promotion of special
enabling legislation,437 many of the resulting laws were also designed to ensure
medical control of all ensuing prepayment schemes.4 39
To a varying degree most of these statutes restrict the formation and opera-
tion of plans to those with medical society approval or control.43n One type of
statute requires that a majority of directors be doctors 440 or they may provide
for state medical society approval of directors.441 Other statutes bar any pre-
payment plan from providing medical services unless it includes a majority of
the licensed physicians in tile area of service.442 The practical effect of such
laws is to prevent lay sponsors or small medical groups from offering prepaid
services.
The increased threat of compulsory national health insurance in the 194'S
gave added impetus to organized medicine's development of its own voluntary
medical care plans. Although disapproved voluntary plans gained little or no
respite from organized medicine, society sponsored plans provided the AMA's
positive answer to the argument for governmental action. 44 3 In 1942 the A.MA
209 (1950) ; Comment, Group Health Plans: Some Legal and Econolnic Aspects, 53 YALE
L.J. 162 (1943); Note, The Lgal Problems of Group Health, 52 HAn'. L RE,. %9
(1939).
436. E.g., Cleveland Hospital Service Ass'n v. Ebright, 36 Ohio L Abs. 60, 45
N.E2d 157 (Ohio App. 1942), aff'd, 142 Ohio St. 51, 49 N.E2d 929 (1943) (insurance) ;
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App.2d 592, 52 P2d 992 (1935), 25:
CALw. L. REv. 91 (corporate practice of medicine); People v. United Medical Service,
362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936) (same). See also Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego
Medical Soc., 120 Adv. Cal. App. 2 9, 260 P.2d 1038 (1953) (private plan fails to qualify
under statute permitting non-profit lay sponsored systems; held illegal as crporate practice
of medicine). Contra: Group Health Ass'n v. Moore, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1933),
aff'd sub nwm. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F-2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
437. Hansen, supra note 435, at 222. These laws have been the result of state medical
society activity. The New Jersey Act, for e.x-ample, w.-as drafted and lobbied by the society.
COs-1rrz O" RESFARCI Ix MEDICAL Ecoxomics, REaIcrI.s o. FrE- Exv.TFraisE,
i.- MEDIcINE 4-8 (1949). See also, e.g., 46 J. KANsAs MEP. Soc. 119-120 (1945); 35 J.
IOWA STA Mu. Soc. 89-90 (1945) (state society legislative liaison committees reporting
on process of drafting, sponsoring, and securing passage of enabling laws).
438. CommirrE ox F.EE EN=asnPUSE x MExcINE, op. cit. supra note 437, at 4-8;
Hansen, supra note 435, at 222-5; Davis, Taken by the Neck, 35 SuRvY GRAenuc 403
(1946).
439. Hearings, supra note 415, at 1779-85; Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Hcalth
Plans, 35 IowA L. REv. 209 (1950).
440. See, e.g., FA. STAT. ANN. § 641.02(3) (Cum. Supp. 1953); GA. CODE A-x.
§ 99-1009 (Cum. Supp. 1951) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 514.4 (1949).
441. See, e.g., 17 MIcn. STAT. AN N. c. 243a, § 24.598 (1943); N. I-IAP. L.-ws c. 55,
p. 56 (1947) ; N.J. STAT. ANN § 17:48A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
442. See Ky. REv,. STAT. § 303.180 (1953); Ohio GEN. CoUE Am'.. § 669-18(h)
(Page, 1946); CODE S. CA.n § 37-1106 (1952); TENN. CODE A:xx. § 418624 (Williams,
Supp. 1952). For other statutes having similar doctor partcipation requirements, sce
Heariugs, supra note 415, at 1783-5.
443. See text at notes 650-3 infra.
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could point only to eleven medical society sponsored or approved plans; by
1951 the total was 104 such plans.4 4 4 Medical society plans frequently offer
less comprehensive coverage than the independent plans with which they
compete.445 However, they have exploited their competitive advantages through
"medical public education" campaigns and word-of-mouth promotion by family
physicians to effect an impressive growth of membership.
The struggle against HIP. Organized medicine is presently bringing the
utmost power at its disposal against the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New
York. HIP, with almost 400,000 subscribers, is one of the largest group prac-
tice, prepayment medical service plans in America.440 It was originally pro-
moted by Mayor La Guardia to provide comprehensive health insurance for
New York City government employees and their families;414 half of the
premium is borne by the city and half by the insured.4 4 8 Since its formation,
HIP has opened its enrollment to other employed groups and some individuals.
HIP's organization resembles that of the typical lay-sponsored plan. The
plan is headed by a doctor,449 but a majority of directors are laymen.4 60 The
Board has control over the premium rates and contracts with groups of physi-
cians who, in turn provide medical care to subscribers. Each of the thirty
affiliated groups receives a per capita payment based on the number of sub-
scribers registering with it.4 1 The group divides its receipts among member-
doctors as it wishes; most choose salaried practice, with annual earnings rang-
ing from $7500 for starting physicians, to $18,000 for senior partners.412 The
subscriber may select any one of the thirty groups, from which he receives
444. AMA COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SRvicE, THE GROWTH OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH
INSURANCE 8 (1952).
445. E.g., compare United Medical Service, Inc. (Benefits), AMA, VOLUNTARY PRE-
PAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 70-1 (1953), with Health Insurance Plan of Greater
New York (Benefits), id. at 121; compare California Physicians' Service (Benefits), id.
at 25-6, with Ross-Loos Medical Group (Benefits), id. at 27.
446. Testimony of George Baehr, M.D., in Hearings before House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Voluntary Health Insurance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
1586 (1954). See generally HUNT & GOLDSTEIN, MEDICAL GROUP PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 25-9 (Pub. Health Serv. Publication No. 77, 1951); MEANS, DoCroRs, PEoi'ui,
AND GOVERNxMENT 124-8 (1953); SERBEIN, PAYING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES 158-61 (1953).
447. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1944, p. 14, cols. 7-8; id., May 1, 1944, p. 1, col. 1.
448. Hearings, supra note 446, at 1585.
449. The present President and Medical Director of HIP is George Baehr, M.D.,
former Medical Director, U.S. Public Health Service; Past-President, New York Acad-
emy of Medicine; co-editor of PREVENTIVE MEDICINE IN MODERN PRACrICE (Baehr,
Miller, Corwin, eds. 1942).
450. AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL BENEFIT PLANS 121 (1953). Among
the original directors of HIP were Winthrop Aldrich; John S. Burke, Director, N.Y.
Life Ins. Co.; Henry J. Kaiser; Fiorello LaGuardia; Tracy J. Putnam, M.D., formerly
Director of Neurology and Neurosurgery, Neurological Institute of New York; Beardsley
Ruml; Gerard Swope. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1944, p. 21, cols. 6-7.
451. HUNT & GOLDSTEIN, op. cit. supra, note 446, at 28. See also MEANS, op. cit.
supra note 446, at 127.
452. HUNT & GOLDSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 446, at 28.
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comprehensive medical care.4r* And the enrollee may choose any doctor
within his group as his family physician.4 4 Preventive medicine is particularly
stressed 45 since it is to the advantage of the group to minimize illness among
its patients. Premium rates vary according to income and size of family :4 O
an individual with an income under $5000 pays $42.72 per year; a family
earning under $6500 pays a maximum of $155.52.457 HIP does not cover
hospitalization; its subscribers are required to enroll in Blue Cross or an
equivalent.458
From its inception, HIP has steadily grown in size, and the local medical
societies' pressure against it has increased proportionately. When Mayor
La Guardia suggested the formation of a comprehensive health plan for city
employees the medical societies urged utilization of existing services, 52 and
liberalized the benefits of the society-sponsored United Medical Service.* 9
Since then, a controversy between these tAo competing plans has ensued over
the right to advertise. 40' The ethical code permits society plans to attract sub-
scribers through advertising on the theory that all doctors benefit equally.4r2
Although the local medical societies initially tolerated advertising by HIP,
they recently have changed their view and branded the practice as unethical. 4
An appeal from this ruling has recently been denied at the state level. 464
Rather than inviting comparison of their plan with HIP in terms of quality,
coverage, and premiums, the local medical societies have disparaged HIP for
its alleged denial of free choice of physician.405 It is true that HIP sub-
scribers can obtain services only from doctors in a participating group. But
the independent subscriber can exercise a free choice originally between any
available plan, or no plan at all. And if he chooses to join HIP, he has a choice
of several groups and of numerous doctors within each group.4c5 Perhaps the
doctors' hostility stems from HIP's denying their free access to 400,000 po-
tential patients. 467
453. Id. at 27; S.mzE, op. cit. supra note 446, at 158-9.
454. Ibid.
455. SEPjmNz, op. cit. mtpra note 446, at 161; Hearings, supra note 446, at 1590.
456. AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAy'MMENT MEPIcAL BENEFIT PANS 121 (1953).
457. MEf s, op. cit. supra note 446, at 125.
458. Hearings, supra note 446, at 1587.
459. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1946, p. 15, col. 3.
460. Id., Sept. 4, 1945, p. 25, col. 5; id., Sept. 5, 1945, p. 21, cols. 5-6.
461. See, e.g., Master, Impact of Medical Care Plans on the Medical Proession, 150
JA*MA 766, 767 (1952); Baehr, Health Insurance Plan of Greater N'%ewo York, 150 J.IA
1422 (1952) ; Hearings, supra note 446, at 1603-5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1954, p. 21, col. 8.
See also, articles on medical service plan advertising in Editor & Publisher, Aug. 8, 1953.
462. See AMA, PRI cIPLEs OF lEDIcAL ETnICs c. 1, §§ 4, 5; Hearings, supra note
446, at 1472.
463. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1954, p. 21, col. 8; Hearings, supra note 446 at 103-5.
464. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1954, p. 1, cols. 3-4.
465. See, e.g., Master, supra note 461; N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1953, p. 23, col. 1.
466. MEAxs, op. cit. supra note 446, at 126-7.
467. See Hearings, supra note 446, at 15S4. But see statement of Alfred P. Ingegno,
M.D., President of the Kings County Medical Society, in N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1953, p. 23,
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Condemning HIP as unethical conveys a threat of possible disciplinary
action against affiliated doctors,468 and may implant the fear that fellow physi-
cians will view their participation as detrimental to the profession's welfare. 400
Nevertheless, increasing numbers of doctors have joined HIP affiliated
groups.470 Consequently the New York medical societies have advocated state
legislation designed to destroy the HIP panel practice system.471 Under the
guise of guaranteeing free choice of physician, the proposed act would have
forced prepayment group plans to compensate any physician rendering services
to subscribers.4 7 2 But the 1954 New York Legislature adjourned without
passing this measure: now the state medical society is attempting to secure
its objective of destroying panel practice groups by "clarifying" its own ethical
code. One new interpretation condemns the salaried practice of medicine ex-
cept in institutions where patients are "public charges" ;473 this ruling would
necessitate a fundamental change in the income distribution system of HIP
affiliated groups, but would not destroy the plan. Another interpretation,
assserting free choice to be denied whenever the patient must choose a physi-
cian from a panel or group,474 would inevitably outlaw any group practice
prepayment system. Whether the New York medical societies will enforce this
ruling by disciplinary action against participating physicians is the crucial
question. 4
75
col. 1: "Naturally, the idea of letting subscribers go to any individual doctor or group of
doctors is going to hit the present H.I.P. doctors right in the pocketbook. It will mean
surrendering a tight little monopoly."
468. Master, supra note 461, at 769 (report of medical society resolutions urging ex-
pulsion of HIP physicians).
469. Cf. 1 MAGNUSON REP. 34.
470. Presently, about 1000 physicians are affiliated with HIP. Hearings, supra note
446, at 1587. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1954, p. 21, col. 8.
471. In 1952, the medical societies supported the Panken Bill, S. 1082, which would
prohibit the operation of plans like HIP. The bill died in committee. Master, supra note
461, at 769. In the 1954 Legislature, a similar measure was introduced in both houses.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1954, p. 15, col. 5.
472. Ibid.
473. Plumb, State Doctors Vote 2 Steps That Imperil Health Groups, N.Y. Times,
May 13, 1954, p. 1, cols. 3-4, p. 32, cols. 4-6.
474. Id., p. 32, col. 6.
475. A dispute over issues similar to those involved in the HIP controversy is cur-
rently in progress on the West Coast. The Kaiser Foundation Health Plan has facilities
in major cities in California, Washington, and Oregon. Although originally formed to
provide medical services for Kaiser workers, only 22,000 of 416,000 present subscribers
are company employees. Hearings, supra note 446, at 1350. It offers comprehensive health
care, preventive medicine, and hospitalization, organized around groups of physicians,
See generally Hearings, supra at 1341-1450. Opposition by local medical societies to the
Kaiser plan closely parallels that experienced by HIP. See, e.g., 83 BuLL. Los ANr Es
CouNTY MED. Ass'N 510 (1953) (resolution condemning "closed panel procedure" for its
denial of free choice of physician, interposition of a "corporate overlord," and interference
with professional practices) ; id. at 501 (editorial, "The Time Has Come," urging doctor
opposition to the Kaiser plan).
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AMA Attitudes toward Health Measures under Governmct Auspices
Governmental activities in the field of public health have steadily increased. 4 0
This expansion has occurred not only through changes in our social and eco-
nomic philosophies, but also from advances in scientific knowledge. 77 Com-
municable disease was once thought to result from environmental defects with
a consequent limitation of public health activities to sanitation. But bacterio-
logical knowledge has demonstrated personal communicability, and led to a
public concern for the welfare of the individual as well as his environment0-7-
Consequently, public health functions have come to include such programs as
diagnosis, treatment, and hospitalization. More recently these programs have
been broadened so as to cover not only communicable, but degenerative disease,
and maternal and child welfare projects as well.470
The development of many public health activities has met with hostility
from the medical profession.48 0 Physicians often resisted such early programs
as smallpox inoculations, diphtheria immunizations, and venereal disease
clinics as invasions of the domain of private practice.4 s Often state health
departments, their personnel being influenced by the medical societies, were
themselves opposed to expansion into areas of general medical care452 Where
health officials did institute new programs, they sometimes had to resign from
their local medical societies because of opposition to these ventures. s9 And
where medical societies gave approval to diagnosis and treatment by public
health agencies, they have favored furnishing care by private practitioners on
a free choice, fee-for-service basis, rather than by the less costly salaried
physician hired by the state.484
TMeasures providing public medical care directly to the patient have usually
met with the opposition of organized medicine when made available to those
able to pay for private ser-ices. s 5 These programs, it is charged, put the
476. See generally Willard, Fifteen Years of Public Health Administration, 10 PuLTUc
ADm. REv. 99 (1950); Roemer, Trends in Health Legislation: Local, State, and Arational,
23 YAI J. OF BIoL. Ai MEm. 165 (1950).
477. See, e.g., Wilson, Looking Ahead in Public Health, 26 Mxssissnrpi Derom% 216, 237
(1949).
478. Anderson, Public Health-A Mandate from the People, 42 A-m. J. oF PL-uuc
HEALTa 1367, 1369-71 (1952).
479. Ibid.
4S0. See generally 96 CONG. REc. 16S65-7 (1950) and sources cited; Gal.'m:;:, Pt TLC
MzmcAL C.u (1945); SaR.x, MED IcAL S-RiaCZs n" GoTr=_sN, r (1946); Anderson,
supra note 478.
48L MALmBERG, 140 MILUON PATIENTS 190-1 (1947). But see Henderson, A Fancy
Package of Untruths, 144 JAMA 933 (1950) (denial that AMA record indicates a history
of opposition to such programs).
482. GOLDMANN, op. cit. sipra note 480, at 136; Anderson, sipra note 480, at 1371.
483. See RORTY, AmERIcA-z MEDIcE MOmizEs 234-5 (1939).
434. STmEP, op. cit. supra note 480, at 28; GoLu=_xSA , op. cit. supra note 480, at 99. See
id. at 95-6 for various provisions guaranteeing free choice of physician by the recipient of
some types of public medical care.
485. STrmN, op. cit. supra note 4S0, at 34 (contrasting formal record of AMA favoring
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state in competition with private practitioners of medicine. As a consequence
of opposition from medical societies, the initiative for most public health de-
velopment has come from outside the medical profession.40  Although the
American Medical Association today approves a number of public health
measures once opposed by medical societies, it would still define the scope of
public health more narrowly than most public health officials. A recent resolu-
tion would limit health departments to such activities as vital statistics, health
education, sanitation, communicable disease, and laboratory and clinical ser-
vices essential to the control of such diseases.487 This concept of public health
excludes programs in the field of maternal and child welfare, sight and hearing
conservation, care of crippled children, degenerative disease, and mental health.
Governmental level of sponsorship and control
AMA opposition to governmental health measures, .occasionally expressed
in terms of general principles, is more often aimed at particular features of ad-
ministration, sponsorship, or control. Medical society opposition increases in in-
tensity as local administration is bypassed and control is lodged in the Federal
Government. Most state medical societies do not uniformly follow AMA pro-
nouncements defining the proper sphere of public health. In many instances state
societies formerly in opposition, now cooperate and participate in state ad-
ministered maternal and child health or degenerative disease programs for
the benefit of indigents.48 8 Nevertheless, similar programs under federal spon-
sorship have encountered AMA opposition. 4 9 Organized medicine primarily
expresses objection to centralization of control in the Federal Government, not
the purposes of the particular program.4 0 Possibly a further explanation for the
differential in state and national activity lies in the state society's relatively
greater control over health programs within its jurisdiction.
On the state level, medical society control is facilitated by the state health de-
partment's relative freedom from legislative and executive supervision over en-
forcement, regulation, and development of new programs.49' And, under federal
grant-in-aid programs, funds originating in Washington, but destined for local
communities, are routed through the state. health office, which thus occupies
a strategic position in indirectly determining national policy.402 Joint co-
care at public expense to medically indigent with resistence from local medical organizations
to an expansive definition of "indigent").
486. Anderson, supra note 478.
487. Id. at 1372-3.
488. See, e.g., STERN, op. cit. supra note 480, at 51-2 (report on Old Age Assistance
Medical and Dental Program in the State of Washington) ; IoWA STATE MEDICAL SocIM',
HANDBooK FOR THE HousE OF DELEGATFS 73-4 (1952) (cautious consideration of expanded
maternal and child health program).
489. See, e.g., 154 JAMA 510-11 (1954). See also text at notes 520-21 infra.
490. Ibid.
491. Cf. MUSTARD, GOVERNMENT IN PUBLIC HEALTH 111-112 (1945).
492. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNM MENTS, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID 183 (1949) ("State
administrative responsibility for public-health work within the state is never questioned.
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ordinating committees of state health department and medical society repre-
sentatives often draw up regulations and allotments under various specified
progams. 493 Such a relationship may promote the efficient administration of
public health measures. But medical society influence goes deeper, pervading
health department activity. In many states, the department head is nominated,
appointed, or recommended by the state medical society;49" in a few states
membership in a county medical society is a requirement for departmental
appointments. 495 And, since the statewide cooperation of doctors is essential
to the success of any program, health departments must permit the medical
societies to participate in the formulation of policy.490 This leverage enables
organized medicine to protect the interests of the profession against govern-
mental encroachment. 497
The national organization has been less influential in shaping federal ad-
ministrative policy. In fact, health leaders of the recent Democratic admini-
strations were openly hostile toward organized medicine. Since 1876 the AMA
has advocated assembling the medical functions of the Federal Government
into a single agency of cabinet rank headed by a physician. 9 s The AMA
opposed and contributed to the defeat of two reorganization proposals sub-
mitted by President Truman consolidating health services together with wel-
fare and education.4 99 Hostility was grounded upon the fear that Oscar Ewing,
advocate of compulsory health insurance and the AMA's arch-enemy, would
gain control over medical matters, and that health services would not be inde-
pendent of other agencies. 00 However, after the 1952 election, the same
proposal was submitted by President Eisenhower, and on this occasion organ-
ized medicine abandoned its former stand.col This reversal followed presi-
Decisions of state health directors are final so long as they stay within the general purposes
of the federal law and the rather broad regulations of the federal supervising agencie. The
United States Public Health Service has been extremely careful not to usurp state authority
and responsibility.").
493. Barker, The State Medical Society and the State Govennwent, 133 JAMA 549
(1947).
494. See note 143 supra.
495. QuCsTIOiNAm No. 54(d).
496. DAvis, A m.a-ic, ORGA.NIZES MEDICINE 115 (1941).
497. Barker, supra note 493, at 549:
"[T]he basis of good relationship with a state government is to have the state
medical societies in a position to be consulted about appLintments to these boards and
agencies. Once this honorable extension of medical society influence has been established,
it becomes difficult to put into effect measures which are not compatible with our ideals.
Physicians on the boards of such agencies have an unusual opportunity to analyze the effects
of proposed measures and oppose them if they are not acceptable to medicine, thus adding
the weight of government to the side of medicine and not leave the profession to stand alone
as a defensive minority."
498. Abel, Medichie in the Changing Social Order, Pittsburgh Med. Bull., April 30,
1938, p. 400. See also FIsHauN 151, 166, passim.
499. 143 JAMA 560 (1950); MEANs, DocroRs, PrOPLE, AND Go v.n,.Imm-" 164
(1953) ; Edwards, Ike Puts Medicine In the Cabinet, Medical Economics, May 1953, p. 130.
500. Ibid.
501. MzA.xs, op. cit. supra note 499, at 164; Edmards, supra note 499, at 130-3.
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dential assurances that the new office would not advocate compulsion in the
medical field 0 2 Organized medicine probably anticipates a relationship on
the national level similar to that enjoyed in the states.
Federal grants-in-aid for health purposes
Federal grants-in-aid in the health field began with the Chamberlain-Kahn
Act of 1918 for control of venereal disease. 0 3 Three years later the Shepard-
Towner Act was passed providing for grants to the states for maternal and
child welfare 04 The 1918 act received qualified approval from the medical
societies, 505 but the latter measure was denounced as "a form of bureaucratic
interference with the sacred rights of the American home." 00° The AMA
based its objections not on public activity in this field, but on federal participa-
tion in it.5° 7 Shortly thereafter, the Association announced its blanket opposi-
tion to federal grants-in-aid for medical services. 08 After a few years both of
these grants were allowed to die, °0 and the AMA successfully resisted efforts
to revive them until the passage of the Social Security Act.6 10 Under this
measure both programs were reactivated, and grants were established for gen-
eral public health activities as well.Y" At the present time funds are allocated
for a wide variety of public health services, research, and hospital construc-
tion. 1 2
Grants for health services. The American Medical Association now accepts
the allotment of federal grants to the states as a "well established principle
in our government." 513 In fact, it has itself called for the extension of public
health services to areas where needed. 1 4 However, the Association emphasizes
that public health is primarily a local responsibility, and that there must be a
502. MEA4,NS, op. cit. supra note 499, at 164-6; Edwards, supra note 499, at 136.
503. 40 STAT. 886 (1918) ($1,000,000 annual appropriation to care for civilians whose
treatment was necessary for the protection of those in the armed forces).
504. 42 STAT. 224 (1921). See MacDonald, Federal Aid to the States, 17 NAT.
MUNICIPAL REv. 619, 647-50 (1928).
505. Cf. Irvine, Syphilis and Venereal Disease as a Public Health Problem, 71 JAMA
1029 (1918).
506. 96 CONG. REc. 13914 (1950) (quoting AMA House of Delegates). See also
Roemer, Trends in Health Legislation: Local, State and National, 10 YALE J. oF BIOL,
AND MMD. 165, 168 (1950).
507. 76 JAMA 383 (1921).
508. 76 JAMA 1504 (1921).
509. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERM'ENTS, FrDeRAL. GRANTS-IN-AID 10 (1949).
510. 49 STAT. 629-35 (1935), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. 1952). Title
VI of the Act which provided for general grants for public health services is now covered
by 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1946). See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-
Am 11 (1949).
511. Id. at 10.
512. See generally SERBEIN, PAYING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 255-
67 (1953) ; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID 180-92 (1949).
513. 128 JAMA 1101 (1945).
514. 145 JAMA 233 (1951); Hearings before Conmmittee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 5644 and H.R. 5678, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-9 (1948); Hearings
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showing of actual need by the states.r 1r Similarly, the AMA favors local
autonomy in administration. 10 Professional advisory committees are fav-
ored,5 17 especially if their recommendations are made binding on admini-
strators.5ls Even when these conditions are met the AMA will resist grants
for treatment of all but the most contagious diseases unless made contingent
on the recipient's inability to pay.-19
Thus, the AIA opposed the Pepper Bill of 1945 50 which would have
increased the authorized expenditures for maternal and child health, crippled
children, and child welfare. The Association protested that the measure con-
tained no means test-grants being available without regard to need-and also
that the chief of the Children's Bureau had too much discretionary authority
in administering the program.5 2 ' However, the AMA gave its approval to
the Priest Bill in the last Congress.52 2 This authorized financial assistance to
states and subdivisions for local public health units, particularly in national
defense areas. Approval followed the adoption of amendments suggested by
the Association to guarantee local autonomy and to clarify the types of service
that might be rendered.52 3
Grants for medical research. When grants-in-aid for medical research were
first proposed in the late 1930's the AMA expressed its disapproval. 2 Their
objections were said to be based on a fear that federal subsidies would dis-
courage private gifts,52 5 and that such subsidies would not be given without
federal control over the manner in which funds were to be used.52 But the
AMIA's position changed after grants for such purposes had been passed. The
work of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during the war
had demonstrated that federal funds could be applied advantageously for pro-
moting research and accelerating the use of medical discoveries. 5  Since that
time the AMlA has usually favored measures providing for research grants.r- 3
before Comnnittee on Interstate and Forcign Commerce on S. 132, S. 522, Title V of S.
1581, and Title V of S. 1679, S1st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-82 (1949).
515. See, e.g., 128 JAMA 1101 (1945) ; Hearings on S. 132 et al., stpra note 514, at
81-2.
516. Ibid.; 145 JAMA 322 (1951); Hearings on H.R. 5644 and H.R. 5678, supra
note 514 at 79.
517. Id. at 81.
518. Cf. 128 JAMA 1101 (1945).
519. Cf. Hearings oan S. 132, et al., mspra note 514, at 82.
520. S. 1318, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
521. See, e.g., Editorial, 128 JAMA 1101 (1945).
522. H.R. 274, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), approved in 145 JAMA 322 (1951).
523. 145 JAMA 322 (1951).
524. See, e.g., 109 JAMA 1280, 12,31 (1937) ; N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1937, § IV, p. S,
col. 5.
525. Abell, Medicinw in the Changing Social Order, Pittsburgh Med Bull., April,
1938, p. 400.
526. 109 JAMA 1280, 1281 (1937).
527. 129 JAMA 699 (1945).
528. As one point in a 12-point program for medical care the AMA recommended
"(2) Promotion of medical research through a National Science Foundation with grants
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The creation of a National Science Foundation, as well as a National Cancer
Institute and National Heart Institute, has been approved ;520 such federal
institutes direct important research projects in medicine." °
Grants for hospital construction. The AMA has consistently favored federal
grants for hospital construction, provided that local need is shown."' Thus
the Association approved 532 the original Hill-Burton Act of 1946 for hospital
surveys, construction, renovation, and improvement.0 3 Hill-Burton funds are
applied only to the physical plant of hospitals, not for medical services. Also
this program has operated primarily to assist hospitals of small capacity in
rural areas where need is greatest. And federal funds, as in most grant pro-
grams, are channelized through state health departments.
Grants for medical education. The increased cost of medical education has
led to recent proposals for federal aid. 04 No measure submitted thus far has
received organized medicine's approval-and none has been enacted-despite
AMA denial that it opposes federal grants to medical schools.531 At first, such
grants were incorporated into the omnibus National Health Act along with
to private institutions which have facilities and personnel sufficient to carry on qualified
research." 139 JAMA 529 (1949).
529. FlsHE rN 488 (National Science Foundation); Hearigs before Subcommittee
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, on S. 720 and S. 2215, 80th Coiig., 2d
Sess. 115 (1948) (National Heart Institute).
530. Forty-two percent of the $180,000,000 devoted to medical research each year in
the United States comes from the Federal Government. 2 MAGNUSON RzE. 234. Federal
activities consist of direct research in federal laboratories and facilities, and grants to
medical schools, hospitals, universities, and clinics. Additional funds are provided for
fellowships and construction. See 1 MAGNUSON REP. 39-42; 2 id. at 234-9; SERBnEx, PAY-
ING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 268-74 (1953).
531. See, e.g., 114 JAMA 490 (1940) (approval of Wagner Bill, S. 3230, 76th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1940), providing grants for hospital construction).
532. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
inerce on S. 191, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1946) (testimony favoring Hill-Burton Act).
533. 60 STAT. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (Supp. 1952). Analyses of
the Act and its operation are found in 2 MAGNUSON REP. 196-9; SERBEIN, PAYING roR
MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 275-7 (1953); CouNciL Or STATE GovERNMENTS,
FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID 185-9 (1949); Hoge, Progress Report on Hospital Survey and
Construction Act, 39 Am. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 889 (1949).
As of September, 1952, a total of 1877 projects providing 90,645 beds had been approved
under the Hill-Burton program. The total cost of these facilities was estimated at
$1,457,000,000, the Federal Government contributing $517,000,000 or 36 percent. 4 MAG-
NUSON REP. 278.
534. Financial problems facing the nation's medical schools are discussed in 1 MAG-
NusoN REP. 11-15; 2 id. at 130-5. Proposals for federal aid are found in 1 id. at 15, See also
MEANS, DOCTORS, PEOPLE, AND GOVERNMENT 85-8 (1953); GREENBERG, MEDICINE IN
CaIsIs (reprinted from Providence Journal and Evening Bulletin, March, 1951); Maisel,
Our Alarming Doctor Shortage, Collier's, Dec. 16, 1950, p. 18.
535. The AMA has stated that it "advocates financial aid to medical education with
funds that will preserve the freedom of the medical schools from political control and
regulation," 141 JAMA 1155 (1949), but it has consistently opposed all aid proposals on
the ground that they do not insure free and local operation of the schools. See, e.g., 145
JAMA 232, 233 (1951).
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controversial compulsory health insurance proposals.0 ° In the hope of ex-
pediting bipartisan action on the aid to education portion, Senators Murray,
Pepper, Taft, and Donnell sponsored a separate bill in 1949.03 This measure
and its House counterpart, r 38 after committee consultation with AMA repre-
sentatives, 39 were amended to limit federal participation in the budget of any
medical school to 40%, and to give a professional advisory council, responsible
to Congress, the duty of making recommendations to the U.S. Surgeon Gen-
eral before he could promulgate regulations under the program.' 0 In addition,
any federal "direction, supervision or control with regard to personnel, cur-
riculum or instruction" was expressly forbidden.U41 After Senate passage of
this measure by unanimous vote,5 the American Medical Association an-
nounced its opposition to the measure.5 43 In accordance with the Association's
recommendations, 54 the House then placed a 30% limit on federal participa-
tion but AMNA still opposed the bill, and it died in Committee.?5  Similar
measures introduced since that time have met a like fate. 4 ' The AMA has
announced that it would support single installment federal grants for the
construction and renovation of medical school plant similar in terms to the
Hill-Burton grants for hospital construction. 47
The AMA bases its opposition to medical education subsidies on a fear that
federal domination over the schools will result, and that educational standards
will deteriorate.5 4s Critics of this argument, particularly the deans of the
medical schools, who have been overwhelmingly in favor of federal aid,r 9
point out that the schools are already receiving large grants for research and
these have resulted in no federal control. 500 Some observers attribute organ-
536. S. 1606, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ; S. 1320, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
537. S. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Senators Humphrey, Neely, Thomas, Hill,
Douglas, Graham, Aiken, Smith (N.J.), and Morse also joined as sponsors. Grants of
$500 per student were to be made to help meet current operating deficits, with additional
sums available to schools increasing their enrollment. An additional $5,000,000 was
allotted for construction and equipment of physical facilities.
538. H.R. 5940, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
539. Maisel, sitpra note 534, at 19, 82.
540. Id. at 82.
541. Ibid.
542. Ibid.
543. See 141 JAMA 1155 (1949).
544. See 142 JAMA 182 (1950).
545. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1950, p. 11, col. 2; id., Aug. 20, 1950, p. 11, col. 1.
546. E.g., S. 337, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. (1951). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1951, p. 16,
col. 3. The bill provided a $500 grant-in-aid for each medical student currently enrolled,
and an additional $500 for each student enrolled in excess of past enrollment.
547. 149 JAMA 1654 (1952).
548. See, e.g., 146 JAMA 1238 (1951).
549. S. 1453 and H.R. 5940 were endorsed by 75% of the medical school deans.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1950, p. 11, col. 1.
550. Dr. George Packer Berry, Dean of Harvard Medical School, stated that, "We
now spend more than a million dollars a year in federal funds at Harvard Mldedical Sci.A,
and it has come to us without any strings attached or any effort to control us. I sce
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ized medicine's attitude to a fear that medical education subsidies would con-
stitute a further acknowledgment of federal responsibility in providing medical
care and thus pave the way for "socialized medicine."' 51 And perhaps the
AMA fears loss of some of its present power to influence the size of medical
school enrollment.
Furthermore the AMA contends that adequate support for medical educa-
tion may be had from voluntary sources, that the availability of such sources
has not been full explored, and that federal subsidies would discourage the
development of private support.55 2 The AMA has supported the efforts of the
National Fund for Medical Education in obtaining contributions from private
and corporate sources. 553 And in 1951 the Association announced the forma-
tion of its own American Medical Education Foundation to aid the National
Fund.5 54 The Foundation has received large amounts from the AMA and its
constituent and component societies, as well as individual physicians.55 Critics
charge that the fund is a mere diversionary action to shift attention from the
need for federal aid, and is sure to be inadequate to meet the annual deficits
of the medical schools. 556 Indeed, while estimates of medical school needs above
present income range from $10,000,000557 to $40,000,000 158 annually, the Fund
contributed less than $2,000,000 in 19531r" However, the AMA claims that
private contributions can provide a solution to the financial crisis facing med-
ical education. 560
Federal health services
United States Public Health Service. Many federal health measures are
carried out through grants-in-aid whereby the Public Health Service is re-
sponsible only for overall administration, with most discretionary authority
being delegated to the states.56 ' But the Service itself directly administers
no ground for apprehension if the schools maintain a proper balance between their own
funds and federal grants." GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 534, at 28.
551. Ibid.
552. Ibid.; cf. 145 JAMA 160 (1951).
553. The National Fund was established in 1949 through the efforts of the AMA, the
Association of American Medical Colleges, the National Association of Manufacturers,
and others.
554. 145 JAMA 160 (1951).
555. See 152 JAMA 1044 (1953).
556. See, e.g., 96 CONG. RFrc 16861 (1950) (address by Rep. Andrew Biemiller).
557. NATIONAL FUND FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION, REPORT To CONTRIBUTORS, 1953
(1954).
558. 2 MAGNUSON REP. 131; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1951, p. 53, col. 1 (report of study
for the U.S. Surgeon General).
559. During 1953 the Fund received contributions totaling $2,400,833, including
$1,044,602 from the AMA's American Medical Education Foundation. Grants to the
medical schools were $1,944,152. NATIONAL FUND FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION, Rn'1wT TO
CONTIBUTORS, 1953 (1954).
560. 149 JAMA 44 (1952); 149 JAMA 1319 (1952).
561. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID 180 (1949).
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numerous programs. Many of these are "old line" public health functions such
as vital statistics, pollution control, and international quarantine. "2 In addi-
tion, the Service now operates direct programs for the treatment of narcotic
addicts, employees of certain Governmental services, and seamen, and for the
provision of a wide variety of other health services.563 The development of
such projects has not met with the opposition from organized medicine that have
some of the grant proposals. 2Iost Public Health Service programs are of a
limited nature, not competitive with private practitioners.
Military and veterans' medicine. During World War II, Congress instituted
an Emergency Maternal and Infant Care program to provide medical care for
servicemen's wives and childrenY16 Although the AMA endorsed the program
it opposed direct EMIC cash payments to participating physicians,-G  and some
medical societies refused to cooperate unless payments were made to service-
men's wives536 Today, the national organization is resisting efforts to revive
any form of EMIC 0 7 Servicemen's dependents can now receive medical care
in military hospitals on the post provided there is sufficient capacity. c3
Families not living within range of the post hospital must arrange and pay for
treatment on their own.0 9 A series of recent bills 50 introduced to provide
off-the-post care has been unsuccessful and the AMA no longer fears the
likelihood of a broader EMIC program.57
Ever since the establishment of governmental medical services for World
War I veterans 572 the AMA has consistently led efforts to block the extension
562. FEDmA. SECulmTV AGmNCY, GUrDE TO HF.-uTu OmiAazATiON m- THE U.-IT"
STATrS 18-28 (1953).
563. Ibid. For a description of the direct activities carried on by the U.S. Public
Health Service see SErrEiN, PAYING For MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNED STiAwLs 246-52
(1953); STEENx, IEDIcAL SmvWcEs By GovnNn,,_NT 145-64 (1946).
564. 57 STAT. 28 (1943). The EMIC program provided maternity care to the vives
of men serving in the four lowest grades of the military forces, and medical care for their
children under one year of age. Before its termination in 1949 EMIC provided services
to almost one and a half million mothers and infants at a total cost of $127 million.
Roberts, Public Medical Care: The Ovcr-all Picture, 273 A.m,%Ls 71 (1951). Cf. AMA,
MEDICAL Sviczs To DFmmEE NTS oF SnEnviczrEz (1952).
565. AMA, Su,.y oF FE.Dma, MErc.-i Smvics 79 (1952).
566. SrmR, 'MEDicA.L SuVcFs By GOVERNMENT 131-5 (1946).
567. S. 1245 and S. 2337, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), would have reestablished
EMIC. In committee hearirgs the AMA opposed those bills on the ground that there
,,as "no demonstrated need" for such a program. 148 JAMA 1037 (1952). The AMA
has viewed more recent attempts to recreate the program as an "opening wedge on social-
ization" of medicine. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1953, p. 14, col 2.
568. 23 STAT. 112 (1884), 10 U.S.C. § 96 (1946) (army and air force); 57 STAT. E0
(1943), 24 U.S.C. § 32 (1946) (navy). Administrative regulations governing dependent
care are found in AMUA, SurvEY or FEr1m. E  cL SERvIcs 33-40 (1952).
569. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1952, p. 34, col. 4.
570. See, e.g., S. 1495, H.R. 4642, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
571. 153 JAMA 844 (1953).
572. Mledical benefits to veterans with respect to service-connected conditions were
provided in an amendment to the War Risk Insurance Act. See 40 Sxra. 105 (1917). In
the World War Veterans' Act of 1924 Congress extended beuefits xvithut regard to th2
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of Veterans Administration care to include non-service connected disabilities5Th
Under present law VA hospitals are permitted to care for such cases to the
limit of available beds and if the recipient cannot defray the expense of private
treatment.5 74
The VA's intensive hospital construction program is constantly increasing
available facilities.5 75 During its campaign against compulsory health insur-
ance, the AMA, not wishing to alienate the American Legion, soft-pedalled
its opposition to the growth of VA medicine. 70 But more recently, organized
medicine has opposed further construction of VA hospitals 577 and urged that
treatment even of service-incurred disabilities be kept within the limits of ex-
isting facilities.578 The AMA is against any federal care of non-service con-
nected disabilities; it advocates state or local care for veterans unable to pay
for private care.570 In lieu of this, however, it has urged a more exacting
means test to disqualify financially able veteransr ° Of 24 bills concerning
veterans' medicine pending in the 1954 Congress, the AMA has announced
its active approval of only one-a bill to investigate the VA. 81
nature or origin of the disabilities but giving preference to needy veterans. 43 STAT. 620
(1924).
573. Commenting on the Veterans' Act of 1924 the Board of Trustees reported: "The
situation may almost be stigmatized as communistic medicine in its most militant form,
endeavoring to edge its way into American life under the cloak of patriotism." AMA,
SURVEY OF FEDERAL MEDIcAl. SERvcEs 75 (1952).
574. 48 STAT. 9 (1933), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1946). While veterans with
non-service-connected disabilities can receive hospital treatment they cannot receive out-
patient or preventive medical care that might avert the need for hospitalization. For a
brief description of the VA medical program, see SERDsN, PAvING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN
THE UNITED STATES, 238-44 (1953).
575. See Herrick, The Problem of Medical Care, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 2, 1952,
p. 8, cols. 5-7.
576. Dr. R. J. Wilkinson, President of the Southern Medical Association stated that
he was "shocked and amazed" at the AMA's "hands-off attitude" toward the VA hospital
program. Dr. Wilkinson said "I have been repeatedly told by high-ranking officers of this
great AMA organization that we must adopt a policy of 'status-quo' because of the
American Legion's attitude in helping defeat the Wagner-Murray-Dingle bills." Bangor
(Maine) Commercial, Nov. 10, 1952. See also Croatman, That Vecranu" Lobby, Medical
Economics, Nov., 1953, p. 128.
577. 152 JAMA 1718 (1953).
578. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1953, p. 36, col. 2. The AMA believes that existing facilities
can serve all future needs of the veterans with service-connected disabilities and denies
any intent to curtail such treatment. See 152 JAMA 1718 (1953) ; 152 JAMA 1343 (1953).
579. Ibid. Arthur J. Connell, National Commander of the American Legion has re-
cently attacked the AMA for its stand on VA medicine calling the Association a "most
powerful and monopolistic medical guild." N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1954, p. 17, col. 3.
580. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1953, p. 13, col. 8. The VA recently announced that
veterans seeking treatment for non-service-connected disabilities would be asked to provide
information concerning their financial status. VA Press Release, dated Nov. 5, 1953
(copy on file in Yale Law Library). Previously the applicant merely had to "affirm" his
inability to pay for private care.
581. 154 JAMA 510-11 (1954).
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Compulsory health insurance
Federal health insurance proposals were a culmination of two lines of
development: the recognition of the insurance principle as adaptable to meet-
ing medical costs, and the increasing scope of governmental interest and par-
ticipation in the provision of medical care. The public and many individual
doctors have accepted both patterns, often from direct contact with voluntary
prepayment schemes on the one hand, and with state and federal health ser-
vices for fractional segments of the population on the other. Organized medi-
cine has generally resisted each of these developments. However, these en-
counters with innovation seem but skirmishes in comparison to the bitter
struggle which followed the merging of the two lines into compulsory health
insurance.
Development of a national health program. While prepaid governmental
medical care has become a major issue in this country only recently, Euro-
pean experiences stimulated some mild interest here nearly forty years ago.Y
The AMA at this time received reports from abroad ith equanimity and
began to consider the possibility of adopting such programs in the United
States.5s3 But by 1920 its position was clearly one of opposition to govern-
ment controlled or regulated medical service. 514 In 1932, the majority report
of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care rs8 indicated tentative approval
of tax-supported health insurance, and received wide attention in medical
ircles.5s 6 It was in 1935 that the New Deal became interested in the pas-
sage of a health insurance law as part of the social security programOsT By
1938 the issue of compulsory health insurance had assumed more threatening
proportions for the AMA. The President's Technical Committee on Medical
Care, appointed to study the 1935 Social Security Act, recommended a pro-
582. FIsHEEiN 281, 286, 289, 292, 296; DAvis, AarnxcA OrG.AmZES MIfxc:~m 166-7
(1941).
583. FiSHSBEi 296-7.
584. Id. at 321.
585. The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care %as financed by grants from eight
private foundations. It was headed by Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, a former AiA Presi-
dent, Secretary of the Interior under President Herbert Hoover, and President of Stan-
ford University.
586. AIEAfs, Docrons, PEoP.E, r GovamNmnrr 141-3 (1953); DAvis, Amauc,
OPGANIZS MAIEDIcNE 177 (1941).
587. FissEiNa 410-17. In 1934 President Roosevelt had appointed a Committee on
Economic Security; Secretary of Labor Perkins formed a Medical Advisory subcommit-
tee which recommended "a nationwide preventive medicine and public health proegram
and application of the principles of insurance." The President's Message to Congress in
January, 1935, stated: "I am not at this time recommending the adoption of so-called
'health insurance,' although groups representing the medical profession are cooperating
with the federal government in the further study of the subject and definite progress is
being made." Quoted id. at 415-16.
The California Medical Association flirted briefly in 1935, with statewide compulsory
health insurance, having adopted a resolution approving it in principle. Id. at 417.
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gram of medical care and sickness insurance.5 8 In an Address to the Con-
gress, President Roosevelt asserted that medical care for the people was a
matter of public concern.58 9
At this point the AMA abandoned its resistance to the insurance principal
for meeting the costs of medical care.5 90 The issue became whether medical
society or governmental auspices for health insurance provided the best solu-
tion. Organized medicine opposed anything which might divest it of any part
of its control over medical services.5 91
The first serious legislative proposal for a national health program was
introduced by Senator Robert Wagner of New York in 1939.592 It followed
closely the program of the President's Technical Committee and provided
for grants-in-aid to the states to enable them to develop plans of their own
choosing 59 -subject to basic standards set by the Federal Government 9 4
Despite a favorable interim report from the subcommittee which studied the
bill,595 the AMA's own study committee submitted twenty-two distinct argu-
ments against it 596 and no further action was taken. The next significant
588. Anderson, Compndsory Medical Care Inmtrance, 1910-1950, 273 ANNALS 106,
11.1 (1951).
589. DAvis, AMERICA ORGANIzEs MEDICINE 247 (1941).
590. The AMA House of Delegates in 1938 approved a reference committee report
containing the following statement of principles:
"Your committee repeats its conviction that voluntary indemnity insurance
may assist many income groups to finance their sickness costs without sub-
sidy. Further development of group hospitalization and establishment of
insurance plans on the indemnity principle to cover the cost of illness will
assist in the solution of these problems."
REFERENCE COMM=E ON CONSIDERATION OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, RE-
PORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HousE OF DELEGATES, SPECIAL
SESSION 54 (1938).
591. To meet the proposals for compulsory health insurance, the AMA applied its
1934 set of criteria for voluntary plans, AMA, VOLUNTARY PREPAYMENT MEDICAL CAR
PLANS 10 (1953), and attacked "socialized medicine" in terms of control of management
and medical standards, freedom of choice, doctor-patient relationship, "means test," and
compulsion. See DICKINSON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ATTITUDE OF THlE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TOWARD VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE 20-21 (AMA Bureau of
Med. Econ. Research Bull. No. 70, 1949).
592. S. 1620, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939), Teprinted in 84 CONG. REc. 1976 (1939).
Previous bills had been introduced by Senator Capper of Kansas in 1935 and 1937;
although similar to the Wagner proposal, they received little attention. Anderson, Col-
fndsory Medical Care Insurance, 1910-1950, 273 ANNALS 106, 11 (1951). See also S.J.
Res. 188, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) (proposal by Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois
making all practicing physicians "civil officers of the United States" for the purpose 6f
caring for "the impoverished"; compensation chargeable to the Social Security Board).
593. The bill envisioned a $35,000,000 annual grant-in-aid program. 84 CONG. REc.
1980 (1939).
594. Ibid. To be approved, a plan was required to give state-wide coverage, with sub-
stantial financial participation and close supervision by the state. For failure to maintain
these standards the Social Security Board would be empowered to withdraw approval.
595. 93 CONG. REC. 5517 (1947).
596. FISHBEIN 449.
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health measure was the first Wagner-Mlurray-Dingell Bill, of 1943. r  This
provided for a federal system of medical and hospital benefits, with medical
care payments from a fund composed of equal payroll contributions from
employer and employee.598 Senator Wagner denied that the bill would social-
ize the medical profession, pointing to provisions maintaining the doctor's
freedom to remain outside the program, to choose his own patients, and to
determine by what method he should be paid.r°0 However, the bill provided
that each patient could select the doctor of his choice only from participating
physicians.,00 Moreover, the Surgeon General was given e-xtensive powers to
set fee schedules and limit the size of the doctor's panel of patients.c9l These
proposals brought forth violent reaction from organized medicine c92 and the
bill died in committee.00 3 A similar Wagner-'Murray-Dingell proposal C0 fol-
lowed President Truman's special message to Congress in November, 1945,-95
but even with outspoken administration support the bill was no more success-
ful than its predecessor.c0
In 1946 and 1947, however, Senator Robert A. Taft sponsored an alter-
native measure to the administration's program. The Taft Bill, r0 instead of
health insurance, proposed locally-administered federal subsidies to the states
to assist "those families and individuals in the state having insufficient income
to pay the whole cost of" health services. The AMA did not react unfavor-
ably, but fearing the possibility of lay administration at the local level, it was
unenthusiastic60 s Also in 1947 the newly-elected Republican Congress con-
sidered a significantly modified Wagner-.Murray-Dingell Bill.c03 Conforming
to criticism of the earlier bills, the sponsors assigned the duties formerly
designated for the Surgeon General to a five-man board in the Federal
597. S. 1161, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), summarized in 89 Cowc. R c. 5_53 (1943).
598. 89 CONG. REc. 5258 t scq. (1943).
599. 89 id. at 5260.
600. 89 id. at 5261.
601. Ibid.
602. See NI\.TIONAL PHYsIcvNs Co0mmIwE, ArOLISnING PnrzA,- MEWxcu PnMc-
Tic, o% $3,048,000,000.00 oF POLTmCAL MDCINE YE rLY IN TP U:NM SA'rrs 3
(1943) : "The processes proposed and the mechanisms indicated are designed to act as the
catalyst in transforming a rapidly expanding Federal bureaucracy into an all powerful
totalitarian state control. Human rights as opposed to slavery is the issue."
603. 93 CONG. Rzc. 5517 (1947).
604. S. 1606, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), summarized in 91 CoN-G. RzE. 107S9 (1945).
605. H.R. Doc. No. 380, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
606. Anderson, supra note 592, at 111.
At its annual meeting of 1945, the AMA passed a strongly-worded resolution con-
demning the bill, FisanwI 486, and spo!kesmen for organized medicine publicized the
AMA's stand. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1945, p. 23, col. 5. See Hearings before Con:ittee
on, Edzcation and Labor on S. 1606, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
607. S. 545, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), criticized by Senator Murray in 93 CoN.G.
REc. 5520-1 (1947).
608. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1946, p. 17, col 4.
609. S. 1320, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), summarized in 93 CoxG. REc. 5517 ct scq.
(1947).
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Security Agency, and control of the proposed program was further decentral-
ized. but more services were offered, and more groups were covered0 10
The last major administration health insurance bill was inspired by the
Ewing Report of 1948.611 This Report endorsed a national health program
and was instrumental in the identification of its author with compulsory health
insurance. Ewing's proposals received the full backing of President Truman
in the 1948 presidential campaign.6 12 AMA anxiety was heightened by the
election returns and the prompt introduction in January, 1949, of a bill similar
to the 1947 Wagner-Murray-Dingell proposal. 618
AMA tactics of opposition. Organized medicine's earlier attempts to block
the passage of compulsory health insurance displayed an essentially ad hoc
approach. The earliest proposals for national health insurance required little
more than vocal opposition by medical spokesmen. With the introduction of
Senator Wagner's 1939 Bill, however, the AMA and many state societies
intensified their campaign against government medicine. 14 The AMA's cause
was almost entirely taken up by the newly formed National Physicians Com-
mittee for the Extension of Medical Service, which served as the propaganda
arm of organized medicine. 15 Although the AMA denied any official con-
nection with this organization, 16 the NPC was headed by AMA members 017
and supported by its fund-raising machinery.61 8 For nearly ten years, the
AMA itself confined its official opposition to state insurance to public ad-
610. 93 id. at 5520-2.
611. EWING, THE NATION'S HEALTH, A TEN YEAR PROGRAM: A REPORT TO TUE
PRESIDENT (Fed. Security Agency 1948).
612. President Truman declared that he was "compelled to advocate national health
insurance" and that he saw "no other possible way to bring medical service to fully half
the American people." 138 JAMA 297 (1948).
613. S. 1679, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). For a discussion of this and other health
measures introduced in 1949, see Comment, Essentials of an Adequate Health Progrant.
59 YALE L.J. 292 (1950). See also 139 JAMA 1005 (1949).
614. See DAvis, AmmuCA ORGANIZES MEDIcINE 174-5 (1941).
615. The NPC was formed in 1939 as a nominally independent group due to the fear
that the AMA was prevented from extensive lobbying by its charter as a non-profit or-
ganization. 22 MINN. MED. 842-3 (1939); 3 CONN. STATE MED. J. 685 (1939). Both
the public and the profession considered the NPC as a front for the AMA. Whitman,
Doctors in an Uproar, Collier's, May 14, 1949, p. 21 (citing, inter alia, demands by phy-
sicians that the AMA sever its connections with NPC). See also Fishbein, The Public
Relations of American Medicine, 130 JAMA 509, 512-13 (1946).
616. See 139 JAMA 924 (1949); 139 JAMA 1276 (1949).
617. Whitman, supra note 615 (2 past presidents and a former AMA trustee headed
the NPC).
618. See, e.g., address of the President of the Arkansas Medical Society to the state
House of Delegates, reprinted in 34 J. ARx. MFD. Soc. 15 (1942) : "I have repeatedly
stressed the fact that each physician in our state should affiliate with the work of the
National Physicians Committee.... ." See 37 Rocxy MOUNTAIN MED. J. 15-16 (1940);
22 MINN. MED. 842-3 (1939) ; 39 NORTHWEST MED. 3 (1940) (editorials urging members
to contribute to NPC). See also NPC, OUTLINE METHOD OF PLANNED AcrioN (1941)
(reprinting letters from county societies tendering donations to NPC or indicating assess-
ment of members by the society for NPC support).
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dresses, to editorials in the Journal, resolutions in the House of Delegates, and
testimony before legislative committees.
The NPC undertook organized medicine's first concerted effort to influence
public opinion. Working largely through doctors, the Committee is reported
to have distributed 25 million pamphlets. 10 But the occasional crudeness of
its methods reduced its effectiveness. In 1948, the press protested the NPC's
"attempt to buy editorial opinion" through a $3000 prize offered for the best
published anti-national health insurance cartoonC"O And when the NPC dis-
tributed copies of a letter signed by "Reverend" Dan Gilbert, Editor of the
notorious Defender and former associate of Silver Shirt Gerald Winrod, severe
criticism from AMA members followed.062 1 By the end of 1948 the NPC's
utility as a rallying point for organized medicine was negligible.62
Similarly, Dr. Morris Fishbein, Editor of the Journal and the recognized
spokesman for organized medicine had become the "symbol of old reactionary
leadership" in the profession, at a time when favorable public opinion was
becoming increasingly important.62 The AMA's decision in 1946 to hire a
special public relations counsel was an important step officially taken to cur-
tail Fishbein's activities. 6 24 Finally, in 1949, the Board of Trustees announced
the "retirement" of Dr. Fishbein after thirty-seven years of "devoted ser-
vice." 625
By the end of 1948 it was apparent to AMA leadership that a more positive
and drastic program was needed to forestall the enactment of compulsory
619. 96 CONG. REc. 13914 (1950). See, e.g., NArioN..L PHYSICIANS CO!XMUTrzy,
ABOLISHING PRivATE MEDICAL PRAcncE, or $3,048,000,000.00 Op POLITICAL MEDI:m
YEARLY Ix THE UNrnED STATES (1943). This pamphlet, originally issued in 1943, see test
at note 602 supra, was again distributed in 1944. More than a million copies of a siN-
page flyer called "Political Medicine-You can Stop It" were circulated. Kahn, Phy-
sicians Fight Trumn Health Plan, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 23, 1945, p. 3, cols.
6-8. The National Physicians Committee spent $3 53,390 during the first nine months of
1948, more than any other registered lobby during that period. Of this sum, $122,00 was
received from twenty-nine drug manufacturers. AM.1A Lobby Group to bo Lilvidaled,
N.Y. Times, April 17, 1949,p. 34, col 1.
620. 96 CONG. REc. 13914 (1950).
621. The Journal officially disavowed the Gilbert letter and all advance knowledge of
its circulation and declared that the AMA "does not require allies of doubtful repute." 139
JAMA 924 (1949).
622. Ibid. (editorial praising NPC but indicating that the AMA is prepared to take
up its own burden). The NPC had already agreed to cease activities and liquidate as soon
as practicable. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1949, p. 34, col. 1.
623. See Mayer, The Rise and Fall of Dr. Fishbein, Harper's, Nov., 1949, p. 76.
624. See N.Y. Times, July 3, 1946, p. 23, col. 7; Boston Daily Globe, Sept. 26, 1946.
Prior to 1946, there had been indications of organized medicine's discontent with Dr.
Fishbein. See, e.g., Chicago Daily Times, May 19, 1938 (New Jersey Medical StCiety
resolution seeing to confine the writings of Dr. Fishbein to the Join:al); Deutsch,
California Doctors Dcmand Dismissal of Dr. Fishbein, PM, May 11, 1944 (res4lution of
California Medical Association demanding Dr. Fishbein's resignation on the grounds that
he was "detracting from the dignity of the profession.').
625. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1949, p. 33, col. S.
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health insurance. The Ewing Report, followed by the Democratic victories in
the fall, increased the likelihood that Congress would pass a national health
program. Moreover, the new British experiment in socialized medicine had
fostered public interest and discussion concerning the adoption of a similar
program in the United States. The discrediting of The National Physicians
Committee and the retirement of Dr. Fishbein cleared the road for new, more
effective opposition techniques.
The interim session of the House of Delegates convened in St. Louis the
month following the November elections "in a spirit of great urgency.J
020
The delegates voted to assess each AMA member $25 to build a $3,500,000
"political war chest to fight socialized medicine. 0 21 Despite considerable ad-
verse criticism from members G28 the AMA went ahead with plans for an
enlarged Washington office and an advertising campaign to "educate" the
American people. 2 9 And it soon announced that its "National Education
Campaign" would be conducted by the public relations firm of Whitaker &
Baxter.03 0
The experts whom the AMA chose to lead its campaign were already well
known for their successes in California politics.08 1 Chief among these was
their victory, on behalf of the California Medical Association, over Governor
Warren's proposal for state-wide compulsory health insurance.03 2 Whitaker &
Baxter were called in immediately after Governor Warren announced his
legislative program in January, 1945.33 In accordance with the procedure
they had evolved for short, urgent campaigns they "started at the top and
worked down."634 They obtained public endorsement from the leaders of more
626. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1948, p. 20, col. 5.
627. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1948, p. 32, col. 2; id., Dec. 3, 1948, p. 20, col. 1.
628. See, e.g., 138 JAMA 1230 (1948); 139 JAMA 532 (1949) (letter of protest
from 148 doctors).
629. See 139 JAMA 532 (1949) (reply to letter of protest, asserting that assessment
funds to be used for educational purposes, not as "slush" fund). See also 138 JAMA
1098 (1948) ("The fund thus provided will be used for a nationwide plan of education on
the progress of American medicine, the importance of the conservation of health and tile
advantages of a high quality of medical care.").
630. 138 JAMA 1230 (1948).
631. Williams, Govermnent by Whitaker and Baxter, I, The Nation, April 14, 1951, p.
346.
632. The Warren plan envisioned a compulsory health insurance program providing
statewide medical, dental, and hospitalization service. The program was to be financed
by a three percent payroll tax on the first $4000 of income, divided equally between em-
ployer and employee. Coverage was extended to all private and public employees and
their dependents-generally, those covered by the California Unemployment Insurance
Act. An eleven-man directorate would be composed of three each from employers, em-
ployees, and physicians, one dentist, and the State Director of Public Health. See Sar-
tain, California's Health Insurance Drama, 34 SuRvY GRAPHIc 440 (1945) ; N.Y. Tnes,
Jan. 21, 1945, p. 34, col. 7.
633. Williams, supra note 631.
634. They had only three months in which to defeat the bill before a vote was
scheduled. WHITAKER, MEDICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 3 (reprint of ad-
dress before the California Medical Association, Nov. 27, 1948).
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than one hundred state organizations, enlisted the support of more than tho
hundred newspapers, made speeches to some nine thousand physicians, and
induced doctors, druggists, insurance executives, and dentists to speak to hun-
dreds of "thought leaders."' 35 A state-wide "Voluntary Health Insurance
Week" promoted membership in the society sponsored California Physicians
Service. 6 36 'Medical groups bought forty thousand inches of paid advertise-
ments, and sympathetic merchants, another thirty thousand., 7 At the end of
three months, Warren's bill was defeated by one vote. 3 8 In 1947 a similar bill
failed by a ider margin, and today, state health insurance is given little or
no chance of passage in California. 3 9
The Chicago office of the AIA's National Education Campaign, v.ith a
staff of thirty-seven, was established in January, 1949. To overcome opposi-
tion from ithin the profession to the Campaign and its 25 assessment,GIO
public speaking tours and circulars were successfully employed 04 and intense
doctor support was stimulated. During the first year of the Campaign all but
a few members displayed posters and nearly 20 million pamphlets were dis-
tributed to patients ;O" Congressmen were contacted by their personal phy-
sicians and urged to support AIA views.6 3 A Campaign "Blueprint" pub-
lished in February G44 indicated that the first year's strategy would be to
635. Ibid. These "thought leaders" consisted of the presidents of 400 ciic clubs, 2D0
officers of veterans organizations, 500 women's club officers, 200 insurance executives and
public officials throughout the state. Williams, Government by 11izhilaker and Baxter, II,
The Nation, April 21, 1951, p. 366.
636. WHrrAKER, op. cit. supra note 634.
637. Ibid.
638. Williams, .supra note 635, at 368.
639. Ibid.
640. See note 628 supra. Both New York and Kings County Medical Societies voted
to oppose the assessment, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1949, p. 15, col. 1; id., Mar. 1, 1949, p. 27,
col. 8, although the former group later reversed itself, id., Mar. 29, 1949, p. 21, col. 1. See
also 240 N. ENG. J. MFa. 587 (1949) (reporting that only 2300 [of .00] members of
the Massachusetts Medical Society had paid by April, 1949).
641. By December, 1949, 80% of AMA members had paid the assessment. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1949, p. 33, col. S. But see 241 N. ENG. J. MED. 3S9 (1949) (indicating
that in Massachusetts only 49% had paid by September, 1949, and that there were eleven
other states with even lower percentage figures).
642. AMA, THE 1949 CAMPAIGN REPORT BY THE COONXINATwG Co' I mir- 7 (1949).
The wives of physicians were also mobilized. A pamphlet, distributed through women's
auxiliaries, advised the doctor's wife to play a part in the campaign. She was instructed
to keep her "husband's office . - . supplied with campaign literature," to "tuck pamphlets
into all her personal correspondence-even invitations to dinner parties," and warned that
"[d]ebates are for experts only." A.MA, IT's YOUR CRUsADE Tool 7-9 (1949).
643. The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950, pp. 75-6. Representative
John Dingell of Michigan, a proponent of the federal program, called this technique, "tal:-
ing advantage of a special confidential relationship to lobby." N.Y. Times, May 21, 1949,
p. 28, col. 1.
644. WmrAKER & BAXT R, A SisPLiFiED BLUEPRINT OF THE CAmPAIGn AG.Iu:NST
ComPutsoRY HEALTH INSURANCE (1949) (cited throughout as BLUEUnNT).
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mobilize lay group leaders who, in turn, would urge the membership of their
groups to back the AMA in communications to legislators.0 45
By December, 1949, the National Education Campaign Headquarters re-
ported that it had the public endorsement of 1829 separate organizations
ranging in size from a few to more than five million members.0 40 In addition
nearly 55 million pieces of literature had been distributed to an estimated 100
million people at a cost of more than $1,000,000.047 Traveling press repre-
sentatives and selected spokesmen operating through "Speakers Bureaus,"
and 250,000 physicians, druggists, and insurance men under less formal or-
ganization, had spoken, written, and distributed AMA material.0 48 Half of
the first year's budget was allocated to "defense and attack," the other half
to "extending and improving the services of the voluntary health insurance
system.' 649 The latter was to be organized medicine's affirmative answer to
the Ewing program. 5 0 Insurance companies 651 and doctors were urged to
promote the sale of voluntary health insurance policies under the slogan "The
Voluntary Way is the American Way. '05 2 The rate of enrollment in 1949
was nearly one million each month.,53
The National Education Campaign soon produced a marked effect. Former
congressional supporters of the President's plan in Congress began to with-
draw their backing, and by November many sponsors conceded that there was
no hope of enacting any health insurance law in the first session of the Eighty-
First Congress. 54
645. Id. at 3. See WHITAKER, THE NATIONAL EDUCATION CAMPAIGN OF THIE AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 6 (Address delivered before the Council of the New England
State Medical Societies, March 27, 1949, mimeo. copy on file in Yale Law Library): "The
fastest way to make our influence felt in Washington is to marshal a powerful array of
Nation-wide organizations, representing great groups of American citizens, in opposition
to compulsory health insurance."
Once representatives of organized medicine secured the endorsement of a group they
were urged to send copies of the resolution to their Senators, Congressmen, State Legis-
lators, the AMA, and the National Education Campaign Directors. BAXTER, WHAT WILL
WE Do WITH THE DocToR's $25, pp. 9-10 (1949) (Address delivered before the Confer-
ence of State Medical Societies, Feb. 12, 1949, mimeo. copy on file in Yale Law Library).
646. AMA, 1949 CAMPAIGN REPORT BY THE COORDINATING COMMItEE 3-4 (1949).
647. WHITAKER, PROFESSIONAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT 3 (Address de-
livered before the Public Relations Society of America, Dec. 5, 1949, reprint on file in
Yale Law Library).
648. Ibid.
649. BAXTER, PULIC RELATIONS' PRECOCIOUS BABY-PROFESSIONAL POLITICAL CAM-
PAIGN MANAGEMENT 4 (Address delivered before the Public Relations Society of America,
Dec. 5, 1949, reprint on file in Yale Law Library).
650. BLUEPRINT 1, 3.
651. See The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950, pp. 75-7 (group of
commercial insurance companies plan to aid the AMA Campaign).
652. Another popular slogan of the National Education Campaign was "Guard your
health-Guard your pocketbook-Socialized Medicine would rob both."
653. AMA, 1949 CAMPAIGN REPORT BY THE COORDINATING CoMMIrE 13 (1949).
654. Morris, Sponsors Abandon Early Health Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1949, p. 28,
col. 4.
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Realizing that its 1949 success provided only temporary respite, organized
medicine planned its 1950 Campaign to end conclusively the threat of national
health insurance. 65 The House of Delegates, in December, 1949, voted to
impose permanent yearly dues of $25 for all AMLA, members.6 0 There were
"fringe bills" to defeat 0 5 7 and, most important, there was a decisive congres-
sional election to be won. 5 s
Much of the strategy of the 1950 Campaign wvas a continuation of the pre-
vious year's Blueprint.659 Furthermore, an intensive two-week advertising
campaign was timed to influence the congressional elections." O $1,100,000
was set aside 61 -one-half for newspaper advertisements and the remainder
equally divided for radio time and magazine space-to arouse public opposition
to compulsory health insurance. -02
Since the AMA could not openly endorse any candidatesfcci it urged in-
655. AMA, 1949 CAMPAIGN RE oRT BY THE COORDINATING CO' 1'ITTEE 20 (1949).
656. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1949, p. 25, col. 1.
657. WHITAXR, MErcnicx's RoAD AHrAD: PART 2-CmPAIGN SmTZU'ZG A:m
POLICIES 2-3 (Address delivered before AMA Second National Conference on the Na-
tional Education Campaign, Feb. 12, 1950, mimeo. copy on file in Yale La, Library) (list-
ing federal aid to medical education, the sickmess-disability provisions of Social Security
proposals, and school health legislation as "the entering wedge for socialized medicine').
658. Id. at 4.
659. BAXTER, MEicINE's RoAD AHnan: PART 1-C-,PAIG:, OBJEcrIVES Am Pro-
cDuu (Address delivered before AMA Second National Conference on the National
Education Campaign, Feb. 12, 1950, mimeo. copy on file in Yale Law Library). For ad-
ditional education techniques employed see 144 JAMA 46 (1950) (comic book, "The Sad
Case of Waiting Room Willie," originated by Baltimore Medical Society and later dis-
tributed nationally) ; DErva, THE COUNTRY Docroa ANswERs THE EW,NG REFoaT (Mich.
Med. Soc. 1950) (Pamphlet equipped with index-like code; a speaker, by referring to this
code, deciding how long he is to speak and to what general type of interest group, is told
what paragraphs of the pamphlet to paste together as the basis for his talk.).
660. 143 JAMA 744 (1950).
661. Anspacher, AMA Maps Ad War on Socialiced M[edicine, San Francisco Chroni-
cle, June 27, 1950, p. 2.
662. During September the AMA bought advertising space in trade publications urg-
ing sympathetic business organizations to support the AMA's October campaign by pur-
chasing tie-in ads, for the purpose of which ready-made mats were available at the AMkA's
campaign headquarters. ' More than one hundred banks, several insurance companies,
utilities, druggists, and other groups underwrote such ads to the extent of $2,000,000.
Stokes, Doctors of Politics, N.Y. World Telegram, Oct. 1, 1950, § 2, p. 1, cols. 1-3. In the
appointed week of October 8, every bona fide weekly and daily newspaper in the United
States---10,033 in all-carried a five column by fourteen inch advertisement from the
AMA. Sixteen hundred radio stations broadcast spot-commercials and thirty-five maga-
zines carried campaign copy. N.Y. Post, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 4, col. 1. At least half of the
nation's newspapers had sold tie-in ads, as had an equal fraction of radio stations. 144
JAMfA 767 (1950). In addition state and local medical societies bought advertisements
with their own funds. Massachusetts Medical Society, for example, bought an entire eight
page insert section of the Boston Post. The section consisted of advertisements and arti-
cles testifying to the advances of American medicine under non-compulsory, non-govern-
mental direction. Boston Post, Oct. 11, 1950, pp. 33-40. So vast was the total advertising
schedule that four major agencies combined to handle the complex arrangements. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26, 1950, p. 9, col 2.
663. The Campaign directors distributed a memorandum prepared by a Chicago law
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dividual members to engage in political action supplementary to the National
Education Campaign. 64 Member doctors formed Healing Arts or Medical-
Dental Committees to help defeat supporters of national health insurance.005
Previous experience in special elections had demonstrated the effectiveness
of such committees. During the 1949 election in the 26th Pennsylvania Con-
gressional District, the Healing Arts Committees mailed more than 190,000
letters, made more than 120,000 personal telephone calls, placed a series of
twelve advertisements in every newspaper in the District, and purchased radio
time to urge the election of John P. Saylor and the defeat of his Democratic
opponent, who had endorsed the President's program. The total vote ap-
proached the District's turnout for the 1948 presidential election and more
than 20,000 Democrats switched their votes to elect Saylor.000
During the 1950 campaign, doctors in many congressional districts formed
their own political committees. In Wisconsin, the Physicians for Freedom
helped to defeat Representative Andrew Biemiller through posters, advertise-
ments, and campaign literature included with monthly bills to patients.00 In
Florida, similar tactics were used against Senator Claude Pepper in his un-
successful bid for renomination. Tallahassee hospital patients received break-
fast trays upon which were placed cards reading, "This is the season for can-
ning Pepper. '668 And in Ohio the Physicians Committee for Taft was poli-
tically active in enlisting support!'"
firm containing a detailed summary of laws relating to the participation of doctors and
medical societies in political affairs. The fundamental principle stressed was that doctors
engaging in active support of a candidate must do so as individuals, for the AMA and Its
societies may not legally endorse or contribute funds to any candidate, use medical society
letterheads or facilities on his behalf, sign an advertisement that endorses him, or sponsor
any advertising on his behalf. KIRxLAND, FLEMING, GaRN, MARTIN & ELLIS, INTER-
PRETATIoN OF LAWS GOVERNING PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (1950).
664. WITAKER, supra note 657, at 6-14.
665. Cunningham, Can Political Means Gain Professional Ends?, Modem Hospital,
Dec., 1951, p. 51; The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950, p. 75; QuosoN-
NAIRE No. 80 (several state medical societies reporting formation of local Healing Artq
Committees in their areas).
666. The story of the campaign and the role of the Healing Arts Committee is related
in Cunningham, supra note 665. The local Cambria County Medical Society officially
endorsed the candidacy of Congressman Saylor; this practice was apparently abandoned
following the publication of the legal memo relating to participation in political campaigns.
See note 663 supra.
During the same special election year, similar tactics were employed without success
on behalf of John Foster Dulles in his senatorial contest with Senator Herbert Lehman.
Cunningham, supra note 665.
667. N.Y. Post, Oct. 24, 1950, p. 35, col. 1.
668. Cf. The Doctor in Politics, Consumer Reports, Feb., 1950, pp. 75-6; see note 132
supra. Dr. Elmer Henderson, Chairman of the AMA's National Education Canpaigti
Coordinating Committee, stated that "doctors, acting as individuals, were in large meas-
ure responsible for the recent defeat of Senator Claude Pepper in Florida and were a
major factor in the defeat of Senator Frank Graham in North Carolina." San Francisco
Chronicle, June 27, 1950, p. 2.
669. N.Y. Post, Oct. 24, 1950, p. 35, col. 2.
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The National Education Campaign and the Healing Arts Committees were
rewarded by the election returns. Some of national health insurance's most
active supporters were defeated. The president of the AMA called the results
"very reassuring 670 and announced to the House of Delegates that in the
light of the recent campaign "any compulsory health insurance bill in Con-
gress today would go down to defeat by at least a 2 to 1 vote."61
Despite the fact that national health insurance seems a dead issue, organized
medicine has maintained a continuing interest in political affairs." - The
Democratic platform in 1952 made no mention of national health insurance.
Governor Stevenson stated his opposition to such a plan but commented on
the need for assistance in financing the costs of illness 673 The Republican
platform unequivocally stated opposition to federal health insurance and Gen-
eral Eisenhower left no doubt that he was opposed to "socialized medicine." G74
A non-partisan organization, 75 the AIA took no official sides. But by
October a "National Professional Committee for Eisenhower and Nixon" was
mailing letters from the National Education Campaign's former address, urg-
ing that medical and related groups support the Republican ticket. The letter-
head featured the names of former AMA Presidents Henderson as chairman,
and Cline and Irons as vice-chairmen, as well as Whitaker & BaxterY7 0
Since the defeat of the Truman-Ewing plan, controversy concerning the
role of the Federal Government in the health insurance field has centered
around proposals to aid voluntary projects. The MIagnuson Report,677 pre-
670. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1950, p. 9, col. 2.
671. 144 JAMA 1269 (1950).
672. The Journal warned that national health insurance might yet be revived by Con-
gress. 144 JA'MA 1186 (1950). Howtever, Representative Dingelrs national health in-
surance bill in the 82d Congress never came out of committee. H.R. 54, S-d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951). See BRoWN, VOLUTNTARY OR Comu.PUsoRy HEALTH INsURAN.CE 6-14 (1952).
673. See Modern Medicine, Nov. 1, 1952, pp. 57-8.
674. Ibid.
675. The AMA consistently asserted its non-partisanship. See, e.g., 147 JAIMA 1362
(1951) (AMA House of Delegates to hear discussion of major national issues by repre-
sentatives of both parties-Senators Robert A. Taft and Harry F. Byrd).
676. Copy of circular letter on file in Yale Law Library. The "Physicians for Steven-
son" group had no similar former AMIA officialdom among its sponsorship. See X.Y.
Times, Oct. 28, 1952, p. 25, cols. 4-8.
677. PRESIDENT'S COIISSION ON THE HEALTH NEEDS OF THE NATION;, BuuaDI:oG
A.ERICA'S HEALTH (1952-53) (cited throughout as 'MAGNUSO: REP.).
President Truman appointed this commission late in 1951 to make a study of America's
"total health requirements" and to recommend courses of action to meet these needs. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1951, p. 1, col. 2. Paul B. Magnuson, M.D., Chairman, is a Professor
Emeritus at Northwestern University Medical School, and Was formerly Medical Direc-
tor of the Veterans Administration. Other members included Chester L Barnard, Chair-
man, National Science Foundation; a college president; one medical school dean and four
distinguished physicians; two dental college deans; and representatives from nursing,
labor, farming, and consumers' organizations. One AMA Trustee hastily declined his
appointment and called the Commission an "instrument of practical politics." 143 JAMA
208 (1952). See also Leviero, Health Program a Camtaign Isse, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1952, §4, p. 6, cols. 1-3. The House of Delegates later characterized it as "politically
inspired." Id., June 11, 1952, p. 20, col. 3. See also Lew-is, AMA Splits Ovcr Hcaltis
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pared by President Truman's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation,
recommended federal grants to subsidize either these plans or potential sub-
scribers having low incomes.678 In a 1954 Message to Congress, President
Eisenhower advocated a different measure: federal "re-insurance" of volun-
tary plans. 679 At present, most voluntary schemes place a limit upon the
protection given their subscribers.080 This leaves the cost of catastrophic ill-
ness to be borne largely by the individual. Under re-insurance the Federal
Government, in return for premiums received from the plans, would insure
against claims over a certain figure so that coverage could be extended to
include high-cost services.0 8' The AMA opposed the Magnuson recommen-
dations because they called for Government subsidies.08 2 They have similarly
condemned re-insurance, fearing that it might lead to subsidization and con-
stitute an "opening wedge to socialized medicine." 683
Throughout its recent campaign to halt governmental inroads into medical
affairs the AMA has adopted an essentially emotional approach. The basic
issues are obscured by the AMA's use of catch-phrases, like "socialized medi-
cine," and such devices as mass distribution of the famous Sir Luke Fildes
painting, "The Doctor," captioned "Keep politics out of this picture." Or-
ganized medicine's counterproposals, advocating local controls or private,
voluntary remedies, often provide inadequate or partial solutions. By present-
ing the profession's views realistically, the AMA's campaign against Govern-
ment health programs could lead to enlightened discussion of the merits rather
than exchange of invective.
LIMITATIONS ON AMA POWER
No other voluntary association commands such power within its area of
interest as does the AMA. It holds a position of authority over the individual
doctor, wields a determining voice in medical education, controls the conditions
of practice, and occupies a unique position of influence in shaping govern-
ment health policies. Despite the dangers inherent in such a concentration of
power, no interest group enjoys more freedom from formal control than
organized medicine. The individual physician, subjected to disciplinary au-
thority of the medical society in his local community, has little redress outside
the framework of organized medicine. Courts, comparing society member-
Commission, Medical Economics, July, 1952, p. 117. But see 246 N. ENG. J. Mira. 73
(1952): "The appointment of a well balanced, unprejudiced commission to study the
health needs of the nation is a logical way of bringing further emphasis to bear on the
problem. The President is to be congratulated on his determination to seek expert advice,
and he should receive the fullest co-operation from organized medicine."
678. 1 MAGNusoN REP. 47-8.
679. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1954, p. 1, col. 8.
680. See note 406 supra and accompanying text.
681. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 10, col. 3; id., Jan. 19, 1954, p. 1, col. 8; id., March
12, 1954, p. 1, col. 8.
682. Dickinson, Building Health by Commission, 151 JAMA 1032-7 (1953) ("Taken
as a whole, this Report should be filed away in the archives marked, 'Creeping Social-
ism.' ").
683. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1954, § 4, p. 2, col. 5; id., Jan. 30, 1954, p. 8, col. 5.
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ship to affiliation in fraternal or benevolent organizations,"-' find that ex-
pulsion or denial of membership deprives the doctor of no property right,"s 5
and are reluctant to interefere unless the society's own prescribed formalities
were not observed.r s6 Even if the scope of judicial review encompassed an
examination of the merits, and resulted in admission or reinstatement of un-
reasonably disciplined physicians, the remedy might still be of little use. Legal
process cannot prevent informal sanctions and ostracism. And within the
framework of organized medicine, the doctor who challenges AIA authority
to determine his method of practice is tried and judged by his fellow phy-
sicians who may have an economic interest in proscribing his allegedly offen-
sive conduct.0 5 7
Moreover, while the disapproved prepaid medical service plan is better able
to cope with some of organized medicine's weapons, the legal protections avail-
able to it are probably inadequate. True, in American Medical Association v.
United States,88 the Supreme Court held organized medicine in violation of
the Sherman Act for its conspiracy to destroy Group Health Association in
WNVashington, D.C.' sO The Court viewed the furnishing of prepaid health ser-
vices as a trade or business within the scope of the antitrust laws.CID It
found the conduct of Group Health doctors to be prohibited by the Principles
of MNedical Ethics,0 91 but refused to give legal status to the Principles by hold-
ing that the societies' attempt to enforce them constituted a restraint. How-
ever, the Government was not required to show an effect upon interstate com-
merce; this case was brought under the Sherman Act's Section 3,G92 which
regulates activities within the District of Columbia.
684. See, e.g., Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal2d 263, 120 P24 874
(1942) (refusal to review medical society expulsion, court relies upon Levy v. Magnolia
Lodge, I.O.O.F., 110 Cal. 297, 42 Pac. 887 (1895)) ; Medical Society of Mobile County v.
Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944) ; Brown v. Harris County Medical Society, 194
S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
685. E.g., Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, supra note 684; Weyrens v. Scotts
Bluff County 'Medical Soc., 133 Neb. 814, 817, 277 N.W. 378, 379 (1938) (expulsion from
medical society resulting in denial of hospital privileges and loss of income held no depri-
vation of property right). But cf. Reid v. Medical Society of Oneida County, 156 N.Y.
Supp. 780, 7,3 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
686. Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, supra note 6S4; Ewald v. Medical Society
of the County of New York, 144 App. Div. 82, 128 N.Y. Supp. SS6 (1st Dep't 1911) ; Reid
v. Medical Society of Oneida County, supra note 685; Brown v. Harris County Medical
Society, supra note 684.
687. "A physician may be brought up for discipline before a committee of doctors that
might include his chief competitors in his private practice. In our civil or criminal courts
we would not tolerate a situation in which the judges might profit financially as a result
of the verdict they rendered. We should not permit such a situatiun to exist in medicine."
Letter from Thurman Arnold, Esq., to Channing Frothingham, M.D., dated July 2, 1947,
copy on file in Yale Law Library).
688. 317 U.S. 519 (1943), affirming 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
689. For the facts of this controversy, see text at notes 421-41 supra.
690. United States v. American Medical Association, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943 ).
691. Id. at 526.
692. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1946).
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United States v. Oregon State Medical Society 093 demonstrates the prac-
tical difficulty of such an action under Sections 1 and 2. There, non-medical
society plans and organized medicine had been engaged in a bitter "tooth-and-
claw struggle. '0 94 One charge, alleging a conspiracy to restrain competition
between several medical society sponsored plans, was dismissed because these
plans did not operate across state lines.695 The other charge, alleging con-
spiracy by organized medicine to destroy private plans which were operating
across state lines, was dismissed for failure of proof, thus avoiding the neces-
sity for deciding the question of interstate commerce. 60 0 Even if interstate
commerce had been involved here, the Commerce Clause remains an obstacle
to Sherman Act relief; practically all other private plans operate within the
confines of a single state. Local sponsorship of such groups plus variations
in restrictive state medical service acts have prevented expansion into neigh-
boring states.
Actions such as Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County
Medical Society, 9 7 brought under the Washington State Constitution,0 8 do
not encounter this problem. However, state courts may not construe anti-
monopoly provisions as broadly as did the Washington Supreme Court.099
And, most important, in a majority of states medical societies have obtained
restrictive legislation which makes their plans legal monopolies °00
Perhaps the major obstacle to antitrust prosecution under either state or
federal law is the difficulty in proving a conspiracy. The District of Columbia
and Washington State cases were characterized by such acts as expulsion and
denial of hospital facilities.7 01 But in the Oregon case, medical societies had
abandoned such tactics in 1941, seven years before the action was brought. 0 2
Recently, organized medicine has conveyed veiled threats to doctors participat2
ing in disapproved plans by outspoken condemnation of such plans in ethical
terms.70 3 Such indirect, less overt opposition probably discourages physicians
from affiliating with disapproved plans,704 but is less susceptible to antitrust
prosecution.
Perhaps a more effective limitation on the power of organized medicine
693. 343 U.S. 326 (1952), affirming 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore. 1950).
694. Id. at 329.
695. Id. at 338.
696. Id. at 329-37.
697. 39 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
698. Art. XII, § 22: "Monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this state, and
no incorporated company, co-partnership, or association of persons in this state shall
directly or indirectly combine or make any contract . . . for the purpose of fixing the
price or limiting the production . . . of any product or commodity. .. ."
699. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39
Wash.2d 586, 634-45, 237 P.2d 737, 763-9 (1951).
700. See notes 437-42 supra and accompanying text.
701. See notes 422, 425, 429 supra and accompanying text.
702. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 329-30 (1952).
703. See, e.g., note 468 supra.
704. 1 MAGNUSON RE. 34.
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stems from developments in medical technology and public demand for more
medical care. The growth of group practice has been inevitable, despite AMA
discouragement, because of advances in medical science, increased specializa-
tion, and interdependence among doctors. And increased public awareness of
the necessity for more frequent and complete medical attention has created an
incentive to provide medical services under systems which encourage lower
costs, facilitate budgeting, and utilize governmental assistance. These ten-
dencies constitute an underlying limitation on organized medicine's ability to
control the development of medical practice.
CONCLUSION
To protect the individual doctor from unreasonable exercise of organized
medicine's authority, the crucial importance of society membership should be
deemphasized. This approach would mitigate the severe consequences of the
medical society's disciplinary powers. Dissident physicians might better be
able to resist AMA views if, for example, government and specialty board
appointments were not dependent upon membership. The societies' power to
punish serious medical offenses would be weakened, but the Medical Practice
Acts can afford the public adequate protection. And revocation or suspension
of licensure, ufilike medical society disciplinary action, is subject to the im-
partial scrutiny of judicial review.
Perhaps the most effective method of deemphasizing membership would be
to insure availability of hospital privileges to non-members. MNontana has
achieved this through legislation prohibiting discrimination by hospitals against
any licensed physician.70 5 If he is qualified to practice under state law, the
Iontana doctor may send his patient to any hospital. This tyTe of provision
might require qualification in teaching hospitals 710 and in urban areas where
variations in the desirability of hospitals would necessitate some limitation on
use of facilities.7 0 7 However, its primary effect is to remove organized medi-
cine's coercive power over doctors without impairing professional standards.
Secondly, to promote greater responsiveness to the public's medical require-
ments, organized medicine should be divested of its control over the nation's
supply of doctors. Presently the AMA sets educational standards and the
state societies dominate licensing boards. It is desirable that agencies com-
posed of physicians control qualifications for admission. But organized medi-
cine's resulting power over supply can be diminished without sacrificing the
quality of a doctor's training. Existing high AMA standards, combined with
lack of funds, impose a practical limitation upon the number of M.D.'s grad-
uated each year. The doctor supply, so crucial to the nation's well-being,
should not hinge upon the financial condition of medical schools. Federal aid
705. Rsv. CoDns Mosnr. § 69-2917 (1947).
706. Those hospital wards used by medical schools for teaching purposes must be
staffed only by the most qualified physicians. See Ma.xs, Docrons, PEnrL, .%:.D Goftn-.-
mF-x, c. 3 (1953).
707. In order to insure an even distribution of doctors among all hospitals in a com-
munity, some neutral agency must have power to prevent overstaffing of certain hospitals.
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to medical education would help divorce the size of classes from standards of
quality. AMA power to set educational requirements and to inspect schools
would not be impaired. But the public's need for physicians, rather than finan-
cial considerations, would determine our doctor resources.
Organized medicine also exercises quasi-legal authority over the formation
of health insurance plans. To foster the development of new methods for
providing low-cost prepaid care, legislatures should divest the state societies
of this control. State statutes requiring approval or participation by the medi-
cal society or a majority of doctors have foreclosed experimentation in solving
pressing medico-economic problems. No existing plan, irrespective of sponsor-
ship, satisfies all requirements. Variations among the needs and financial
capacity of medical consumers necessitate different types of practice, coverage,
and sponsorship. While indemnity insurance against hospitalization and sur-
gical costs may be adequate for some, comprehensive coverage under group
practice may be highly desirable for others. Independent groups of doctors,
cooperatives, unions, and employers-as well as the medical societies-should
be free to work out their own solutions. Governmental assistance to plans
or low-income subscribers may also be required.
The Illinois Voluntary Health Services Plans Act of 1951 708 is a unique
example of progressive health insurance legislation. This statute enables the
formation of non-profit medical service plans under consumer sponsorship.
Thirty percent of the trustees of such groups must be licensed physicians;
doctor representation is assured but lay control is permitted. Group practice
is facilitated because there is no requirement that all or a majority of doctors
in the area participate. The Illinois State Medical Society assisted in securing
the passage of this legislation.709 But other medical societies have not been
so forward-looking.
Finally, there is a range of activity which external restraints upon organized
medicine cannot reach. Certainly no legislation can require the AMA to pro-
vide a forum for dissenting opinion. But so long as conflicting viewpoints are
sidetracked at the lower levels and denied space in the Journal, the AMA
cannot accurately claim to speak for the profession. Similarly, no legislation
can prevent organized medicine from prejudging new ideas and disparaging
them in evasive ethical terms. In the past, the AMA has condemned as un-
ethical various medical practices which it now approves and advocates; the
"Principles," as interpreted by the medical societies, are not unchanging. And
until organized medicine meets questions of medical economics in terms of the
real issues, it will not contribute to the solution of current problems. New
ideas which the Association has accepted have been forced upon it; by assum-
ing leadership in experimentation with unproved systems of practice and pay-
ment, the AMA could become an instrument of progress.
708. ILL. Rzv. STAT. c. 32, § 599 et seq. (Supp. 1951). See Frey, Expanding Private
Health Service Prograz s in Illinois, 34 CHICAGo BAR REcoR) 295 (1953).
709. ILLISoIS QUESTIONNAM No. 78; Cooperative Health Federation of America In-
formation Letter, Vol. IV, No. 7, Nov.-Dec., 1950. The State Medical Society of Wis-
consin, too, has helped procure liberalization of restrictive enabling acts. Ibid.
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